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Drones and Support for the Use of Force
Combat drones are transforming attitudes about the use of military 
force. Military casualties and the costs of conflict sap public support for 
war and for political and military leaders. Combat drones offer an un-
precedented ability to simultaneously reduce these costs by increasing 
accuracy, reducing the risks to civilians, and protecting military person-
nel from harm. These advantages should make drone strikes more popu-
lar than operations involving ground troops. Many critics contend that 
drone warfare will make political leaders too willing to authorize wars, 
which could weaken ethical and legal constraints on the use of force. Be-
cause combat drones are a relatively new phenomenon, these arguments 
have largely been based on anecdotes, a handful of public opinion polls, 
or theoretical speculation.
Drones and Support for the Use of Force utilizes experimental research 
to analyze the effects of combat drones on Americans’ support for the 
use of force. The authors develop expectations drawn from social science 
theory and then assess these conjectures using a series of survey experi-
ments. Their findings— that drones have had important but nuanced ef-
fects on support for the use of force— have implications for democratic 
control of military action and civil- military relations, and they provide 
insight into how the development and proliferation of current and future 
military technologies influence the domestic politics of foreign policy.
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Political leaders face two key challenges when they decide to use mili-
tary force: winning the war itself, and winning support at home. In the 
past two decades, the United States has pursued a technological solution 
to these problems by developing combat drones— weapons that can both 
selectively target opponents and minimize the costs and risks of combat. 
In this book, we seek to understand how this solution to the challenge of 
military victory also addresses the need for public support for engaging in 
conflict.
Combat drones have been employed by the United States against in-
surgent and terrorist groups. These militant organizations are materially 
weaker than the governments they fight. Their relative weakness leads 
them to avoid direct military confrontations and to use the civilian popu-
lation to mask their identities, attempting to pass as noncombatants by 
eschewing uniforms and by residing in populated areas. A key challenge 
that authorities face in countering insurgencies is solving this “identifica-
tion” problem of distinguishing bona fide militants from civilians.1 Doing 
so allows the authorities to bring to bear their superior military power. 
But failure to correctly identify militants means that strikes risk military 
casualties, mission failure, and civilian harm.2 This is not only unfortunate 
but counterproductive, as militants can use their opponent’s failure and 
the deaths of noncombatants to persuade the population that the authori-
ties are indiscriminate and unjust, while the militants can offer protection 
today and the promise to replace the government in the future.3
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The United States faced just this problem in its attempts to counter 
insurgencies in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In Vietnam, areas subject 
to aerial bombing experienced many civilian casualties and saw declines in 
government control and increases in influence by militants. In Iraq, inad-
vertent killings of civilians by the United States led to more militant vio-
lence in regions where government influence and support was the weakest. 
In Afghanistan, popular support for the international military coalition 
led by the United States declined in villages where its use of force resulted 
in civilian harm.4
Leaders in democracies also need to maintain domestic political sup-
port for the conflict by convincing the public that the benefits and likeli-
hood of eventual victory will exceed the human and financial costs. Their 
ability to do so depends in part on success on the battlefield, but it is 
difficult to demonstrate with much certainty that counterinsurgency cam-
paigns are “working.” Militant movements present few opportunities to 
decisively defeat the enemy in set- piece battles, and the militants’ ability 
to hide among the population makes it difficult to assess their military 
capabilities. Even when militants lose major engagements, as they did dur-
ing the Tet Offensive in Vietnam and the Battles of Fallujah in Iraq, the 
outcome rarely feels like a victory because the confrontations provide evi-
dence of militants’ strength and foster doubts about whether long- term 
political objectives can be met. Citizens can clearly see the costs of us-
ing force against militants— government spending and military casualties, 
for example— but have difficulty seeing any successes. Mounting financial 
and human costs, especially military casualties, directly reduce support for 
countering insurgencies. Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan illustrate this dy-
namic; in each case, public support for the use of force declined as casual-
ties increased.5
Technological developments now allow the creation of weapons, the 
most prominent of which are armed unmanned aerial vehicles, or “drones,” 
that promise to make it easier to address both challenges. These combat 
drones have two relevant characteristics when it comes to managing the 
costs of counterinsurgency and improving the chances of success. The first 
is selectivity, understood as the ability to identify and strike a well- defined 
target— such as a particular building, vehicle, or individual— while mini-
mizing harm to nearby noncombatants and civilian infrastructure. Weap-
ons are more selective when they can be actively guided to their targets, 
such as missiles directed to specific geographic coordinates. Selectivity is 
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also enhanced when the weapon is integrated with multiple streams of 
intelligence— collected by the weapons platform itself or by other systems, 
such as satellites or communications intercepts— that provide information 
about the identity and location of a target. Greater selectivity means that 
a weapon is better able to solve the identification problem, allowing more 
effective detection and targeting of hostile militants while timing strikes 
to reduce the possibility of civilian casualties. Drones hold advantages in 
terms of both aspects of selectivity, as they are tools for conducting pro-
tracted reconnaissance missions to track suspected enemy fighters and for 
launching attacks using relatively low- yield munitions that reduce the risk 
of inflicting civilian casualties.
The second characteristic is pilot invulnerability: the capacity to achieve 
battlefield victories while minimizing the risk that military personnel face 
when engaging enemy forces. Pilot invulnerability is a function of the 
range with which a weapon can strike from its operator. In general, the 
longer the range, the less vulnerable the weapon’s operator is to enemy 
fire. Field artillery, for example, typically has a much longer range than 
mortars, meaning that soldiers manning the former are, all other things 
being equal, at less risk than those operating the latter. Similarly, the crews 
of aircraft armed with guided missiles are less vulnerable than their coun-
terparts flying aircraft that drop simple “gravity” bombs, which have to fly 
closer to their targets to increase their accuracy.
This invulnerability is a characteristic of the pilot, not of the machine. 
Drones remove their human operators from danger, but the machines 
themselves may be attacked and destroyed. Current generation drones are 
generally more susceptible to attack than aircraft with onboard crews be-
cause they tend to fly slower, have limited defensive capabilities, and per-
form poorly in air- to- air combat against enemy aircraft.6 Drones may also 
be hacked, spoofed, or suffer from technical faults that interfere with their 
control systems. These limitations put the machines at risk of attack or 
failure, yet the pilots remain invulnerable because they are at such extreme 
distances from the battlefield that their fate is completely divorced from 
that of the aircraft. The entire American drone force could be shot down 
without causing any loss of human life; the same cannot be said of aircraft 
without onboard crews.
Both characteristics have powerful political consequences, especially 
when they are combined in the same weapon system. This has not received 
sufficient attention, in part because until recently the designers of weapons 
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have faced a trade- off between selectivity and pilot invulnerability. To con-
tinue the examples introduced above, mortars are typically more selective 
than artillery but place troops in greater danger of counterattack. Strike 
aircraft armed with laser- guided bombs can regularly hit specific targets, 
but this selectivity declines when they fly at higher altitudes to avoid anti- 
aircraft fire. For this reason, much analysis has focused on either selectivity 
or pilot invulnerability, while assuming that these goals cannot be realized 
simultaneously.7 There is a robust debate dating back to the 1920s, for 
example, about how selectivity influences political and military outcomes.8 
Other works have considered how pilot invulnerability reduces the costs 
and risks of using force, for example by allowing attacks with long- range 
aircraft compared to the use of ground troops.9
Recent technological developments have sharply narrowed the trade- off 
between selectivity and pilot invulnerability. Combat drones— remotely 
piloted aircraft armed with air- to- ground missiles— are the best example of 
a weapon system that incorporates both characteristics. Drones are more 
selective and offer their operators greater safety than their most similar 
weapon system, the strike aircraft with an onboard crew. Both are armed 
with accurate, guided munitions and can collect intelligence about poten-
tial targets from onboard sensors. Drones have the advantage of being able 
to loiter for much longer periods, allowing more time for the integration 
of intelligence, the positive identification of targets, and the selection of a 
time to strike that will maximize damage to the target while minimizing 
risks to noncombatants. Modern strike aircraft have considerable ability 
to avoid taking enemy fire, including high- speed, defensive weapons, and 
in some cases a “stealthy” design. But their crews are always at some risk 
of being shot down or experiencing a malfunction, while the pilots of 
a drone may be located thousands of miles from the battlefield and im-
mune from physical harm. Importantly, drones represent an improvement 
in both selectivity and pilot invulnerability over other weapons systems. 
Piloted aircraft, for example, can increase the selectivity of their attacks 
by flying closer to their targets, but this increases the vulnerability of their 
crews to ground fire or accidents. Drones require no such trade- off; they 
allow attacks that are more selective while eliminating risks of physical 
harm to military personnel.
The ability of more selective weapons, such as drones, to mitigate the 
political difficulties of war— winning on the battlefield and securing do-
mestic support— has been debated since the advent of air power in the 
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early twentieth century.10 Campaigns that shaped this debate include the 
British use of air power to counter rebels in northern Iraq and in Waziristan 
in the 1920s and the United States’ extensive bombing against insurgent 
Viet Cong units during the Vietnam War.11 Most of these attacks were car-
ried out with gravity bombs dropped from manned aircraft, which could 
not be directed to their targets with much precision and which placed their 
crews at risk. Later assessments concluded that they had little effect on, or 
actually strengthened, the insurgents they targeted.12 The use of truly selec-
tive weapons has been much less frequent or sustained. The United States 
launched cruise missiles against al Qaeda bases in Sudan and Afghanistan 
after attacks on American embassies in 1998, but these attacks were not 
maintained for long enough to undermine the group. Israel has used mis-
siles fired from helicopters, fixed- wing aircraft, and drones, as well as snip-
ers and ground troops, in a campaign of “targeted killings” directed against 
armed Palestinian groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the United 
States used similar technologies of violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. These 
campaigns were certainly more selective than their predecessors, although 
their military effectiveness has been debated, and they continued to place 
military personnel at some risk of harm.13
Drones may fundamentally alter these trade- offs and more generally 
the costs and benefits of using armed force. Scholars of international 
politics have long thought that the costs of conflict influence potential 
combatants’ willingness to take up arms.14 Recent work uses as its starting 
point the assumption that states and other actors who have different inter-
ests and preferences bargain with each other to resolve these differences. 
Using force, or threatening to do so, is one strategy an actor can adopt to 
press its opponent to make concessions. But even successful military action 
is costly; it risks the lives of military personnel and civilians, is expensive 
in financial terms, and reduces the capacity to use force in other theaters 
or against other opponents. Before resorting to military force, states and 
other actors subtract their estimates of these costs from the benefits they 
expect to accrue from successful coercion of a foe. This creates a “bargain-
ing range,” understood as negotiated agreements that both sides prefer to 
incurring the costs and risks of war. When the bargaining range is larger, 
there are more potential bargains that the sides might prefer to war.15
The costs of war are an important influence on the size of the bargain-
ing range; as these costs change, so does the range of peaceful settlements 
that both sides would prefer to armed conflict. Innovation in military 
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technology and doctrine is one way that the costs of war change. Innova-
tions that make war more costly should, ceteris paribus, create a larger 
bargaining range and thus reduce the likelihood of war. A good example of 
this is the effect of nuclear weapons on interstate conflict; many conclude 
that, under the right conditions, nuclear weapons can prevent conflict by 
hugely raising its costs.16
Nuclear weapons increase the costs of war, while drones reduce them. 
This means that possession of armed drones could strengthen incentives 
for an actor to start or to sustain conflicts. The pilot invulnerability that 
drones allow eliminates a key cost of military action: the military casualties 
that undermine domestic political support for the conflict. Their selectiv-
ity means that weapons launched from drones are more likely to achieve 
their battlefield objectives, increasing the costs imposed on the opposing 
side. Selectivity also lowers the chances that releasing such weapons will 
result in harm to civilians, which, like military casualties, can make politi-
cal actors at home and abroad less willing to support the conflict. Drone 
operations further reduce the need for large forward military bases, lower-
ing (but not eliminating) the financial costs of military operations and the 
need to rely on allies, who may demand concessions in exchange for their 
cooperation. These reductions in the cost of war are particularly strong for 
combatants that possess drones and that face foes unable to destroy these 
weapons in combat or to easily impose other costs on the adversary. This 
has been the situation for many of the conflicts involving terrorist and 
militant organizations against whom the United States has used armed 
drones since 2002.17
Drones have substantially reduced the costs of conflict for the United 
States. The concern is that this has made armed conflict a more attractive 
option for the United States. In contrast with nuclear weapons, which may 
have reduced the likelihood of interstate war, the development of drone 
technology may create incentives for more and longer conflicts. The use 
of combat drones by the United States in the twenty- first century, then, 
marks an important change from these earlier conflicts. The United States 
and other countries have been developing precision- guided munitions in 
earnest since the 1970s. But until recently, these weapons were not used 
regularly enough to permit a sustained analysis of their effects. For this rea-
son, most assessments of selective weapons have been anecdotal. The drone 
campaigns of the past decade and a half have involved hundreds of strikes 
against militant organizations, most in the Federally Administered Tribal 
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Areas of Pakistan, with additional strikes in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, and 
Syria.18 This large number of attacks over a long period of time provides 
the first opportunity to assess in a systematic way how the sustained use of 
such weapons influences public support for the use of force.
Support for the Use of Force
This book seeks to understand how the development of combat drones 
influences popular support for the use of force by the United States. In-
vestigating the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy has 
a long history in political science.19 Much of the recent work in this area 
can be grouped into three broad schools of thought. A first school, and 
the one with which the book engages most directly, focuses on how indi-
viduals assess the costs and benefits of using military force or engaging in 
other foreign policy actions; public support rises as the benefits increase, 
the costs decrease, or both. Benefits of using force can include deterring 
states (or nonstate actors, such as terrorist or militant groups) that threaten 
the security of the United States, coercing states and nonstate actors into 
taking actions that benefit the United States but that those actors would 
otherwise prefer to avoid, preventing such actors from committing mass 
killings or other atrocities, or supporting allied states against the threats 
they face. Considerable research shows that the public attaches different 
weights to the value of each of these “principal policy objectives,” and that 
these weights can change as the threats to American interests and values 
vary over time. For example, deterring aggression by powerful states was 
especially important during the Cold War, when this was the principal 
goal of American foreign policy, while the importance of countering ter-
rorism has increased since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.20
According to this line of reasoning, the public balances these poten-
tial benefits against the costs of using force. The cost that has received 
the most attention is military casualties, which have been shown to be 
a consistent and important influence on such attitudes. A large body of 
research has concluded that the occurrence, rate, home state, race and eth-
nicity, socioeconomic status, timing, and framing of military casualties 
influence Americans’ attitudes.21 Another important cost is the possibility 
that military action will fail to secure American interests. Influential recent 
work concludes that the American public is willing to tolerate the risk of 
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military casualties if doing so ensures that important American interests 
are secured.22 Less work has investigated how the public assesses the cost 
of civilian casualties that result from American military action. Some con-
clude that such casualties play little role in the citizens’ cost- benefit calcu-
lations, although more recent work suggests that many individuals attach 
considerable weight to avoiding harm to noncombatants.23
This book seeks to understand how the use of combat drones influ-
ences these cost- benefit calculations. This is an important contribution 
to the study of public attitudes. Most of the research to date on public 
opinion and the use of force assumes, often implicitly, that military action 
will place American service members at risk of harm on the battlefield. 
Perhaps the most widely discussed consequence of combat drones is that 
pilot invulnerability eliminates military casualties. Drones’ selectivity also 
has the potential to reduce many of the costs of combat. If drones can 
target the leaders of insurgent and terrorist organizations, their use could 
undermine these combatants’ political and military effectiveness, leading 
to shorter or less bloody conflicts. The ability of drones to reduce civilian 
casualties compared to other, less selective forms of military force could 
make the deaths of noncombatants less consequential for the American 
public. If drones reduce these costs of combat, then this would have im-
portant implications for decisions to initiate and to continue conflicts. If 
the United States is able to pay much lower costs for engaging in combat, 
this could increase the incentive to resort to arms and decrease the will-
ingness to find peaceful solutions. This in turn may lead the country to 
engage in more, and possibly more reckless, wars to achieve its aims. Our 
goal is to assess the degree to which drones lead individuals to reassess 
these costs of conflict and how such reassessments influence their support 
for military action.
A second school emphasizes that individuals’ preferences and opinions 
are heavily influenced by the information provided to them by the media 
and by political elites. According to the most influential version of this 
approach, when elites across the political spectrum agree on the wisdom 
of using military force, citizens who follow politics align their views with 
those of the country’s political leaders. But when these leaders hold con-
flicting preferences about foreign policy, individuals express support for 
the policies espoused by leaders who share their partisan identity. Related 
work has explored how the preferences of other elite actors, such as inter-
national organizations and nongovernmental organizations, as well as the 
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framing of conflicts by the media, also drive individuals’ perceptions and 
preferences.24
Although we focus on public opinion formation in direct response to 
prospective attacks, rather than on the role of elite influence, our results 
indirectly address this perspective. Reducing the perceived costs of fight-
ing for the public may reduce the perceived costs for elites as well. That 
is to say, elites may themselves subscribe to the narrative of drones being 
effective low- cost weapons that can be used more readily than other types 
of military force. If elites adopt this viewpoint, they may be more credible 
and influential sources of guidance for the American public. Confidence 
in drones will also increase the likelihood that they will be portrayed as 
a viable attack strategy when the country is contemplating war. While 
the findings presented in subsequent chapters arise from a different start-
ing position than much of the elite- focused work on public opinion, we 
demonstrate at multiple points that the interplay between elite and citizen 
preferences could also influence the domestic politics of employing com-
bat drones. For example, in chapter 4 on principal policy objectives, we 
discuss how political leaders have powerful incentives to frame conflicts 
in terms of objectives that receive more public support. Our findings also 
have implications for what strategies elites may adopt to frame informa-
tion effectively.
A third school of thought begins with the premise that individuals have 
underlying values about the utility and morality of military force and the 
importance of international collaboration as a means for achieving na-
tional objectives. This school of thought holds that general foreign policy 
attitudes play an important role in shaping individuals’ understandings of 
and preferences regarding military action in a wide range of specific cir-
cumstances.25 We have little doubt that such attitudes could influence how 
Americans think about combat drones. It seems plausible to expect that, 
for example, individuals whose attitudes about foreign policy are charac-
terized by “militant assertiveness” would be more willing to countenance 
drone strikes. Our focus is on the more proximate factors surrounding 
combat drones, such as their selectivity and pilot invulnerability, as these 
characteristics are the most novel aspects of the technology and exercise 
a direct influence over the costs and benefits of decisions to use military 
force. However, our experiments indirectly address questions about the 
influence of existing values. In particular, we find that Democrats assign 
less utility to using force than do Republicans. This likely reflects underly-
10  Drones and Support for the Use of Force
ing differences in partisans’ assessments of the utility and morality of mili-
tary force. We find little evidence of differences in partisan preferences for 
different types of military force; both Democrats and Republicans prefer 
drone strikes to the use of ground troops. This suggests that while over-
arching political ideologies matter for assessments of the value of military 
action, there is considerable consensus preferring attacks from more selec-
tive and invulnerable platforms that reduce the costs of conflict for the 
United States.
History of Drone Warfare
Drones respond to the challenges of managing the costs of war and more 
precisely targeting enemies. These challenges have become more promi-
nent in recent counterinsurgencies, but they are not entirely new. Remote 
weapons designed to increase pilot invulnerability and selectivity predate 
the current generation of drones by several decades. Tracing the evolution 
of these weapons from the Second World War to the War on Terror is im-
portant for four reasons. First, it offers insight into the links between the 
goals of improving pilot invulnerability and selectivity. Second, it shows 
how drones have been used to not only manage the risks of fighting, but 
to also avoid displeasing an American public often seen as being reluctant 
to wage costly wars, especially in the post- Vietnam era. Third, it shows 
the extent of recent drone operations throughout the War on Terror and 
the ongoing race to produce new drone variants, which in turn suggests 
that drones will continue to play a central role in future American mili-
tary operations. Finally, this history clarifies the moral and legal questions 
that drones pose, especially those relating to unintended consequences of 
lowering inhibitions against fighting, which we test throughout the book.
Early drone variants were produced by both sides during the Second 
World War. Germany experimented with unmanned ground vehicles 
(UGVs) by introducing the Goliath remote- controlled mine, which was 
designed to be driven under enemy tanks before exploding. The Allies 
tested their own drones, though they were more interested in unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) and initially only saw its Radioplane aircraft as train-
ing tools to give pilots practice with air- to- air combat.26 These and other 
early applications of remote weaponry pointed the way toward future de-
velopments in unmanned warfare, yet they showed that the technology 
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had not advanced to a stage that would make drones feasible weapons. 
Remote mines were single- use devices that had to be operated at short 
range, thereby failing to provide operator invulnerability. They were also 
unreliable and difficult to control, which made them a poor addition to 
Germany’s arsenal. Target UAVs were more successful, becoming a fixture 
of training for United States Air Force pilots during the Cold War and 
gradually transitioning into use as reconnaissance aircraft as their control 
and communication systems became more advanced.
Among the earliest drones in the sense of being able to replace a 
manned vehicle in precise and low- risk attacks was the Ryan Firebee. 
Originally designed as a target for pilots in training, it was later adapted 
for ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) in the form of the 
Fire Fly and Lightning Bug variants. From 1964 to 1974, Firebees flew 
3,435 sorties over Southeast Asia.27 Some were shot down over North 
Vietnam, yet they had a survival rate averaging around 84 percent, reach-
ing as high as 90 percent near the end of the war.28 These aircraft were 
designed to be recoverable and even carried countermeasures to interfere 
with enemy targeting systems, which allowed them to take over at a low 
cost some of the missions that would have endangered human pilots. Still, 
they were primitive compared to modern drones, and technical limita-
tions prevented them from being used on a larger scale. Among the most 
serious shortcomings were that they could not take off and land on their 
own, depending on assistance from manned aircraft for launch and recov-
ery, and they had to be controlled by nearby DC- 130 director planes.29 
Thus, the reconnaissance drones failed to provide pilot invulnerability— 
only reducing the risk to pilots by distancing them from their drones 
while still forcing them to remain in the battlespace— and lacked the ca-
pacity to conduct selective attacks.
The MQ- 1 Predator was first deployed in 1995 to provide surveillance 
in the Balkans. The small, light aircraft were ideal for unarmed reconnais-
sance and were used in that capacity over the following decade. Their util-
ity compared to manned aircraft became clear when Scott O’Grady was 
shot down over Bosnia on July 2, 1995. O’Grady spent six days evading 
enemy fighters, with his struggle to avoid capture and his rescue becom-
ing a major media event. He survived the ordeal, yet it provoked fears 
that ostensibly low- cost humanitarian interventions conducted with the 
utmost care could still result in American military casualties. The incident 
built on fears that public support for fighting could drop sharply with the 
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loss of even a single American life. On August 11, 1995, a Predator drone 
was shot down over Bosnia, but this incident attracted much less attention 
and lacked the human element that had made O’Grady such a compelling 
figure. The apparently limited concern over the crash seemed to confirm 
that pilot invulnerability could lower the costs of war and help to avert po-
tentially disastrous drops in public support. Predators returned to service 
in 1999 during the intervention in Kosovo. Once again, they were used to 
locate enemy positions concealed in forests or towns, flying at low altitudes 
where manned aircraft would not have been safe from ground fire.30 The 
importance of pilot invulnerability was evident, yet UAVs were still only 
seen as facilitating selective attacks and not as weapons platforms in their 
own right.
Predator drones began operating in Afghanistan in 2000 as part of the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) search for Osama bin Laden following 
al Qaeda attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The 
plan was to use a drone to direct a cruise missile to the target once he was 
discovered. A man matching bin Laden’s description was found, but attack 
orders were not issued. The mission faced a serious challenge when it came 
to ensuring that the target would remain in the same location while a mis-
sile traveled hundreds of miles to reach him. With this difficulty in mind, 
the CIA sought permission to arm a Predator with Hellfire missiles.31 Ad-
vocates claimed that mounting weapons directly on UAVs was the best 
way to eliminate a delay between missile launch and impact, which could 
otherwise allow a target to escape or endanger innocent people who might 
wander into the attack site. Thus, the impetus for arming Predator drones 
came from a desire to combine the pilot invulnerability of surveillance 
aircraft with weapons that were more selective than cruise missiles.
The first targeted killing with a Predator UAV took place on October 
7, 2001, and was directed against Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban. 
The plan was to kill several bodyguards, which would then draw Mullah 
Omar into the open where a second missile would be able to strike him. 
However, the target was able to escape, leaving only a few low- ranking 
bodyguards as casualties. Control of the Predator used in the attack was 
contested from the start, as “the drone was remotely piloted by USAF 
operators, working from a mobile station in the carpark of the CIA’s head-
quarters in Langley.”32 The CIA had overall authority over the strike, but 
the Air Force insisted on being involved, and the CIA was obliged to assent 
because of collaborative arrangements between the military and intelli-
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gence services that were designed to facilitate the War on Terror. Failure to 
kill the target escalated the tensions between the services involved and fu-
eled a protracted struggle over the management of lethal UAV operations.
Over the following months the CIA began arming its Predators and us-
ing them to conduct additional strikes against suspected al Qaeda and Tali-
ban leaders in Afghanistan. With only around 40 missiles fired in October 
and November 2001 compared to more than 6,500 strikes by manned 
aircraft, the Predator’s contribution to the war effort was modest.33 Singer 
estimates that Predators had only launched independent attacks on 115 
targets in Afghanistan by the end of their first year in the conflict.34 They 
were more commonly used to mark targets for manned aircraft, assist-
ing in around 525 strikes during the first two months of fighting in Af-
ghanistan.35 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that just 52 
strikes were carried out during President Bush’s time in office, resulting in 
416 deaths, including approximately 167 civilians.36 Reliance on armed 
drones therefore developed slowly throughout the Bush administration’s 
time managing the program.
In terms of numbers alone, the scale of drone strikes was compara-
tively modest from 2001 to 2008, but the geographical scope expanded 
considerably. Targeted killing operations spread to Yemen in 2002, when 
a suspected participant in the attack on the USS Cole, Qa’id Salim Sinan 
al- Harithi, was assassinated.37 He and five other members of al Qaeda 
were killed as they were driving, which further demonstrated the drones 
precision by showing that they could hit moving vehicles. Operations in 
Pakistan began in June 2004 with an attack in South Waziristan. This 
killed Nek Mohammed, a senior Taliban leader, but also killed two young 
boys and several other bystanders who may have been civilians. The attack 
highlighted how opaque these operations were, particularly when it came 
to attribution, as Pakistan’s government initially claimed responsibility for 
the attack. It was also evidence of the tenuous relationship between Paki-
stan and the United States. The Pakistani government had authorized the 
attack following its failure to capture Waziristan with ground forces, and 
yet it still publicly criticized American actions. Attacks like these fueled 
concerns over the morality of drone warfare, and especially of the unin-
tended consequences of using weapons that could improve precision while 
also making pilots invulnerable to attack.
The Bush administration’s drone strikes increased sharply in 2008. It 
launched around 36 attacks in Pakistan, where the previous annual high 
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had only been four. This trend continued under the Obama administra-
tion, with 54 strikes in 2009, more than in all previous years combined. 
Drone operations in Pakistan reached their peak in 2010, with roughly 
122 attacks. The height of activities in Yemen came two years later with 
around 41 strikes.38 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that 
around 421 UAV attacks have occurred in Pakistan since the start of op-
erations in 2004, resulting in 2,476– 3,989 people killed and 1,158– 1,738 
injured.39 Since 2002, between 107 and 127 strikes have taken place in 
Yemen, with 492– 725 people killed and 94– 223 wounded. The Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism also estimates that the civilian death rates among 
the total casualties in drone strikes are between 11 percent and 39 percent 
in Pakistan and between 9 percent and 21 percent in Yemen.40
Prior to mid- 2008, the United States launched drone strikes in Paki-
stan when it was able to identify the location of a named individual leader 
of a militant group. These “personality strikes” were few in number; only 
two were launched in 2006 and four in 2007. These rules of engagement 
were altered in early 2008 to allow attacks against groups of armed men 
that bore the “signatures” of militants, as long as no civilians were nearby. 
Off- the- record explanations by American and Pakistani officials were sum-
marized in the following terms:
Instead of having to confirm the identity of a suspected militant 
leader before attacking, this shift allowed American operators to 
strike convoys of vehicles that bear the characteristics of al- Qaeda 
or Taliban leaders on the run, for instance, so long as the risk of 
civilian casualties is judged to be low.41
Another journalist used the following examples to describe the new pro-
cedures: attacks from drones could be launched “based solely on intelligence 
indicating patterns of suspicious behavior, such as imagery showing mili-
tants gathering at known al- Qaeda compounds or unloading explosives.”42 
The emergence of signature strikes showed growing confidence drones as the 
key to killing terrorist leaders with minimal American losses, but it contrib-
uted to moral concerns that drones were making war too easy.
Shortly after this shift in policy, the number of drone strikes increased 
to 34 in 2008, 53 in 2009, and 119 in 2010. This reliance on patterns of 
behavior that resemble those of militants the United States wishes to tar-
get, but who cannot be positively identified, soon attracted concerns from 
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within the United States government. One American official critical of this 
policy stated that “it bothers me when they say that there were seven guys, 
so they must all be militants. They count the corpses and they’re not really 
sure who they are.”43 Internal, classified assessments of most drone strikes 
conducted from 2006 to 2008 and in 2010 and 2011 call many of the un-
identified individuals “foreign fighters” or “other insurgents” or members 
of militant groups, such as the Pakistan Taliban and Lashkar i Jhangvi, 
who have not regularly targeted the United States.44
Beginning in early 2012, the United States developed new procedures 
to govern drone strikes in Pakistan. Many of these focused on ensuring 
that no civilians were likely to be harmed by drone strikes, as it became 
clear that civilian deaths were attracting increasing criticism from political 
parties and other groups within Pakistan. That is to say, the policies were 
driven by a desire to further improve the selectivity of drones with a policy- 
oriented approach to how they were employed. This move to tighten and 
institutionalize the conditions under which it was permissible to launch 
drone strikes was associated with a decline in their use to 73 attacks in 
2011 and 48 in 2012. The shift also suggests that the rules governing the 
use of drones in earlier years was considerably more elastic and that more 
attacks were justified by the activities or location of the target than by pre-
cise intelligence on the target’s affiliation.45
Although it has attracted much less media coverage than other fronts 
in the War on Terror, the Philippines have been the site of at least one at-
tack. The first reported incident came in 2006, with a failed attempt to 
kill Umar Patek, one of the terrorists responsible for the Bali bombing 
in 2002.46 However, this incident has not been confirmed by any official 
sources and it remains unclear whether claims of American involvement 
are accurate. Some say that the February 2012 attack against members of 
Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah was the first drone strike in the Philip-
pines.47 Given this degree of uncertainty, it is impossible to say how many 
strikes have been carried out and how many casualties inflicted.
In Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, the United States used drones in 
conflicts to which it was not an official or declared party. Drone strikes 
have also taken place alongside other types of American military action 
in conflicts where the United States is a combatant. The numbers for Af-
ghanistan, Iraq, and Syria are also difficult to discern. With ongoing fight-
ing in these countries, there are challenges in identifying the source of 
some attacks based on publicly available reports. It is often difficult to tell 
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when a strike was conducted by a drone and when a manned aircraft was 
involved, especially when reports often refer to both simply as “air strikes.” 
Nevertheless, it is clear that UAV operations in both countries were exten-
sive. One report finds that there were at least 333 attacks in 2012 alone.48 
A report published in 2014 found that “Afghanistan is the most heavily 
drone- bombed country in the world” with “over 1,000 known to have hit 
the country in the past 13 years.”49 And these strikes do not come from the 
United States alone. The British government reported flying over 100,000 
hours in Afghanistan as of 2012, firing 349 missiles.50
As the Obama administration came to rely more heavily on drones to 
kill foreign militants, it also spread operations into new areas. The first 
drone strike in Somalia came in June 2011, wounding several members of 
al Shabab and foreign militias. Activity in Somalia has consistently been 
much lower than in other theaters, reaching a peak of around five strikes 
in the first half of 2016.51 Between 15 and 19 strikes were carried out in 
Somalia, resulting in between 25 and 108 deaths and between 2 to 7 inju-
ries. Once again the attack was preceded ongoing unarmed reconnaissance 
since at least 2009, when an unarmed drone was shot down. This was also 
reportedly the first time the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command 
collaborated on a drone strike.52
Other operations were conducted in Libya. The Pentagon acknowl-
edged carrying out 145 drone attacks between April 23 and October 20, 
2011. Drones from the United States and the United Kingdom continued 
patrols over Libya during the following years, occasionally launching at-
tacks. The operations were justified as part of the effort to monitor first al 
Qaeda and then Islamic State operatives. In November 2015 drones killed 
Abu Nabil, the leader of Islamic State in Libya.53 And involvement seems 
set to increase with the United States acquiring an airfield in Sicily from 
which to conduct drone missions in support of special operations forces 
working in Libya.
It is useful to reflect on this history with help from research on military 
innovation. That literature shows that technological and organizational 
changes can come from a range of different sources, including pressure 
from civilian politicians, inter- service dynamics, institutional cultures, and 
bottom- up initiatives from soldiers themselves.54 The impetus for change 
and the overall process vary considerably depending on the technology in 
question, with larger projects tending to require a top- down approach and 
field modifications or new uses for existing equipment being pioneered 
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through bottom- up approaches. A military conservatism that frequently 
impedes technological innovation of all types was responsible for limiting 
enthusiasm for drones throughout the Cold War and reluctance to arm 
them. Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann argue that drones offer relatively 
few advantages during conventional interstate wars because they are more 
susceptible to enemy aircraft and air defense systems than aircraft with 
onboard pilots. Drones become far more attractive during asymmetric 
conflicts in which the enemy lacks anti- aircraft capacities.55 As long as the 
Air Force was preoccupied with a conventional war- fighting mission, there 
was little to gain from arming drones. It took a new mission and external 
pressure from intelligence agencies and the highest levels of government to 
overcome this conservatism.
The rise of drones from relatively obscure reconnaissance aircraft to 
central weapons in America’s War on Terror was guided by the novel incen-
tives that policymakers were responding to at the time, especially the chal-
lenges associated with hunting suspected terrorists. Intelligence collection 
and attack functions had to be linked more closely, and it became essen-
tial to direct violence narrowly at specific individuals. Once drones were 
armed, the early innovations were largely driven by inter- service dynamics. 
The Central Intelligence Agency and the Air Force collaborated on mis-
sions while also striving to develop the foremost targeted killing capacities. 
The Air Force had a cultural bias against launching remote attacks because 
these conflict with a sense of honor that depends on physical presence 
on the battlefield.56 However, competition for resources and missions is a 
powerful incentive,57 which compelled it to begin arming its own aircraft 
even though this conflicted with the institutional culture.58
Drones were used sparingly early in the War on Terror because the 
initial motives for arming drones had limited reach. The central targets 
were a relatively small number of high- profile terrorists, so the scale of op-
erations was naturally limited. A more concerted effort to employ drones 
only emerged when members of the Bush and Obama administrations, 
along with supporters in Congress, decided to rethink the country’s strat-
egy. Barry Posen argues that “Even in its own war, a military organization 
can misperceive the implications of a new technology unless the lessons 
are very stark.”59 This is borne out by drones, as the military and intel-
ligence agencies had developed a revolutionary new tool as a counterter-
rorism expedient without this initially having much influence on the US 
counterterrorism strategy.
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Posen contends that major failures cause civilian politicians to intervene 
in military affairs and force technological change, which explains why the 
number of strikes rose sharply in 2008 and the scope of targeting param-
eters increased. By this point, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were losing 
support and the quest to kill Osama bin Laden was failing. Efforts to revive 
the war effort through troop surges led to protracted partisan disagree-
ments.60 Drones offered an attractive new approach without further risk 
to American military personnel at a time when public support was fragile, 
and they have since held the promise of sustaining counterterrorism opera-
tions around the world without the risk of committing large numbers of 
ground forces. This history of political incentives driving drone innovation 
highlights the importance of understanding what these incentives are and 
how they will continue to shape the use of drones in future conflicts.
As this brief history of drone operations illustrates, UAVs are versatile 
machines, capable of ISR, ground support, targeted killing, and even air- 
to- air combat against enemy aircraft (though this capability has received 
relatively little testing). Not all UAV missions are targeted killings. The 
drones operating in Afghanistan and Iraq also provide support for troops 
on the ground. Former drone operator Matt Martin describes using a 
Predator drone to search for and attack mortar crews that were shelling 
American airbases in Iraq.61 Drones are also not the only means of con-
ducting targeted killings. Various manned aircraft, cruise missiles, and spe-
cial operations forces have been involved in these missions, even operating 
beyond established war zones with their attacks taking place in Pakistan, 
Yemen, and Somalia. This is evidence that drones are not uniquely con-
nected to any particular mission type and that policymakers and military 
commanders have a range of attack options available to them. Building 
on this, one of the central themes of this book will be how members of 
the civilian public react to policymakers’ choices about what weapons and 
tactics are most appropriate.
Drones come in dozens of variants that perform a broad range of roles, 
from long- range targeted killing operations to short- range tactical surveil-
lance to bomb disposal. The ScanEagle, RQ- 14 Dragon Eye, and RQ- 
11 Raven each provide short- range unmanned reconnaissance, allowing 
ground forces to check potential ambush sites or gain greater situational 
awareness via an overhead view of combat areas. Drones like the Pack-
Bot and TALON were employed to defuse or detonate improvised ex-
plosive devices (IEDs). Like armed UAVs, these machines owe much of 
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their popularity to their applications in the War on Terror. The PackBot 
was first used to help in 9/11 recovery efforts.62 Reliance on it and other 
ground- based UGVs has been accelerated by the demands of finding ways 
to protect soldiers in counterinsurgency operations, especially in urban 
environments.
Since 2001 the US military has used the RQ- 4 Global Hawk to conduct 
surveillance around the world. The aircraft can carry an array of different 
ISR packages, operates at heights of 60,000 feet, and is able to fly continu-
ously without refueling for more than 25 hours.63 The RQ- 170 Sentinel is 
a smaller and lighter drone that is likewise used for covert reconnaissance. 
This machine achieved prominence when one crashed in Iran in 2011, 
yet it remains shrouded in secrecy and little is known about its capacities. 
Reconnaissance UAVs face criticisms for infringing on privacy rights, vio-
lating state sovereignty, and being dangerously unreliable because of their 
high crash rate compared to manned aircraft. Nevertheless, the fact that 
they are not used to kill means that they generally evade media coverage 
and are marginalized in the ongoing debate over drone warfare, which is 
typically concerned with lethal machines. Our focus is on UAVs that are 
used in targeted killing and ground support operations, with the MQ- 1 
Predator and MQ- 9 Reaper foremost among these.
The Predator was designed for reconnaissance, not combat, and was 
only gradually adapted for fighting. Those responsible for drone opera-
tions in the CIA saw arming Predators with AGM- 114 Hellfire missiles as 
a practical necessity— the only way to quickly respond to the targets lo-
cated when conducting surveillance. Because Predators are extremely light 
(weighing only around 1,030 lbs. empty and 2,250 lbs. when fully loaded) 
and were designed for reconnaissance, they are unable to carry the heavier 
weapons that are typically mounted on manned aircraft and are limited 
to two Hellfire missiles. The Reaper improves on this with its capacity to 
carry multiple types of munitions, including GBU- 12 Paveway II laser- 
guided bombs, GBU- 38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), AIM- 9 
Sidewinder missiles, and the AGM- 114 Hellfire II missiles that are used by 
the Predator. Moreover, Reapers can carry heavier loads, enabling them to 
operate longer and to attack more targets. These capacities are not always 
used in practice. Sidewinder missiles are designed for air- to- air combat, in 
which no Reaper has been involved. Outfitting the aircraft with JDAMs 
is difficult and was only successfully tested in 2017.64 This leaves Reapers 
depending primarily on GBU- 12s and AGM- 114s, though still with the 
20  Drones and Support for the Use of Force
significant advantage of being able to carry heavier munition loads than 
its predecessor.
Understanding How Drones Influence Support for  
the Use of Force
Over time, drone technology has become increasingly selective and has 
made operators largely invulnerable to enemy fire. Our goal is to assess 
how these developments influence the public’s willingness to support the 
use of drones on the battlefield. One seemingly straightforward source of 
answers is public opinion surveys. Surveys asking about support for the 
use of drones in combat, or about the utility of different types of military 
force, are conducted frequently. Such surveys, though, are not intended to 
shed much light on the research questions motivating this book, leading 
us to rely primarily on survey experiments we designed with this specific 
goal in mind.
Consider, for example, the data in table 1.1, which summarizes the 
support for drone strikes among representative samples of Americans 
during 2012 and 2013— when the drone campaign received significant 
and often negative coverage in the media— in surveys carried out by dif-
ferent news and survey organizations. In every poll, a majority— and in 
some case a large majority— express support for drone strikes overseas 
against targets described as terrorists or militants. Drone strikes, then, 
appear to have wide support. But this tells us little about why drone 
warfare is popular. We do not know if the public supports drones be-
cause they are seen as more accurate or effective weapons, or because they 
eliminate concerns about military casualties, or because the foes they tar-
get are viewed as especially dangerous, or for other reasons. Furthermore, 
these high levels of support for combat drones are sensitive to how the 
survey questions were asked.65
One issue that public opinion surveys could address, at least in princi-
ple, is support for drones compared to other policies, such as relying more 
heavily on diplomatic efforts or different types of military force, such as 
ground troops. A window on such issues is provided by the public debate 
about the wisdom of American action against Islamic State militants dur-
ing the summer and fall of 2014. This occurred shortly after the Islamic 
State had seized control of large parts of northern and western Iraq and 
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eastern Syria and had publicly executed an American journalist. Political 
leaders debated both the wisdom of intervention as well as the form any 
such intervention should take. Much of this debate centered on the type 
of military action, if any, the United States should undertake. A number of 
public opinion organizations polled representative samples of the Ameri-
can public and asked the degree to which they favored or opposed a range 
of steps being considered by the United States.
Consider the data in the top panel of table 1.2, which summarizes 
responses to questions about different types of intervention in public 
opinion surveys conducted during this period. A sizable majority of re-
spondents favored air strikes in Syria and in Iraq, while far fewer sup-
ported the introduction of American ground troops. This is consistent 
with the argument that technologies that reduce the costs of conflict by 
placing fewer military personnel at risk of harm, such as drones and air 
power, lead to increased support for the use of force. The lower panel of 
TABLE 1.1. Support for Drone Strikes
Date Organization Support
February 2012 Washington Post/ABC 83
February 2012 Rasmussen 76
July 2012 Pew Research Center 55
February 2013 Pew Research Center 56
February 2013 CBS 70
February 2013 New York Times/CBS 71
February 2013 NBC/Wall Street Journal 66
February 2013 Fox News 74
March 2013 Gallup 65
March 2013 YouTube/Huffington Post 53
April 2013 New York Times/CBS 70
May 2013 New York Times/CBS 72
May 2013 NBC/Wall Street Journal 64
Note: Support is the percentage of respondents indicating some or strong support for drone 
strikes against suspected terrorists overseas. For details, see Alyssa Brown and Frank New-
port, “In U.S., 65% Support Drone Attacks on Terrorists Abroad,” Gallup, March 25, 2013; 
Sarah Dutton et al., “Poll: 45% Approve of Obama’s Handling of the Economy— CBS News,” 
CBS News, February 12, 2013; Rasmussen Reports, “Voters Are Gung- Ho for Use of Drones 
But Not Over the United States,” February 24, 2012; Megan Thee- Brenan, “Americans Wary 
on Syria and North Korea Intervention, Poll Finds,” New York Times, April 30, 2013; Scott 
Wilson and Jon Cohen, “Poll Finds Broad Support for Obama’s Counterterrorism Policies,” 
Washington Post, February 08, 2012; Micah Zenko, “U.S. Public Opinion on Drone Strikes,” 
Power, Politics, and Preventive Action, 2013, http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2013/03/18/u-s-public-
opinion-on-drone-strikes/; for a discussion, see Tom McCauley, “US Public Support for Drone 
Strikes Against Asymmetric Enemies Abroad: Poll Trends in 2013,” Dynamics of Asymmetric 
Conflict (n.d.).
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table 1.2 depicts responses to questions that asked respondents if they 
favored the use of drones and manned aircraft in striking the Islamic 
State. This pair of questions is especially useful for our purposes, since it 
directly compares the utility that members of the public attach to differ-
ent types of military action.
Drone strikes received considerably more support than attacks from 
manned aircraft, which is also consistent with the argument that reducing 
the costs of war increases support for the use of force. Unfortunately for 
our purposes, neither of these surveys included questions asking about 
support for drone strikes, air strikes from piloted aircraft, and the use of 
ground troops, making it impossible to know how the public compares 
these different forms of military action. Furthermore, the questions in this 
and most public opinion surveys are intended to measure support for vari-
ous options, not to assess directly why respondents express the preferences 
that they do. Yet doing so is important for understanding how changes in 
the cost of conflict influence public support for the use of force. In the 
next section, we argue that an experimental approach is better- suited for 
this purpose, and we summarize results from a series of experiments that 
are designed to directly test such propositions.
While survey research assembles a group of respondents who are rep-
resentative of some larger population (such as adults in the United States) 
and asks them all the same questions, a survey experiment assigns respon-
dents randomly to control and treatment conditions. In our work, these 
conditions take the form of providing respondents with different infor-
mation about a planned military attack. For example, in a version of the 




Air strikes in Iraq 71 21 8
Air strikes in Syria 69 21 9
Military advisors to Iraq 66 29 6
Train and equip Rebels 48 40 11
US ground troops 39 55 6
Drone strikes 56 38 6
Manned aircraft 43 51 6
Note: Data from CBS/New York Times public opinion surveys released September 17, 2014 (top 
panel ) and June 23, 2014 (bottom panel ). Totals do not equal 100 due to rounding.
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“attack type” experiment we use in most chapters of the book, respondents 
are randomly assigned to read online one of three mock news stories de-
scribing plans by the United States to use military force. These three condi-
tions are identical except in their description of the type of military action 
to be undertaken. In one condition, respondents read about a planned 
drone strike; in another, about an attack by piloted aircraft; and in third, 
about the use of American ground troops.
Survey experiments such as this, which form the core of our empiri-
cal analysis, have two key advantages for answering the research questions 
motivating this book.66 First, their conditions are designed to answer spe-
cific research questions. Unlike the survey research about the Islamic State, 
the experiment described above includes conditions for the three types of 
military force that social science theory suggests should produce differ-
ent patterns of responses. The foundation of this approach is the prod-
uct of a great deal of research that finds that respondents’ attitudes and 
opinions are heavily influenced by the context in which survey questions 
are answered.67 In our survey experiments, this context is the information 
included in the conditions, such as the type of military force employed. 
Second, survey experiments allow us to conclude that such differences are 
causal rather than coincidental. Since respondents are randomly assigned 
to conditions, it is reasonable to conclude that any differences we find 
across conditions are due to their content rather than some other factor.
We recruited respondents for our survey experiments from two sources. 
The commercial survey firm YouGov provided respondents for two ex-
periments. YouGov maintains a large panel of individuals willing to take 
surveys in exchange for points that can be redeemed for gift certificates 
and other items. Since individuals willing to complete surveys may not 
be representative of the adult population in the United States, YouGov 
matches samples drawn from its panel with samples drawn from the popu-
lation at large, using probability sampling based on a range of individual 
characteristics such as age, partisan identification, and other political and 
demographic characteristics. The YouGov approach to panel recruitment 
and matching is now widely used in research on public opinion.68
For the remainder of our experiments, we recruited respondents from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, an online labor market where individuals 
complete tasks, including surveys, in exchange for small payments. Me-
chanical Turk has quickly become one of the most common sources of 
respondents for online experiments in the social sciences because of its 
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flexibility and low cost compared to more representative samples. It dif-
fers from online respondent panels provided by firms such as YouGov 
in one important respect. YouGov panels are designed to maximize the 
similarity between samples and a larger population, such as adults in the 
United States. In contrast, Mechanical Turk samples differ from the adult 
population in systematic ways; respondents are typically younger and 
more politically liberal, for example.69 This difference raises an important 
question: can we draw conclusions about how Americans in general think 
about and evaluate combat drones when using Mechanical Turk survey 
experiments? In other words, do the characteristics that distinguish our 
Mechanical Turk respondents make them likely to respond differently to 
experimental treatments?
This is an important concern, which we address in a number of ways. 
The first is to acknowledge that the primary goal of this book is to under-
stand how a new military technology, combat drones, alters what existing 
theories tell us about the public’s support for the use of force. In other 
words, the primary goal of our experiments is to test theory. Experiments 
are the ideal tool for achieving this goal, because they provide the re-
searcher the ability to control conditions and treatment assignment, which 
permits one to conclude that any findings are most likely caused by ran-
dom assignment to different conditions, rather than by other, potentially 
confounding factors. At the same time, we do think there is some scope 
to conclude that the experimental effects we report are likely to occur not 
just among members of our Mechanical Turk convenience sample, but also 
among other samples. The similarity of experimental results conducted 
with probability and convenience samples has been subject to a large body 
of research in recent years, and much of this work finds that conditions 
produce similar effects across these types of samples,70 especially when rel-
evant covariates are included in statistical models.71 We build on this line 
of work as well; in chapter 3, we report the results of identical survey ex-
periments on our probability and convenience samples conducted within 
a few weeks of each other and find that these two groups of respondents 
reveal qualitatively similar results. Although our work is not designed pri-
marily to produce estimates of how the population at large would respond 
to our experimental conditions, these factors do suggest that future re-
search could begin with the expectation that there would be a close cor-
respondence between probability and convenience samples on this topic.
Our research approach is designed to maximize the transparency of the 
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data and process of analysis we use in reaching our results. All of the data 
and analysis code is available for other researchers to inspect and to use in 
their own work.72 We also preregistered the research design for the two ex-
periments that relied on a nationally representative sample of respondents 
and one experiment that recruited respondents from Mechanical Turk.73 
Prior to receiving the data from these experiments, we pre- registered our 
plan for using this data to test hypotheses about how drone technology 
influences support for the use of force. Pre- registration is, among other 
things, a form of committing in advance to our hypotheses. By declaring 
in advance the data we plan to collect, how many respondents would be 
included, and how we would analyze data from our experiments, it reduces 
the incentive to conduct analyses after the fact in a manner that is consis-
tent with our hypotheses. This should increase readers’ confidence that the 
results reported from these experiments have not been subtly shaped by 
pressure to report novel or statistically significant analyses, and that they 
are based on the implications of drone technology that we deduce from 
existing theories of public opinion rather than post hoc theorizing.74
Outline of the Book
Chapter 2 begins our empirical investigation, using a survey experiment 
with a representative sample of Americans to answer two questions. First, 
do attacks with drones receive more support than other attack types, such 
as the use of ground troops or air power? Second, how large is the effect 
of drones compared to other influences on support for the use of force? 
These questions are at the core of the debate about drones, but existing 
research has not addressed them directly. This chapter takes on this task, 
using a conjoint survey experiment that permits comparison of the effects 
of drones to many other factors that shape attitudes toward military ac-
tion. It finds that attacks from drones do garner more support than other 
attack types, but that the size of this effect is moderate, roughly equal to 
other factors identified by previous research such as gender and the likeli-
hood of military success.
Chapter 3 addresses one of the biggest potential benefits of and po-
tentially serious objections against using drones: the possibility that pilot 
invulnerability may increase the incidence of war by allowing politicians 
to fight without provoking backlash from casualty- averse constituents. 
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The reasoning here is that states armed with drones would have few in-
hibitions against using them in combat when they would not sustain any 
military casualties— a result that could lead not only to more wars but also 
to a decline in democratic accountability. We discuss an experiment with 
a respondent pool representative of adults in the United States showing 
that attacks using drones, compared to manned aircraft or ground forces, 
do garner more support for the use of force and that this relationship is 
influenced by the fact that drones minimize the chance of military casual-
ties. However, the shift in support is fairly small and is not the only factor 
that shapes attitudes about violent conflict. This indicates that drones are 
unlikely to cause a radical increase in support for military operations, and 
that their effects on the incidence of war have to be understood alongside 
many other considerations.
In chapter 4 we consider how support for the use of force is influenced 
by the type of policy objective being pursued. We show that public opin-
ion is not only sensitive to the anticipated numbers of military casualties, 
but also to the goals and objectives of military force. Regardless of the 
weapons being used, counterterrorism operations receive the greatest sup-
port, followed by foreign policy restraint, internal political change, and 
humanitarian intervention. This demonstrates that the perceived urgency 
of a threat or perceived legitimacy of a mission exert a powerful influence 
on support for war, which is comparable to the influence of using drones 
rather than ground forces or manned aircraft. When considered alongside 
the data presented in chapter 3, this result provides grounds for develop-
ing a more complex understanding of how drones affect the support for 
the use of force than the common prediction that drones are apt to simply 
lower inhibitions against fighting.
Chapter 5 evaluates the argument that, because they lower the costs of 
conflict, drones create incentives for political leaders to engage in conflicts 
that have little chance of success. We hypothesize that people might be 
more willing to support drone strikes even when there are viable alterna-
tives to military action, since the costs of mission failure (for example in 
terms of military casualties) would seemingly be low. If that is the case, it 
would have profound implications for when authorities can use force with 
the support of the public. It could free politicians to initiate conflicts that 
have a lower probability of success while also limiting the backlash they 
may face when an operation goes badly. The results of this experiment sug-
gest that this is not the case, and that respondents continue to hesitate to 
support military action even when drones are available.
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Chapter 6 argues that the absence of military casualties will increase 
attention to civilians harmed by drones. Drawing on insights from psy-
chology about “counterfactual thinking,” we theorize that selectivity raises 
expectations about the results that will obtain when selective weapons such 
as drones are employed. Drones make it easier to avoid inflicting civilian 
casualties, and the public adjusts its expectations with this in mind. A 
first survey experiment tests these conjectures about how drone weaponry 
makes individuals more sensitive to civilian harm. Respondents primed to 
expect fewer civilian casualties expressed more regret, more sympathy with 
victims’ families, and less satisfaction than did those primed with a higher 
risk of civilian deaths, even though the actual outcomes across treatments 
were identical. This effect weakens when precision strikes are carried out 
by manned platforms. We also argue that people expect their leaders to 
exploit the selectivity that drones create and to plan their attacks in ways 
that minimize the risk of killing civilians, especially when doing so does 
not reduce their ability to achieve military objectives. A second survey 
experiment assesses this expectation and finds that support for the use of 
force declines when attacks place civilians in harm’s way unnecessarily. This 
effect strengthens when respondents are informed that the attack violates 
international law, suggesting that legal and moral norms exert an indepen-
dent influence on assessments of the use of force. Importantly, the differ-
ences remain even when the group targeted with an attack is described as 
directly threatening the United States, indicating that individuals are not 
willing to “trade” the risk of civilian death for greater security.
The concluding chapter analyzes the implications of the findings re-
ported in the book for the ethics of the use of force. By removing the pos-
sibility of American military casualties and appearing to be very selective, 
drone technology may tempt leaders to ignore the ethical injunctions of 
just war theory and instead to use drones to achieve quick and low- cost 
military successes. The empirical results of the book can help to inform 
this debate by providing evidence about the extent to which the American 
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The central questions we address in this book are: how do armed drones 
influence support for the use of military force among citizens? To what 
extent are the factors that have previously been identified as influences on 
public approval for war salient in an era when the costs of conflict appear 
to have been radically disrupted by drones? Our goal is to better compre-
hend how drones alter the American public’s support for military opera-
tions, and to use this as the basis for understanding American foreign pol-
icy as this type of weapons platform plays an increasingly important role.
This chapter focuses on the first question, seeking to determine if and 
how much drones alter support for the use of force. We begin by assess-
ing arguments about how the availability of combat drones reduces the 
domestic political costs of conflict. Lower costs for conflict could lead 
the United States to engage in wars that are counterproductive or that 
have a questionable moral and ethical basis. While these arguments make 
plausible inferences about how drones could influence support for the use 
of force, they have not been assessed in a rigorous way. There is a large 
and diverse literature on public opinion and foreign policy that includes 
analyses of previous American wars and experiments based on hypotheti-
cal conflicts. This work identifies a range of factors, such as the likelihood 
of military casualties and of success on the battlefield, that affect opinions 
about military operations. But because combat drones have only been used 
for about a decade, most of this rich body of work has not grappled with 
their implications.
This chapter brings together these two streams of work by comparing 
the effect of drones to these known influences on Americans’ attitudes, al-
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lowing us to gauge the relative impact of this new military technology. To 
achieve this objective, we introduce our “attack type” survey experiment, 
variants of which are also employed in the next three chapters. In these 
experiments, respondents are presented with information about a planned 
use of military force, which is described as being carried out by a drone, 
a manned aircraft, or ground troops. The specific type of experiment we 
report in this chapter, known as a conjoint survey experiment, is ideally 
suited to comparing the effect of the attack type on support for the use of 
force with other, well- established influences on the public’s support for 
military action.
This experiment yields a number of findings that shed light on how 
drones influence attitudes toward war. Our first and most important find-
ing is that attacks with drones receive more support than attacks with 
ground troops. Drones do increase citizens’ support for the use of force. 
Second, attacks from drones are only preferred to the use of ground troops. 
Respondents in our experiments expressed statistically indistinguishable 
levels of support for drone strikes and air strikes. Third, this relationship 
holds for both Democrats and Republicans. Previous research indicates 
that Republicans are generally more favorably disposed to military action. 
Consistent with this argument, our experiment finds that when asked to 
assess the desirability of any type of military action, Democrats provide 
lower levels of support than do Republicans. However, when asked to 
compare the desirability of drone strikes and the use of ground troops, 
both Democrats and Republicans prefer the former. This suggests that 
there is a cross- party consensus favoring the use of drones, unlike much 
of domestic and foreign policy in the contemporary United States, and 
that changes in the partisan makeup of Congress and the presidency are 
unlikely to restrain the use of this technology.
We also find that drones have a substantive effect on attitudes toward 
conflict that is of the same magnitude as other, well- established influences 
on support for the use of force. For example, attacks carried out by drones 
increase support over those conducted with ground troops by about as 
much as do attacks that are likely to succeed or that are unlikely to cause 
civilian casualties. Drones, then, noticeably increase support for the use of 
force. In this and the next chapter, we suggest that it is pilot invulnerabil-
ity, rather than selectivity, that has the most substantial influence on public 
opinion about using drones. Respondents in our survey experiments fore-
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see a far lower risk of military casualties when drones are employed than 
they do when attacks are carried out by strike aircraft or by ground troops.
The following chapters build on these findings. In the next chapter, 
we explore the role of invulnerability and casualty aversion in more detail. 
Subsequent chapters analyze how drone technology relates to other influ-
ences on public opinion. We ask, for example, do drone strikes receive 
greater support across the range of objectives that can be achieved with 
military force? Do the lower costs of drones make individuals more willing 
to endorse risky military missions (chapter 4)? Do they alter how people 
think about civilian casualties (chapter 5)? The combination of a compara-
tive perspective in this chapter, along with analysis in later chapters of how 
drones may modify other influences on support for the use of force, allows 
a thorough assessment of the political consequences of this new military 
technology.
Drones and Support for Military Action
There are two reasons to think that attacks by drones could receive more 
support than attacks with manned aircraft or ground combat personnel. 
The first is the invulnerability that drones provide to their operators. One 
of the most widely recognized constraints limiting the United States’ exer-
cise of its military strength are political leaders’ concerns about the public’s 
aversion to casualties. By some accounts, Americans are highly sensitive to 
military casualties and quickly become disillusioned with a war as casual-
ties mount.1 Similarly, many commentators attribute American reluctance 
to deploy its full might in small wars to a fear that the American public is 
unwilling to bear the costs of these conflicts.2 The extent of casualty aver-
sion is debatable, with some studies finding that it has a small effect, that 
it influences elites more than the general public, or that it only operates in 
conjunction with other factors.3 Nevertheless, even those who doubt that 
casualty aversion is a decisive factor typically credit it with having some 
role in dampening support for war. Without operators aboard, drones 
could decisively alter calculations about when to fight, making it easier 
for the United States to support its allies, deter rivals, and participate in 
humanitarian interventions.
Second, drones may be preferred over other types of military force if 
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they are perceived as being more likely to achieve military objectives. Armed 
drones have only recently entered the American military’s arsenal and have 
been deployed primarily to counter terrorist and insurgent groups. As we 
saw in chapter 1, a key problem in this type of attack is distinguishing 
combatants from noncombatants. The selectivity of drones should reduce 
the chance that military force will miss its target or harm noncombatants, 
both of which dampen support for engaging in military action. Drones 
may even make it possible to avoid harming low- ranking enemy person-
nel who may be ineffective or unwilling combatants once their leaders are 
killed.4 The technical capabilities of drones may make them particularly 
effective in solving this problem of target selection, leading them to take 
on the image of high- tech super- weapons, much as precision- guided mu-
nitions did following the First Gulf War.5
Politicians, members of the military, and media commentators have 
encouraged this perception by making lofty promises about what drones 
are able to accomplish. The Obama administration regularly publicized 
the results of strikes that killed key terrorist leaders and credited these with 
crippling organizations that were determined to attack the United States.6 
If members of the public see drones as being more selective than manned 
aircraft and ground forces, then they may be more willing to support 
drone strikes. Drones may therefore offer the attractive promise of war 
that satisfies the jus in bello principles of discrimination and proportional-
ity more effectively than ever before. This is particularly true when drones 
are compared to manned aircraft, which were used in some of the clearest 
violations of those norms throughout twentieth- century wars.7
By reducing public concern about, or attention to, the costs of conflict, 
drone warfare could have dangerous consequences. Protecting American 
soldiers from enemy fire by physically removing them from the battlefield 
and replacing them with drones could make it easier for the United States 
to use military force when it is justified. But it could also facilitate aggres-
sive or unjustified wars. Lowering this cost of war could remove an invalu-
able political constraint on reckless and unnecessary conflicts, making it 
possible for leaders to initiate wars more easily and to avoid being removed 
from office if the wars go badly. Some opponents of unmanned weapons 
platforms even go so far as to argue that the ability to fight without suffer-
ing casualties will dramatically lower the threshold for initiating wars and 
promote public disengagement from use of force decisions.8
Even if drones are more effective than other weapons systems for cer-
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tain missions, confidence in their selectivity may lead to a dangerous over-
reliance on these weapon systems. Of particular concern is the possibility 
that they could create a “moral hazard” by lowering the costs of fighting to 
such an extent that the American public may be enthusiastic about using 
force even when victory is unlikely.9 The ultimate risk here is that drones 
could cause a surge in the incidence of unnecessary wars of choice that 
would kill people and destroy infrastructure while delivering few strategic 
benefits to the United States.
Critics contend that improvements in selectivity highlighted by drone 
proponents are largely illusory. Selectivity is gauged within a margin of 
error that is always fallible, especially given the chances of drones’ mal-
functioning, launching attacks against misidentified targets, or striking 
innocent bystanders in the process of killing terrorist leaders.10 Worse 
still, portraying drones as being more selective and precise may paradoxi-
cally pave the way for increased violence against civilians by making it 
easier to build support for attacks that are carried out in populated areas. 
Whereas the American public may believe that massive aerial bombard-
ments against cities would have unconscionable effects on civilians, people 
could arguably be lulled into a false sense of security that a series of precise 
attacks directed at a city would have little or no adverse effects. Added to 
this, there is uncertainty about the extent to which Americans care about 
foreign civilian casualties at all, especially if the absence of American losses 
make the costs of war virtually imperceptible.11
In much of the literature on drones, both the appealing characteristics 
and the potential dangers are presented with compelling theoretical expla-
nations. But drones’ influence on support for war in the United States has 
not been systematically tested in most of this work. With sweeping pre-
dictions of rising American military aggression, an escalation of violence 
around the world, and increasing civilian casualties on the one hand, or 
promises of more restrained, ethically sensitive, and precise attacks on the 
other, it is vital to have a clearer sense of whether these expectations stand 
up to scrutiny, a task we tackle in this chapter.
What Shapes Opinions Regarding Military Action?
One goal of this chapter is to determine whether drones influence support 
for the use of force. A second goal is to estimate the size of this influence. 
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A difficulty here is that we do not have obvious benchmarks for what 
constitutes a large or small effect of drone technology. Theories suggesting, 
for example, that drones will lead to more support for military action do 
not make precise predictions of the size of this effect among members of 
the public. Those making these claims likewise tend to treat the public as 
a homogeneous group that will respond to drones in fairly uniform ways, 
without considering the extent to which demographic characteristics and 
party affiliations may shape preferences. Our solution to these problems 
is to compare the effects of drones to other, well- established influences on 
public opinion.
Previous research finds that perceptions of military success, the politi-
cal goals of military action, the likelihood of civilian casualties, and the 
opinions of allies, international organizations, and nongovernmental or-
ganizations all exercise consistent influences on attitudes toward conflict. 
Kreps’ study of public support for drones, which is one of the few studies 
that analyzes these weapons platforms in particular, shows that variations 
in how survey questions characterize drones’ effectiveness and their status 
under international law influence support for strikes.12 Although she only 
focuses on the effect of these two considerations, the framing effects she 
finds demonstrate the value of developing experiments that incorporate 
more variables that could potentially shape public opinion. The experi-
ment we report in this chapter is designed to compare the substantive 
effect of drones to these known influences. This not only builds a more 
comprehensive picture of the factors shaping public opinion about drones, 
but also helps to link our findings to public opinion research on foreign 
policy more broadly. Here we briefly summarize each of these. Subsequent 
chapters analyze how the availability of drones interacts with these factors 
to determine if drones alter the manner in which these factors influence 
public opinion. In this chapter, though, our aim is to simply compare the 
size of the effects for these four factors to that of drones.
Consider first how the likelihood that a military mission will achieve its 
goals influences attitudes regarding war. From this perspective, individuals 
are more apt to support the use of force when they believe it will achieve 
important political or military objectives. The reasoning here is straight-
forward: when the United States is likely to prevail in conflicts, the public 
concludes that the net costs of using military force— military casualties, 
expenditures, the risk of a long war, and so on— are modest compared to 
the benefits of success on the battlefield. Early work in this vein identifies 
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the likelihood of success, along with the clarity of the mission’s objectives 
and its stakes for the United States, as important influences on how the 
public evaluates war.13 Subsequent work has extended this line of inquiry, 
using public opinion surveys as well as experiments to conclude that con-
flicts with a high chance of success are more popular and that setbacks 
or advances during the course of conflict exercise a negative or positive 
influence on public attitudes toward war.14 Debate continues about if and 
how large an effect perceptions of success have on attitudes. Some suggest 
that such perceptions are, in large measure, either driven by respondents’ 
political predispositions, such as their partisan identification, or are simply 
a substitute for the expectation that military casualties and other costs of 
the conflict will be low.15 Nonetheless, there is considerable evidence that 
perceptions of success continue to matter even when such factors are taken 
into account.16
Less work has looked at how civilian deaths caused by American mili-
tary action alter support for the use of force. Some analysis of polling 
data and other sources from the Second World War onwards suggest that 
noncombatant deaths have at most a modest influence on American citi-
zens’ calculations.17 More recent research has found that civilian casualties 
influence public attitudes, particularly since the 1970s.18 One study, for 
example, finds that survey questions that mention the possibility of civil-
ian casualties reduce support for military action, and that the size of this 
effect was of the same magnitude as for questions that mention American 
military casualties.19 A survey experiment that compares the effects of mili-
tary and civilian casualties in a hypothetical war reached similar conclu-
sions, although most respondents, when asked, responded that avoiding 
military casualties was more important than avoiding casualties among 
noncombatants.20 There is reason to believe, then, that the risk of civil-
ian harm can lead to meaningful reductions in Americans’ willingness to 
endorse military action.
Another factor influencing support for the use of force are the goals, 
or “principal policy objectives” (PPO) that military force is intended 
to achieve. Work in this vein has distinguished between four distinct 
goals: foreign policy restraint, which aims to deter or restrain another 
state from taking threatening actions; internal political change, in which 
force is used to assist an ally facing rebellion or other threats to its hold 
on power; humanitarian intervention to prevent or stop conflicts inflict-
ing large- scale harm on noncombatants; and counter terrorism, such as 
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using force to attack terrorist bases overseas.21 Initial work found that 
foreign policy restraint receives much higher levels of support than does 
internal political change. Subsequent studies found that support for hu-
manitarian interventions tends to fall somewhere between foreign policy 
restraint and internal political change. Humanitarian interventions have 
lower levels of support than the former because they are not seen as be-
ing as necessary for the protection of national security, but they are more 
popular than internal political change missions that lack the moral status 
of humanitarian operations.22
After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, 
and the United States’ involvement in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, other 
researchers gauged support for counterterrorism missions, which received 
the broadest level of support.23 As with other findings on public opinion and 
foreign policy, these have not gone unchallenged. Some research suggests 
that how conflicts are framed as PPOs is flexible and, to some degree, un-
der the control of political leaders. Individuals who lack information about 
foreign policy, in particular, may be susceptible to such framing and follow 
the judgments of leaders with interests and ideologies similar to their own.24 
Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence that PPOs are important to the 
public, even if some individuals are influenced by how the conflicts are cast 
by political leaders rather than by the reality on the ground.
Finally, we compare the effect of drones on public attitudes to the effect 
of opinions of international actors including allies of the United States, 
international organizations, and nongovernment organizations like trans-
national human rights groups. Recent research suggests that these actors 
can influence Americans’ attitudes under certain conditions. The starting 
point for this approach is that many individuals have general preferences 
or pre- dispositions for the goals and means of American foreign policy, but 
lack the detailed knowledge of the international environment that would 
allow them to translate these into support for or opposition to specific 
policy measures, including drone strikes.25 These individuals can use the 
opinions of international actors with expertise in such policies as a signal 
for how to translate their general preferences into positions on particular 
policies. In doing so, individuals compare their general predispositions to 
those of the international actors. If these are in broad agreement, the in-
dividual can adopt the specific policy preference of the better- informed 
international actor. Disagreement between the two is also informative; in 
such cases, the individual can oppose policies that are supported by the 
international actor.26
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Comparing Influences on Support for the Use of Force
In this chapter we report the results from an experiment designed to pro-
vide a comparative perspective on attitudes about the use of force, before 
turning to the more specific issues later in the book. We developed a fully 
randomized choice- based conjoint experiment,27 designed specifically to 
assess the influence of many factors simultaneously and to compare their 
relative impact on attitudes about military action.28 Respondents were a 
representative sample of 1,000 adults in the United States recruited by the 
survey research firm YouGov.29 Each respondent first read the following 
introduction to the experiment, placing them in the role of evaluating two 
attacks by American forces:
For the next few minutes, imagine you are the Secretary of Defense 
of the United States. Military officials have provided you with intel-
ligence assessments about two attacks that the United States might 
carry out in the near future. For each pair of proposed attacks, in-
dicate which you personally would prefer to authorize. In making 
your choices, remember that military resources are limited, and the 
United States can only carry out some attacks that are proposed by 
military planners. Even if you are not entirely sure, please indicate 
which of the two you prefer.
Respondents were then presented with six attributes of each attack, 
each of which can be described in multiple ways. Table 2.1 lists the levels 
of the attributes included in the experiment; those in bold serve as the 
baseline treatments in the statistical analysis reported below. The levels 
of each attribute were randomly selected for each of the two attacks that 
respondents were asked to compare. This allows us to estimate the effect 
of each attribute value on support for the attack. In the analysis below, 
each value is measured on the same scale, allowing direct comparison of 
their causal effect on the dependent variable. Each respondent makes five 
comparisons of two attack plans, each on a separate screen, resulting in 10 
responses for each variable and a total of 10,000 observations. Table 2.2 
depicts one such comparison between two attacks.
As can be seen in table 2.1, this conjoint experiment allows for the 
simultaneous inclusion of many attributes. We did not include military 
casualties as an attribute in this experiment. One reason for this is that 
drone strikes would produce no military casualties. To account for this, 
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the experiment would need to constrain the value of the military casualties 
attribute to equal zero in all cases where the attack type was described as a 
drone strike. This means that the assignment of attribute values would not 
be fully random, potentially weakening the experimental design. While 
there are statistical techniques that account for such deviations from a 
truly random design,30 our decision to forgo including this attribute was 
motivated by a more fundamental consideration. Had we not done so, 
every attack described as a drone strike would be accompanied by infor-
mation that this would produce zero military casualties, while the other 
attack types— air strikes and ground troops— would always describe the 
expected number of military casualties as zero or greater. We worried that 
always comparing drones with no casualties against air strikes or attacks by 
ground troops with the possibility of casualties would lead some respon-
dents to draw close attention to this pattern, and base a disproportionate 
share of their choices on the presence or absence of military casualties 
rather than on other factors.
Nonetheless, we are interested in how perceptions of military casualties 
shape attitudes. To address this, we followed up the conjoint experiment 
with questions that asked respondents to estimate the likelihood of mili-
tary casualties resulting from a drone strike, a strike with manned aircraft, 
and the use of ground troops. Based on the literature on military casualty 
aversion, we expect that the likelihood of military casualties foreseen by 
our respondents would be lower when the attack is described as coming 
from a drone than from aircraft or ground troops.
One difference from the experiments discussed in subsequent chapters 
is that the descriptions of the attributes are shorter in this conjoint ex-
periment. Short attribute levels should reduce the chance that respondents 
might become confused or fatigued and stop the survey before completing 
it. They also allow us to assess the degree to which small changes in how 
an attack is described influence respondents’ attitudes. In the next chapter, 
experimental conditions for attacks carried out by drones and by aircraft 
included information that these attacks would have a low risk of military 
casualties. This information about military casualties is not included in the 
conjoint experiment, allowing us to assess whether this leads to substantive 
changes in how attack type influences support for the use of force.
To analyze the data, we first generated indicator variables for each level 
of each attribute. We then set one level as the baseline for each attribute. 
The effect of each attribute is measured as the change in the probability of 
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preferring an attack compared to this baseline. For example, the baseline 
for the attack type attribute is an attack described as a drone strike. The 
effect of attacks described as air strikes and ground troops is the difference 
in the probability of preferring these attacks from those described as drone 
strikes. These estimates are calculated as average marginal component ef-
fects (AMCEs), which identifies the average differences of being preferred 
when comparing two attribute values over all of the possible combinations 
of other attribute values, with standard errors clustered on respondents.31
Figure 2.1 summarizes the results of this exercise. We have omitted 
information about international opinion to make the figure easier to in-
terpret; full statistical results are presented in the chapter appendix. The 
levels in bold with dots at zero on the vertical line are the baseline levels 
for each attribute. The horizontal axis indicates how treatment by each 
TABLE 2.1. Attributes and Values for Conjoint Experiment
Attributes Values
Type of attack Missiles fired from unmanned drone aircraft
Missiles fired from military aircraft with a crew of two officers
Ground troops in armored vehicles
Target of attack Group of low- level enemy forces
Commander of enemy forces
Likelihood that attack  









Objective of attack Prevent a foreign country from providing safe haven to  
al Qaeda terrorist bases
Prevent a foreign country from engaging in genocide and 
ethnic cleansing







Supported by NATO allies in Europe
Opposed by NATO allies in Europe
Supported by the United Nations Security Council
Opposed by the United Nations Security Council
Supported by international human rights groups
Opposed by international human rights groups
Note: Baseline attribute values are indicated in bold.
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attribute level reduces or increases support for an attack compared to the 
baseline level. Dots indicate point estimates, and horizontal lines identify 
the 95 percent confidence intervals for the ACME of each attribute level. 
For example, attacks with air strikes receive only slightly less support than 
drone strikes, and the difference between these two estimates is not statisti-
cally significant.32 But when the attack is carried out by ground troops, the 
probability of preferring the attack declines compared to drone strike. Here 
it seems that the greater risk of losing American soldiers in ground combat 
operations encourages respondents to become more cautious about en-
dorsing military action, a point we return to below and in chapter 3. The 
most likely explanation is that respondents see aircraft as having a decisive 
effect on protecting American military personnel, such that the presence 
or absence of an onboard crew matters little when it comes to trigger-
TABLE 2.2. Comparison of Two Attacks
Please carefully review the information about two attacks detailed below, then answer the 
questions.
Attack 1 Attack 2
Likelihood that attack will 
achieve its objective
Low Low
International opinion Supported by the United  
Nations Security Council
Opposed by NATO allies in 
Europe
Objective of attack Prevent a foreign country  
from engaging in genocide  
and ethnic cleansing
Prevent a foreign country  
from providing safe haven to  
al Qaeda terrorist bases
Target of attack Commander of enemy  
forces
Group of low- level enemy 
forces
Type of attack Ground troops in armored 
vehicles
Missiles fired from military 
aircraft with a crew of two 
officers
Likelihood of civilian 
casualties
High Moderate 
Question: Which attack do you prefer?
□ Attack 1
□ Attack 2
Question: On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that the United States should definitely 
not carry out the attack and 7 indicates that the United States definitely should carry out 
the attack, how would you rate attack 1?
Question: On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that the United States should definitely 
not carry out the attack and 7 indicates that the United States definitely should carry out 
the attack, how would you rate attack 2?
Drones and Support for the Use of Force  41
ing risk aversion. This attitude reflects the country’s ongoing participation 
in asymmetric wars against enemies that have little anti- aircraft capacity. 
One potential concern is that this perception of pilot invulnerability may 
persist into conventional wars to create false expectations of low casualties 
regardless of the type of aircraft involved and the enemy’s capacities.
Considerable evidence suggests that Republicans are more likely to en-
dorse the use of military force than are Democrats.33 This is the case in 
our conjoint experiment. Recall that in addition to asking respondents to 
indicate which of two attacks they prefer, we also asked them to rate their 
support for each attack. This seven- point rating ranges from 1 to 7, with 
higher values indicating the respondent expressed a greater willingness to 
authorize the attack. Figure 2.2 summarizes the distribution of these rat-
ings for all the attack plans presented in the experiment for Democratic 
and Republican respondents. Compared to the ratings of Democratic re-
Fig. 2.1. Effects 
of attributes on 
probability of 
preferring attack
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spondents, those of Republicans are skewed to the right, with over half of 
the ratings in the three highest values for this variable. While the average 
rating by Democratic respondents was 3.9 on the seven- point scale, the 
average for Republicans was 4.7, and this difference between partisans is 
statistically significant (p < .01). Our Democratic respondents, then, were 
less willing to authorize attacks.34
However, these differences in willingness to endorse the use of force 
in general disappear when we consider specific attack types. We twice re-
peated the conjoint analysis used to create figure 2.2 but limited the sam-
ple to Democrats and Republicans. The results of this exercise are depicted 
in figure 2.3, which shows the effect of each attack type for supporters of 
each party on their willingness to prefer one attack over the other. (To 
simplify the display of information, this figure omits the other attributes; 
details can be found in models 3 and 4 of table A2.1 in the chapter appen-
dix.) Democrats and Republicans evaluate attacks in similar ways. Both 
prefer drone strikes to the use of ground troops. Republicans also prefer 
drone strikes to air strikes, although this difference does not meet the con-
ventional threshold for statistical significance.
The absence of partisan differences in support for drone strikes over the 
use of ground troops explains, in part, the continuity in the use of drones. 
Drone strikes against militants outside of traditional combat zones began 
under Republican president George W. Bush. President Bush accelerated 
the pace of drone strikes significantly in early 2008 and loosened the con-
ditions under which they could be used to target militants. Early drone 
strikes were authorized when a target was positively identified as a militant. 
Beginning in 2008, drone strikes also targeted individuals or groups that 
Fig. 2.2. Partisanship and ratings of attacks
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exhibited the “signature” of militants, such as a group of armed men travel-
ing in a convoy or residing in a building that had been used by militants 
in the past. Barack Obama was elected on a promise to extract American 
troops from wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But this aversion to large- scale 
combat did not lead his administration to curtail drone strikes; instead, the 
number of strikes expanded dramatically during his first term in office. Fur-
thermore, the use of drones by both Presidents Bush and Obama evinced 
little criticism or even public oversight by members of Congress, even when 
the opposing party controlled the legislature. At both the mass and elite 
level, then, there is a consensus across party lines favoring drone strikes.35
Attacks in which the chance of civilian casualties were moderate or 
high receive less support than those with a low likelihood of civilian harm. 
Concern about inflicting civilian casualties does limit support for the use 
of force. The same pattern exists for mission success; attacks described as 
Fig. 2.3. Effects of 
attributes on probability 
of preferring attack by 
party
44  Drones and Support for the Use of Force
having a moderate or high chance of achieving their objectives are more 
likely to be preferred. This coincides with Kreps’ study of the influence of 
question framing on responses to opinion polls about drones, as her find-
ings show a drop in support when questions indicated a high likelihood of 
harming civilians or inflicting disproportionate damage.36
At first glance, this may appear to be an obvious result. After all, it is 
clearly more advantageous to launch attacks that are apt to succeed than 
those that are less likely to succeed, and previous research has found that 
anticipations of success play a central role in determining overall levels of 
support for war.37 However, this result takes on special significance when 
drones are involved because of the debate over how the costs of fighting 
may be displaced onto civilians. Critics of drones have worried that the 
low costs of launching strikes could induce the United States to wage wars 
even when the chances of winning are low. This might result in greater 
willingness to escalate a conflict, less patience with diplomatic alternatives 
to fighting, and a proliferation of wars that are unlikely to yield any re-
deeming benefits— all while placing civilians at greater risk than if there 
were stronger inhibitions against fighting. Kreps says that her findings sup-
port these fears, as she concludes that most polls downplay the potential 
consequences of drone warfare to create a misleadingly optimistic perspec-
tive on the strikes. This is an issue we explore in greater depth in chapter 5, 
with additional testing and a discussion of the various causal mechanisms 
that might arguably create such a moral hazard.
Compared to attacks with the objective of countering terrorism, those 
with the goal of restraining a foreign state’s aggression receive less sup-
port, while those with the objective of stopping genocide receive more 
support (although this difference from counterterrorism missions is not 
statistically significant). We will revisit this ranking of preferences in 
chapter 4, where we find that counterterrorism operations receive more 
support than alternative mission types. We also explore some of the pos-
sible reasons for this variance in mission preferences across attack types. 
For now, it is important to bear in mind that preferences here are not as 
consistent as some of the other patterns we identify, which is likely due 
to changes in what threats seem most urgent when the experiments are 
conducted and how each type of mission is framed when it is described 
in a hypothetical attack scenario. The high support for counterterror-
ism compared to restraining foreign aggression probably has much to 
do with how threats have been framed since 9/11. Political and media 
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elites have consistently emphasized the threat that terrorism poses and 
used this as a rationale for launching drone strikes. This means that it is 
a pattern that will change along with shifts in the security landscape and 
elites’ framing of threats.
Although the relative importance of counterterrorism is likely tempo-
rary, it does raise some concerns for the country’s ability to respond to 
security threats. By many accounts, politicians and members of the media 
dramatically overstate the threat of terrorism.38 The comparatively high 
support for drones may be a consequence of this threat inflation, which 
calls the value of these preferences into question. Preoccupation with 
counterterrorism could present difficulties for leaders seeking to reorient 
drone operations to contend with conventional military threats, though 
as we pointed out in the previous chapter, drones may be less effective in 
conventional operations.39 Similarly, it is possible that support for drones 
in any context will decline if terrorism is framed as a less urgent threat. 
Experimental designs cannot account for these long- term trends in atti-
tudes toward drone use, so it will be important to revisit this problem if 
perceived national security priorities change.
Attacks that target commanders of enemy forces receive more sup-
port than those against low- level fighters. This is consistent with what we 
should expect from how drone strikes and other forms of military action 
have been framed throughout the War on Terror. Attacks are typically de-
scribed as being made against high- ranking terrorist leaders who are un-
compromising enemies determined to kill innocent people.
The most puzzling pattern concerns the influence of preferences of 
the international community. Predictably, attacks opposed by the United 
States’ NATO allies are less likely to be preferred than those in which 
NATO allies support the attack, the baseline category for this attribute. 
But support or opposition to the attack by either the United Nations Se-
curity Council or by human rights nongovernmental organizations are less 
likely to receive support. This is surprising, as existing research would sug-
gest that these factors should have opposite effects. Kreps finds that refer-
ences to international humanitarian law (IHL) can influence support for 
drone strikes in public opinion polls, with support declining as questions 
are framed to suggest that attacks may be legally problematic. Although 
she focuses on IHL, rather than on international organizations, her results 
suggest that the pressure of norms coming from the international commu-
nity should have some constraining influence on public opinion.
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Separate analyses of Democrats and Republicans shed some light on this 
paradoxical pattern of support for attacks. Among Democrats, the opin-
ions of international actors has a consistent effect on support for the use of 
force. Opposition to an attack by NATO allies, human rights groups, and 
the United Nations Security Council all lead to less support for an attack 
among Democratic respondents in our experiment. Republicans were less 
likely to support an attack if it was opposed by NATO allies or endorsed 
or opposed by the Security Council or by human rights nongovernmental 
organizations. This result indicates that Republicans in particular are wary 
of international organizations, especially those that are not dominated by 
the United States as thoroughly as NATO or that have previously acted as 
checks on US military operations (as the Security Council has). This aligns 
with previous findings that have shown that Republicans tend to dislike 
multilateralism except when it is clearly in American interests and that 
Democrats are more inclined to see an inherent value in fostering interna-
tional cooperation.40 It also coincides with the parties’ traditional strate-
gies, as leading Republicans are more inclined to denigrate multilateralism 
and assert American independence in foreign policy matters.41
Figure 2.1 also allows comparison of the relative size of the influence 
of drone strikes to the other factors that influence support for the use of 
force.42 The difference between the effect of an attack carried out by ground 
troops compared to a drone strike is of roughly the same magnitude as the 
difference between attacks with the objectives of counterterrorism and for-
eign policy restraint, and it is smaller than attacks with a high probability 
of leading to civilian casualties and those with a moderate and high chance 
of success. This is borne out by our findings in chapters 3 and 4, where we 
also conclude that while the availability of combat drones does increase 
the public’s willingness to condone military action, the substantive effect 
is relatively modest in size. Other factors, especially the political objective 
and chance of success and civilian harm, continue to exert sizable effects 
on respondents’ calculations even when accounting for drone technology. 
This comparative perspective on the magnitude of influence is one reason 
why it is helpful to start with this experiment before delving into the more 
focused analysis of specific variables.
Another way of thinking about this is in terms of whether using drones 
rather than ground forces would realistically cause a decisive shift in opin-
ion toward war. When judged by this standard, the effect of using drones 
is not large. Policymakers may be able to increase support for military ven-
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tures if they use drones or piloted aircraft rather than ground forces, but 
the difference between the aerial and ground- based approaches shows that 
this change in the type of military force involved will only tip the balance 
for or against wars in instances if opinion is closely divided. When a clear 
majority favors or opposes fighting, the choice of means may not matter a 
great deal. Despite being extremely controversial, the American invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 was consistently favored by more than 70 percent of the 
population.43 With such enthusiasm, the Bush administration faced no 
need to make more extensive use of drones to lower the costs of fighting. 
The war was much less popular in the United Kingdom, but even there 
polls found support exceeding 50 percent.44 Here again it was not neces-
sary to increase reliance on drones even when there was a much clearer 
division between the pro- and antiwar camps.
Recall that this experiment did not include military casualties as an at-
tribute so as not to suggest too strongly to respondents that concern about 
such casualties should drive their evaluations of the attack. As we will dis-
cuss in more detail in chapter 3, there is good reason to believe that avoid-
ing casualties is an important reason for preferring drone strikes to other 
attack types. To determine if respondents in this experiment viewed drones 
as reducing the risk of military casualties, we asked them to estimate the 
likelihood of harm to military personnel from attacks carried out by drone 
strikes, air strikes, and ground troops. Responses were on a seven- point 
scale, ranging from estimates that casualties would be extremely unlikely 
to extremely likely, which we collapse into three categories: likely, neither 
likely nor unlikely, and unlikely. This question was posed to respondents 
after they had completed rating the ten attack plans in the conjoint experi-
ment. Results are summarized in figure 2.4. Air strikes and ground troops 
were viewed as placing military personnel markedly more at risk of harm 
than were drone strikes. This is consistent with the idea that an important 
advantage of drones is that they minimize the risk to American soldiers.45
It is worth noting that although respondents rated the chance of Amer-
ican military casualties following from drone strikes much less likely than 
sustaining casualties in ground operations or strikes from manned aircraft, 
some indicated casualties were possible. If one of the foremost advantages 
and potential dangers of employing drones is that they can circumvent 
sensitivity to military casualties, then these effects will only be realized if 
the general public anticipates drones will lead to casualty- free wars. How-
ever, the findings presented in figure 2.4 indicate that respondents are not 
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willing to entirely discount the chance of military casualties, even when 
they read vignettes that describe an attack being conducted exclusively 
with drones and are not given any indication that enemies have a chance 
to retaliate.
Conclusion
Many of the findings we discussed in this chapter are probed further with 
the experiments we present later in the book. The level of agreement be-
tween multiple experiments using different designs, involving different 
respondent pools, and with representative and nonrepresentative samples 
helps to increase confidence that any particular finding is not an aberration 
and shows the experiments can be taken as revealing the underlying forces 
driving attitudes toward drone strikes.
Aside from those we have already mentioned, one of the most impor-
tant points of agreement across these experiments is that air strikes receive 
nearly the same levels of support as drones. The narrow gap between these 
two options for using military force indicates that the presence or absence 
of a pilot onboard an aircraft makes relatively little difference in determin-
Fig. 2.4. Estimates of 
military casualties by 
attack type
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ing whether the American public will support military operations. The fact 
that the difference between manned aircraft and drones was not statisti-
cally significant in the conjoint experiment is especially important because 
this is a more representative sample of the population. In later chapters we 
will employ respondents recruited from Mechanical Turk. In some of these 
experiments we find a larger gap between support for manned aircraft and 
drones, though it still remains small when judged in terms of whether this 
difference could influence policy choices. But a consistent finding across 
all our experiments is that attacks with ground troops receive less support 
than those carried out by drones.
These results help us to better understand how drone technology could 
alter the domestic politics of conflict. They are consistent with the idea 
that policymakers will be able to maintain higher levels of support for 
conflicts when they avoid committing ground forces. The choice between 
drones and manned aircraft is more ambiguous. Leaders could be able to 
achieve slightly higher levels of support for missions by employing drones, 
especially because this could eliminate the chance of American soldiers 
being injured or killed. But using drones does come at a potential cost of 
fueling the ongoing debate about what many see as an excessive reliance 
on these weapons platforms. The results also show that the mission type 
is an important determinant of an attack’s popularity. Counterterrorism 
operations were more popular than humanitarian interventions or attacks 
against foreign states— an understandable response given that terrorism is 
often presented as the most serious threat to American national security 
and that the other missions could result in much longer deployments of 
American forces overseas.
Nevertheless, the levels of approval for various mission types needs 
more attention for several reasons. First, in this chapter we have only tested 
three different principal policy objectives. The available literature has iden-
tified as many as four and has framed these in varying ways. In chapter 4 
we consider some of the alternative formulations of the PPOs and include 
internal political change to those we investigate. Second, and even more 
importantly, PPOs only refer to the general type of operation and may take 
countless different forms depending on what is at stake under particular 
circumstances. Even though counterterrorism operations receive support 
in the scenario we described in this experiment, it is possible that counter-
terrorism may be less appealing when the attack conditions are changed. 
The same is true for each of the other PPOs. By testing our results with a 
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different experiment in chapter 4 we can develop a clearer picture of the 
ranking of PPOs and confirm the perceived importance of counterterror-
ism operations by showing that these are consistently more popular than 
other mission types.
Our conjoint experiment informs respondents of the likelihood of suc-
cess, characterizing it as high, moderate, or low. In some instances, this 
reflects the way information is presented prior to an attack. Political lead-
ers, military elites, and media commentators frequently make promises 
about the likelihood of a good outcome when resorting to military force. 
However, there are times when these people either refrain from making 
any clear promises or issue contradictory claims. Disagreements between 
political parties are especially likely to result in divergent assessments of 
whether victory is possible.46 Audiences may also be skeptical about these 
claims because promises of quick and easy wars so often turn out to be 
wrong. The information landscape in the lead- up to war is therefore usu-
ally more complex than the tripartite success prompt we include in the 
conjoint experiment. Even more importantly, the attack type could alter 
the anticipated outcome. Respondents may expect that drone strikes will 
be better at accomplishing the missions they read about if they see these 
machines as being more precise and efficient than other attack types. Al-
ternatively, they could fear that drones are potentially counterproductive 
because of the controversy surrounding these weapons platforms and the 
risk of provoking harsh reactions from foreign populations. With these 
challenges in mind, we introduce another experiment in chapter 5 that 
asks respondents to form their own opinions about the likelihood of suc-
cess. Here respondents draw inferences about the possible outcome from 
the details of the operation and the means of attack selected.
Another important point to consider is how preferences for attack may 
change depending on the presence or absence of peaceful alternatives. Like 
most survey experiments about use of force decisions, our conjoint experi-
ment does not give respondents clues about whether the attack described 
is truly necessary. It may therefore predispose respondents to see violence 
as being justified or accepting the available response. A charge that is often 
directed against drones is that they lower the threshold for using military 
force, and it is impossible to determine whether this is the case if experi-
ments push respondents to authorize some type of attack.47 We therefore 
add in chapter 5 further nuance to our account of how drones influence 
valuations of success by considering how responses change when the ex-
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periment gives respondents details about whether nonviolent options are 
available. If drones really do make it easier to wage wars, then we should 
expect to see a preference for drones over other types of force when there 
are promising nonviolent alternatives.
The conjoint experiment showed that support for an attack declines as 
the likelihood of civilian casualties increases, but the considerations influ-
encing civilian casualty sensitivity are potentially more complex than this 
direct relationship. Concern for civilians may not be a fixed characteristic. 
It is possible that using drones to reduce the harm to civilians could inspire 
heightened sensitivity to civilian casualties, thereby making the public less 
likely to support subsequent operations.48 If this is the case, then reliance 
on drones may be cyclical, with each attack that avoids harming civilians 
increasing the demand for other attacks to do likewise. Alternatively, some 
commentators have argued that drones might cause a decline in sensitivity 
to civilian casualties over time. They raise the possibility that drones may 
cause public disengagement, encouraging audiences at home to pay less 
attention to the costs of war, including the suffering of foreign civilians.49 




Drones, Casualties, and Attitudes
One long- standing debate in research on public opinion and foreign policy 
is the degree to which support for the use of force declines when military 
casualties are incurred. Influential works in this area conclude that in the 
public’s mind, the risk of losing soldiers is among the most prominent and 
important costs of military engagement.1 Others, though, contend that 
casualties are less decisive, as citizens balance the costs of such casualties 
against the political goals of military action and the likelihood of battle-
field success.2
By rendering their operators invulnerable to enemy fire, drones upset 
the casualty calculations that have influenced decisions relating to the use 
of military force and have structured the academic debate over how public 
opinion responds to the possibility of armed conflict. Pilot invulnerability 
raises two important problems. First, research on casualty aversion focuses 
on operations involving human combatants, leaving considerable uncer-
tainty about how military casualties influence public opinion when it is 
possible for belligerents to fight without exposing soldiers to any danger. 
Testing the effects of casualty aversion is particularly important now that 
the availability of drones could potentially make risks to soldiers superflu-
ous. It is possible that drones could not only be preferred over other attack 
types, but that they may also alter existing attitudes toward other attack 
types because of their comparative advantage in minimizing risk.
Second, studies of the influence of casualty aversion tend to focus more 
heavily on how losses during a war compel an end to fighting. Less at-
tention is devoted to what effect anticipated casualties could have on the 
public’s desire to initiate conflicts or to expand ongoing conflicts into new 
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areas.3 This question of preventing new engagements is especially salient 
during the War on Terror, which has been characterized by the spread of 
military operations to new conflicts and countries, each time with ques-
tions about the permissibility of the new area of operations. As we showed 
in chapter 1, combat drones have been central to the rapid expansion of 
operations geographically, yet it remains unclear whether or not this ex-
pansion has been made politically easier by drones’ pilot invulnerability.
Beyond these general questions relating to casualty aversion, there is 
also an urgent puzzle that gets to the heart of the issue of whether drones 
are justifiable weapons platforms. Drones allow the use of force while re-
ducing the risks that military personnel face. Pilot invulnerability makes it 
possible to effectively wage wars at a distance, arguably without triggering 
any feelings of casualty aversion that the public may have. Peter Singer, 
whose work has done much to highlight the political implications of new 
military technologies, writes that:
The strongest appeal of unmanned systems is that we don’t have 
to send someone’s son or daughter into harm’s way. But when 
politicians can avoid the political consequences of the condolence 
letter— and the impact that military casualties have on voters and 
on the news media— they no longer treat the previously weighty 
matters of war and peace the same way.4
The absence of military casualties may lead, as Singer suggests, to more 
public support for the use of force when drones are employed compared to 
attacks that create higher risks of military casualties. If casualty aversion5 
reduces support for the use of force, then drones create a politically easier 
way to strike overseas. This concern has been taken up by many other crit-
ics of drone warfare and has become one of the chief arguments against 
using drones. From this perspective, civilians’ sensitivity to casualties is a 
beneficial constraint on use of force decisions that helps to prevent wars, 
especially wars that are not essential to national security.
In this chapter we consider existing research on how military casualties 
influence support for wars, focusing on whether the availability of drones 
influences the public’s willingness to initiate armed conflict. Our expecta-
tions are summarized in table 3.1. Given the evidence that the public is 
responsive to casualties and the concern that drones may circumvent this 
constraint on fighting, our first and most central conjecture is that the 
public will express greater support for military missions in which there 
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is no risk of military casualties because drones are employed compared 
to missions where such casualties may occur. The results of the conjoint 
survey experiment in chapter 2 are consistent with this conjecture. In this 
chapter, we begin to try to understand why drones get more support than 
do other attack types.
Our second expectation is that casualty aversion drives this relation-
ship. We assess these expectations with two survey experiments that sys-
tematically alter the type of attack— by drone, by combat aircraft with 
onboard crews, or by ground troops— being considered by American lead-
ers, and then ask respondents how strongly they support or oppose this 
use of force. We find that respondents to whom the attack was described 
as being carried out with a drone expected far fewer military casualties, but 
the same likelihood of success and of civilian casualties, than do those for 
whom the attack was described as an air strike or as being carried out by 
ground forces. This suggests that casualty aversion, but not perceptions of 
victory or concern over the possibility of harming noncombatants, is what 
leads to more support for drone strikes.
Consistent with the chapter’s first expectation, as well as the findings 
reported in chapter 2, respondents who read about a planned drone strike 
exhibited greater support for the attack than those reading about an at-
tack with ground troops. We subject the relationship between attack type 
and support for military action to a number of additional tests, including 
duplicating it on different samples of respondents and controlling for a 
host of other factors that influence support for the use of force, to increase 
confidence that the finding is not due to chance but reflects concern about 
minimizing the risk American military personnel face during war.
Casualty Aversion and Support for War
John Mueller’s study of public opinion during the wars in Korea and 
Vietnam did much to call attention to casualty sensitivity and illustrate 
TABLE 3.1. Casualty Aversion Expectations
Expectation 3.1: The public will express greater support for prospective military mis-
sions in which there is no risk of military casualties because drones are employed 
compared to missions where such casualties may occur.
Expectation 3.2: Individuals expect fewer military casualties when attacks are carried out 
by drones then when they employ air power or ground troops.
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its dynamics.6 He found a similar pattern at work in both conflicts, with 
support for the wars declining as the number of casualties increased. The 
decline did not follow a consistent progression. Rather, there was a sharp 
drop in support following the initial losses, then comparatively smaller 
declines later. Mueller concludes that it takes a larger number of casualties 
to produce the same level of decline in support as a war progresses. This 
unequal perception of casualties may be the result of those whose support 
for fighting is weak becoming easily disillusioned and those with stronger 
commitments to the cause having greater tolerance for loss. The shift in 
the relative weight of casualties could also be linked to changes in a will-
ingness to bear risks as a conflict develops. Whatever the exact mechanisms 
behind this change, the implication is that the effects of casualty aversion 
are apt to be especially strong early in a conflict but that wars may per-
sist past the initial drop and slowly lose popularity as casualties mount, 
eventually forcing policymakers to withdraw military forces or negotiate a 
peace agreement when support falls too low.
Other studies of the Vietnam War echoed Mueller’s findings and were 
supported by a more widespread sense that the war was hindered and ul-
timately lost because of the limited support it received.7 Martel argues 
that “In Vietnam, mounting U.S. casualties contributed to the collapse of 
public support for the war because it fostered the perception that victory 
was not a realistic outcome and that intervention was not worth the cost in 
lives and resources.”8 This narrative of casualty aversion fueled subsequent 
fears of repeating the mistakes of Vietnam and again allowing the country 
to become mired in unwinnable wars.
Although Vietnam often takes the central place in research on casu-
alty aversion, there is ample evidence of its influence in other conflicts as 
well. Choices made during virtually every American military operation 
since Vietnam have been linked to this phenomenon. Somalia became an-
other of the recurrent examples of the effects of casualty aversion when 
the loss of eighteen American soldiers precipitated a withdrawal from the 
country.9 Moskos goes so far as to say that the conflict created a “Somalia 
syndrome” to replace the Vietnam syndrome in demonstrating that the 
American public will not tolerate casualties.10 Sapolsky and Shapiro echo 
this sentiment when they say that “one very bad night was enough to start 
our planning for a withdrawal from Somalia.”11 The collapse of support 
for the intervention in Somalia is remarkable in these accounts because it 
came suddenly and after a single incident, rather than following years of 
smaller declines in support, as in Vietnam.
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Mueller’s work has remained central to sustaining the view that civil-
ians are highly sensitive to wounded and dead soldiers. Most recently, he 
has argued that the war in Iraq showed the same basic process of support 
falling as casualties increase, though in this instance he sees the process 
occurring even more rapidly than in the past.12 Luttwak writes of the emer-
gence of post- heroic warfare in an era when “military force collides with 
the general refusal of the American public to sanction interventions in 
place after place without end.”13 As he sees it, behind the public reluctance 
to fight is the desire to avoid loss that has become stronger with the shrink-
ing size of families. The implication is that victory requires the ability to 
withstand casualties and to persevere undaunted.
Some have argued that the evidence for casualty aversion is less 
straightforward. Burk finds evidence of rapid fluctuations in support for 
the intervention in Lebanon and a counterintuitive increase in Americans’ 
willingness to fight after the bombing of the Marine barracks. He likewise 
identifies a drop in public support for fighting in Somalia taking place 
before the battle that left eighteen soldiers dead, then being erroneously 
cited as an effect of the battle. This leads him to conclude that “patterns of 
public support for peacekeeping missions reveal no irrational or kneejerk 
reactions based on a putative unwillingness to tolerate casualties.”14 Eric 
Larson disputes the evidence that the American public has a low toler-
ance for casualties and argues that “it is more accurate to say that the 
public hopes for low- to- no casualty operations but fears a very different 
outcome.”15 Here casualty sensitivity simply appears as a preference and 
not as a decisive factor influencing American foreign policy. Charles Hyde 
goes even further by characterizing casualty aversion as a myth and saying 
that the members of the public make careful evaluations about conflicts 
that are guided by rational decision procedures and cues from leaders.16
Much of the recent work on casualty aversion has sought to show that 
it is a more complex process than one of casualties producing a clear de-
cline in support for war. Some have even given renewed attention to the 
early works on casualty aversion to show that the formative studies of this 
phenomenon made more complex predictions than this type of straight-
forward drop.17 Other studies have identified additional intervening vari-
ables. Kriner and Shen contend that the strength of casualty sensitivity 
varies depending on where the casualties come from, with those commu-
nities that have suffered disproportionately in the past being less willing 
to support new military ventures.18 This has regional and socioeconomic 
manifestations that reflect disparities in where members of the military 
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come from. This builds on work from Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening that 
shows similar differences in support for the Vietnam War depending on 
the extent of suffering communities endured in the fighting.19
Delany finds that multiple factors influenced the decision to withdraw 
American forces from Somalia, and that the growing number of casualties 
was only the final cause in building a consensus that the war, and the proj-
ect of nation- building more broadly, was not in the country’s interests.20 
Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler argue that casualty sensitivity does have some 
influence on support for wars, but that it is only one of a cluster of factors 
that voters take into account and that it is outweighed by the perceived 
likelihood of success and attitudes toward a war’s justifiability. We will re-
turn to these other causal mechanisms over the following chapters, paying 
special attention in chapter 5 to anticipations of success and failure. For 
now, the critical point is that these authors find some decline in support 
for war as casualties mount, but that it is rarely as sudden or as clearly 
linked to military losses as the conventional wisdom about the casualty 
sensitive American public would have it.
Some of those who suffer the most during wars, such as those who are 
injured or whose family members and friends are injured or killed, may 
not feel casualty aversion. Boettcher and Cobb argue that support for the 
war in Iraq remained high enough to sustain military operations and even 
to secure George Bush’s re- election because of the influence of the sunk 
costs trap.21 Far from triggering a withdrawal, the losses led many policy-
makers and civilians to call for a sustained investment in Iraq that would 
redeem the losses and ensure that they were not in vain. The military’s 
response to early defeats was, in General Petraeus’ words, to “go all in” in 
an effort to reclaim the losses, a decision that prompted the troop surge 
of 2007.22 This research reveals that the interplay of casualties and support 
for war is far from certain and that much disagreement remains about the 
mechanisms driving shifts in approval for fighting.
Casualty Aversion and Restraint
In Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, and Iraq, most of the evidence sup-
porting low casualty tolerance emerged during the fighting. The typical 
approach to studying casualty sensitivity in these cases is by comparing 
casualty figures to polling data, sometimes while situating these figures in 
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the context of events taking place during the war that may offer insight 
into intervening variables. For example, studies may show a steady decline 
in enthusiasm for fighting in Vietnam, then a sharp drop following the 
perceived American loss of the Tet Offensive, or they show that support for 
the intervention in Somalia fell gradually and that the Battle of Mogadishu 
did not actually disrupt the existing trend. Whatever the cases involved, 
this method of searching for the effects of casualties as they occur is in line 
with Mueller’s discovery of a steady decline in support for war as more 
American soldiers were injured or killed. However, this is only one possible 
way of interpreting the evidence.
In addition to casualties causing drops in public support during a con-
flict, we may also see casualty aversion in relation to anticipated losses. Here 
casualties are a constraint on when and how wars can be initiated, rather 
than a force compelling the end of conflicts already in progress. Many 
studies of American foreign policy throughout the 1990s link military re-
straint and an unwillingness to effectively prosecute operations with a fear 
of the public backlash that might occur.23 The American interventions in 
the Balkans stand out as some of the strongest evidence of anticipated 
casualties restraining military operations. Ignatieff says of the intervention 
in Kosovo that “[i]t was fought without ground troops, in the hope and 
expectation that there would be no casualties at all.” In many ways this is 
an even more powerful manifestation of casualty aversion than drops in 
support that occur during a war, since it may seriously constrain when and 
how military force is used rather than just limiting the duration and extent 
of operations.
The effects of casualty aversion should be seen not only in the public 
responses to losses that actually occur, but also in the pressures of avoiding 
those casualties in the first place. The problem is that the effects of casualty 
aversion on future actions is difficult to gauge because it requires explor-
ing counterfactual scenarios. As Smith points out, “it is . . . easy to claim 
that a decision not to make a commitment is based on fear of casualties 
and difficult for a government to deny such a charge, since it has to prove 
a negative.”24 It remains unclear whether reservations about intervening in 
Kosovo or starting other prospective American military operations were 
informed by fears of military losses or by other considerations. It is espe-
cially problematic to say when, if ever, the fear of losing soldiers has com-
pelled politicians to avoid fighting. With no casualty figures to link with 
polling data in these instances, it is impossible to tell whether shifts in sup-
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port for a potential war are driven by the anticipated casualties or by some 
other factor. This challenge informs our methodological approach, which 
we describe in detail later in the chapter, of employing survey experiments 
about hypothetical conflicts. These experiments allow us to gain deeper 
insight into prospective conflicts, which cannot be judged with polling data 
because of their hypothetical character.
The arguments mobilized to support drone operations reveals that 
these machines are often justified based on their ability to reduce the risk 
to American military personnel. Strawser argues that armed forces have 
a moral obligation to protect their personnel to the greatest extent pos-
sible.25 It would, he thinks, be irresponsible and morally questionable for 
them to deliberately expose soldiers to the hazards of the battlefield when 
there are technologies for improving their security. Extrapolating from 
this, it is possible that the availability of drones could promote a sense 
that it is unfair to risk soldiers’ lives unnecessarily. Sapolsky and Shapiro 
reach a similar conclusion when speaking about new military technologies 
more generally.26 They find that each time the United States reduces the 
number of civilian and military casualties incurred by an operation, it also 
raises expectations for future operations. They envision a kind of ratchet in 
which policymakers and members of the military must continually strive 
to either improve on past performance or face a public backlash for not 
meeting expectations. This suggests that the availability of drones and their 
recent use in relatively low- cost operations (at least to American military 
personnel) may intensify preferences for drones and other precision weap-
ons compared to employing manned aircraft or ground forces.
In much of the literature, casualty aversion is characterized as an un-
desirable phenomenon that has high political and strategic costs for the 
United States. Many of the commentators who find evidence that casualty 
aversion is overstated or that it does not exist explain the persistent belief in 
it as a misperception by elites. Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver, who find mixed 
support for casualty aversion, contend that “the view that the public is 
casualty phobic is widely entrenched among policymakers and the elite.”27 
Building on his contention that the phenomenon is largely illusory, Hyde 
says that there is “strong evidence that policymakers and senior military 
leaders believe the American public is casualty averse and will not tolerate 
deaths except when vital interests are at stake.”28 He goes on to say that 
“[b]y attributing casualty aversion to the public, civilian and military elites 
have masked their own aversion to casualties and threatened our status 
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as a superpower.”29 Work on American military strategy throughout the 
1980s and 1990s reveals widespread concern over the prospects of erod-
ing civilian support and, in particular, of another Vietnam. Policymakers’ 
reticence to lose soldiers is also evident in their rhetoric and their decisions 
about whether to support wars.30 Kull and Destler report that the desire to 
avoid losing soldiers in combat was a theme of their interviews with senior 
government officials.31
The perception that the American public has limited tolerance for los-
ing soldiers extends beyond American officials. Gentry finds evidence of 
figures as diverse as Yugoslav, Syrian, and Iraqi leaders, Iranian and Chi-
nese generals, and terrorists predicting that they could defeat the United 
States by inflicting light casualties and undermining public support for 
fighting.32 Osama bin Laden famously claimed that the withdrawal from 
Somalia demonstrated the country’s unwillingness to pay the costs of war.33 
These perceptions even play a role in negotiations, as in the case of a Chi-
nese official refusing to back down during a 1996 confrontation over Tai-
wan, saying, “We’ve watched you in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, you don’t 
have the will.”34 Sapolsky and Shapiro contend that “we have grown ever 
more sensitive about casualties . . . and we seek to avoid them. This limits 
our ability to exercise the tremendous power we possess and makes us sus-
ceptible to pressures others can ignore.”35 With these points in mind, some 
conclude that perceived casualty aversion on the part of American and 
foreign officials will limit foreign policy choices, slow military responses, 
and undermine the country’s ability to exercise deterrence.36 Thus, accord-
ing to some, casualty aversion is a potentially dangerous phenomenon that 
reduces security and should be overcome.
Critics of drone warfare tend to take a much different perspective on 
casualty aversion, seeing it as a beneficial constraint on military operations 
that must be sustained in the interest of preventing unnecessary or aggres-
sive wars. We already mentioned Singer’s concern that using drones to 
avoid costly military operations could trivialize conflicts. He also says that 
when the costs of war diminish, leaders gain a dangerous freedom of action 
that could lead them to initiate conflicts at will: “[a] leader needn’t carry 
out the kind of consensus building that is normally needed before a war, 
and doesn’t even need to unite the country behind the effort.”37
Others raise similar concerns, making this one of the most powerful 
arguments against drone warfare. Kaag and Kreps argue that public op-
position to losing soldiers is one of the central mechanisms through which 
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citizens force the government to be accountable to its wishes. They con-
tend that the pressure to avoid costly wars is responsible for the growing 
use of drones, which will ultimately succeed in limiting public engage-
ment in use of force decisions and degrading accountability. They say that 
“methods of warfare that leverage technology in order to insulate citizen- 
soldiers from harm” and that this “creates the possibility that leaders will 
no longer, in a prudential sense, have to obtain popular permission to go 
to war.”38 Linda Johansson argues that pilot invulnerability “might have an 
impact on domestic opinion, and, in turn, lower the threshold of entering 
and sustaining a war.”
Frank Sauer and Niklas Schörnig contend that drones are uniquely at-
tractive to democracies because they allow elected officials to wage wars 
without the potential adverse consequences that would come from losing 
soldiers in battle. Thus, as with Kaag and Kreps, they see the invulnerabil-
ity of drone operators as a threat to accountability and the loss of one of 
the barriers against initiating wars. Finally, in another variation of this ar-
gument, Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun conclude that drones make 
major wars less likely by preventing cycles of escalation between states, 
but that they will make small wars much easier by lowering the costs of 
intervention. This suggests that it will be especially important to test the 
effects of drones on approval for fighting by looking at small military in-
terventions that may only be tenable when the anticipated casualties are 
light or nonexistent.39
Both supporters and critics of combat drones, then, use the fact that 
these weapons produce no military casualties to bolster their conclusions, 
albeit with much different goals in mind. The conjecture that drones could 
make it easier to fight by circumventing casualty sensitivity is plausible, but 
at present there is no strong empirical evidence supporting it. Those who 
advance this claim rely primarily on studies of casualty aversion produced 
before drones were being actively used in combat or that fail to distinguish 
drones from other attack types. With so many of the moral concerns relat-
ing to drones resting on this empirical prediction, it is imperative to gain 
better understanding of whether drones actually have any effect on per-
ceptions of conflict. Our purpose differs from these other commentators; 
we seek to determine if it is true that the pilot invulnerability enabled by 
drones is one of the reasons that individuals, on average, prefer this means 
of attack over others.
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Attack Type and Support for the Use of Force:  
Survey Experiments
The discussion to this point indicates that concern about military casualties 
often is a key influence on individuals’ attitudes toward the use of military 
force. All things equal, attacks conducted by drones should receive more 
support than attacks that expose military personnel to the risk of physi-
cal harm, an expectation supported by the conjoint experiment discussed 
in the previous chapter. To assess this idea, we designed a vignette- based 
survey experiment that manipulated the type of attack. All respondents 
read a mock news story that began with the statement that al Qaeda had 
established training camps in the country of Yemen and planned to use 
these to attack American targets:
Terrorists connected to al Qaeda have established bases and training 
camps in the country of Yemen in the Middle East. Political tur-
moil has prevented the government of Yemen from acting against 
the terrorists. Recently the Yemen branch of al Qaeda attempted to 
bomb an American airliner and to mail bombs to the United States. 
American intelligence agencies have identified the location of the al 
Qaeda bases in Yemen.
This introduction was followed with information about how the United 
States planned to attack these bases. Respondents were randomly assigned 
to read a paragraph that described the attack as being carried out by drones, 
by aircraft with onboard crews, or by ground troops:
Drone Strike: The United States plans to launch attacks on these 
bases with missiles fired from unmanned drone aircraft to kill al 
Qaeda leaders and militants. The use of unmanned drones means 
that no American military personnel would be placed at risk.
Air Strike: The United States plans to launch attacks on these bases 
with bombs dropped from airplanes to kill al Qaeda leaders and 
militants. The militants are believed to lack weapons capable of at-
tacking these airplanes.
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Ground Troops: The United States plans to strike the bases with 
American paratroopers. These American troops would attack the 
militants and their leaders located in the bases.
After reading this news story, respondents were asked to indicate how 
much they supported the attack and to answer some additional questions 
detailed below. This chapter’s second expectation leads us to expect that 
the average level of support among respondents who read about an attack 
by drones will be higher than among those who read about an assault with 
ground forces. Average support among those who read about air strikes 
should fall somewhere between these two extremes.
We followed previous experiments on support for the use of force in 
choosing Yemen as the location for this scenario, for two reasons.40 First, 
the scenario is a realistic one; al Qaeda has, in fact, used Yemen as a base 
from which to attack American targets, such as the suicide bombing of 
the USS Cole in 2000 and attempts to bring down airliners bound for the 
United States in 2010 and 2011. As we discussed in chapter 1, Yemen has 
also been the site of many American targeted killing operations involving 
drones, special operations forces, and precision- guided munitions such as 
cruise missiles and missiles launched from manned aircraft. Respondents 
are therefore apt to perceive Yemen as a realistic setting for US military 
interventions and may even recall some of these previous missions.
Second, few Americans are familiar with Yemen, and the country did 
not receive a great deal of news coverage while we conducted this experi-
ment. Polls of Americans’ knowledge of international affairs show that 
most people have little awareness of events in the country.41 Over the 
course of our research, the fighting against al Qaeda in Iraq, then Islamic 
State in Syria and Iraq, received far more attention than drone operations 
in other countries. This means that most respondents reading our experi-
mental conditions should base their responses on its content rather than 
on information they have independently acquired by reading or watching 
news media (see the chapter appendix for the full texts of all the news 
story conditions). Even more importantly, there was a risk that fictional 
scenarios involving more familiar conflict areas or rivals, such as Iran, 
Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, would produce bias because of the 
greater public awareness of them and the stronger negative connotations. 
Yemen is therefore a good case in which we can create plausible fictional 
conflicts without much risk of respondents’ background knowledge of the 
region interfering with their decisions.
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The experiment manipulates how the United States plans to carry out 
attacks on the militant bases, which we call the attack type. While all re-
spondents’ news stories contained identical background information on 
the situation in Yemen, the attack type is systematically varied. Respon-
dents were randomly assigned to news stories that described the attack as 
being carried out by “unmanned drone aircraft,” “bombs dropped from 
airplanes,” or “American paratroopers.” The first two of these conditions 
included information about the likelihood of military casualties. The drone 
strike condition stated that “[t]he use of unmanned drones means that no 
American military personnel would be placed at risk.” The air strike con-
dition included the information that “[t]he militants are believed to lack 
weapons capable of attacking these airplanes.”
One concern is that including this information about the chance that 
Americans service members could be harmed might draw the attention of 
some respondents to the issue of military casualties, reducing their will-
ingness to support the attack. Previous research on framing, especially 
work grounded in prospect theory, has found that emphasizing losses can 
prompt a risk- averse style of thinking.42 When it comes to the decision 
to initiate war, this work has found that presenting the adverse effects of 
fighting, which include not only the expected casualties but also other neg-
ative evaluations like a low likelihood of success or high civilian casualty 
estimates, can reduce support for war by encouraging members of the pub-
lic to focus on the possible bad consequences of fighting over the benefits 
that it may offer. This suggests that explicitly mentioning expected mili-
tary casualties could cause a decline in support for military operations.43 
Studies of framing that deal with drone strikes and autonomous weapons 
have likewise shown that framing plays an important role in activating 
risk aversion. When questions mention the human costs of launching at-
tacks or normative transgressions, respondents become less supportive of 
launching attacks.44
We decided to include information about expected casualties in the 
treatments for three reasons. First, doing this ensures that respondents 
understood this element of each attack type. Our worry was that not in-
cluding these details would lead respondents to pay little attention to the 
type of attack that was planned and instead focus on the more general 
issue of whether it was a good idea to use military force in this situation. 
This is particularly important when it comes to evaluating support for 
drones. These weapons platforms are relatively new, having only been used 
to launch attacks for around ten years at the time of the study. Without 
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some mention of the potential risk of military casualties, it may be diffi-
cult for some respondents with little knowledge of military affairs to make 
informed risk evaluations when drones are involved.
Second, the conjoint experiment discussed in chapter 2 shows that not 
including information about the risk of harm that military personnel face 
does not alter the findings we report below. That experiment also varies 
the attack type, but the conditions include no mention of the chance of 
military casualties. The results of that experiment are consistent with those 
we discuss in this chapter, lending credence to the idea that including this 
information did not decisively influence our findings.
Third, if explicit mention that drone strikes will not result in mili-
tary casualties and that air strikes might result in casualties were to have 
any influence on respondents’ risk evaluations, then the existing research 
indicates that the effect would be to increase the divide between these 
two treatments.45 Explicitly mentioning the possibility of casualties when 
it comes to air strikes is apt to trigger a risk- averse stance, while ruling 
out that possibility when it comes to drone strikes should trigger a risk- 
acceptance stance. If these different attitudes are activated, then the effect 
would be to increase the divide between the drone and air strike treat-
ments. As we will discuss later in the chapter, the separation between the 
drone and air strike treatments is fairly small, indicating that any influence 
of risk framing on evaluations was likewise weak or nonexistent.
After reading the news story, all respondents answered the same four 
questions.46 The first asked them to rate the attack plan on a seven- point 
scale ranging from “definitely do not carry out attack” to “definitely carry 
out attack.” Responses to this question are used to assess the chapter’s first 
expectation. They were then asked to estimate how likely it was that the 
attack would result in military casualties, achieve its military objectives, 
and kill civilians. We included these questions to evaluate the chapter’s 
second expectation, which holds that respondents assigned to the drone 
strike condition would predict that there would be fewer military casual-
ties than those in the ground troops condition. As discussed in chapter 1, 
some proponents of drones suggest that in addition to reducing military 
casualties, their technical capabilities, such as the ability to integrate real- 
time intelligence into the timing and targets of attacks, make them both 
better at achieving military objectives and less likely to cause civilian harm. 
The last two questions assess whether respondents assigned to read about 
drone strikes were more likely to think the attack would succeed or avoid 
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civilian casualties than those who read about an air strike or the use of 
ground troops.
We conducted this experiment with two respondent pools about one 
month apart.47 The first was recruited by the survey research firm YouGov 
and is a sample of 1,000 adults that is representative of the population of 
the United States.48 The second was a sample of 1,202 adults recruited 
via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online labor market. Duplicating the same 
experiment with these two respondent pools allows comparison of how 
nationally representative samples, such as our YouGov respondents, and 
respondents in convenience samples respond to the same manipulations. 
Respondents in convenience samples such as Mechanical Turk may re-
spond to experimental treatments in different ways than do respondents 
in more representative samples. In later chapters, we rely on Mechanical 
Turk samples to assess hypotheses about the effects of drone warfare on at-
titudes. The identical experiments analyzed in this chapter produce similar 
findings across the two different samples. This suggests that the findings 
of our subsequent work that uses convenience samples alone is likely to 
reflect mechanisms that have a strong potential to be generalized to the 
public at large.
We preregistered our plan for collecting and analyzing data prior to 
fielding the experiments.49 Preregistration strengthens confidence that our 
findings, and the similarities across the representative and convenience 
samples, are not the product of post hoc decisions about which measures 
to include or how to conduct the analysis. Our pre- analysis plan identifies 
the dependent variable as responses to the question asking about support 
for the attack described in the news story, and ordered logistic regression as 
the estimator. We follow the convention of using weights for the data from 
the representative sample but not the convenience sample.50 The key in-
dependent variables are dichotomous variables identifying if respondents 
were randomly assigned to the air strike and ground troop conditions; as-
signment to drone strike treatment is the excluded category.
Our expectation is that the coefficients on the ground troop variables 
will be negative. We also include standard covariates for both samples: 
gender, party identification, age, education, and identification as a mem-
ber of a minority group. The chapter appendix compares the political and 
demographic characteristics of the representative and convenience samples 
to those of the American National Election Survey (ANES), which has 
rigorous procedures for selecting a random sample of adults. Our YouGov 
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sample is similar to the ANES sample, while the Mechanical Turk respon-
dents for this experiment are, on average, younger and more likely to have 
a college degree, to identify as agnostic or atheist, to be Caucasian, and to 
be Democrats. These differences are typical for such samples.51 For this 
convenience sample, we run an additional model that includes five ad-
ditional covariates: age squared, income, marital status, political ideology, 
and identification as atheist or agnostic. Previous research finds that in-
cluding these covariates produces estimates of causal effects in Mechanical 
Turk samples that are qualitatively similar to those produced when identi-
cal experiments are conducted with representative samples.52 This allows 
us to further identify the degree to which our substantive findings differ 
across these two sampling frames.
Figure 3.1 plots the percentage of support offered by respondents in 
our YouGov sample in each of the three conditions.53 Two facts stand out. 
First, large fractions of respondents support the use of force across the 
three attack types. This is consistent with previous work that has found 
that Americans are particularly willing to support military action to coun-
ter terrorism directed at the United States.54 Furthermore, the experiment 
was conducted at a time when the actual threat of terrorist attacks against 
the United States and its interests was quite high. Over the previous year, 
Islamic State– inspired terrorists had launched attacks in the United States, 
Belgium, and France, all of which received extensive press coverage.55 
Based on this we can surmise that casualty sensitivity may be a barrier to 
initiating wars, but that perceived national security imperatives can still 
be strong enough to push the public to support war despite the possibility 
of losing soldiers. Even after more than a decade of intractable fighting in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, leaders could plausibly rally sufficient backing to 
send American forces into another conflict. It is essential to avoid over-
stating the extent of casualty aversion or underestimating the power of 
perceived national security priorities when it comes to mobilizing support 
for war.
Second, differences across the conditions are modest; of the respon-
dents who read about an attack by ground troops, a slightly smaller per-
centage supported attacking, and a slightly larger percentage opposed at-
tacking, compared to those who read about attacks by drones or aircraft. 
This is consistent with our first expectation that attack type influences sup-
port for the use of force, but suggests that the substantive effect of varia-
tion in attack type may be smaller than indicated by those who fear that 
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using drones will substantially increase public support for military action. 
The differences across attack types has several important implications. It 
is further evidence that casualty aversion is not an overwhelming impedi-
ment to initiating wars. Fear of loss appears to shift levels of support, but 
only by a modest amount. It seems doubtful that such small changes will 
have a decisive impact on whether the country goes to war, especially when 
leaders have a degree of autonomy from public opinion and may initiate 
wars even when they lack majority backing. It is possible that casualty aver-
sion could have a stronger limiting influence in other countries, but in the 
case of the United States there is little empirical basis for the concern that 
drones will seriously alter the public’s willingness to fight terrorism with 
military force. This sheds light on the moral debate over drone warfare by 
challenging the widespread assumption that drones make it easier to fight.
The similarities between treatments involving drones or inhabited air-
craft give us greater insight into how the American public perceives the 
risks associated with war. Drones may in principle mark a radical step 
beyond inhabited aircraft because they make pilots invulnerable, but 
from the public’s standpoint, all air warfare seems to be relatively safe. 
Fig. 3.1. Support for 
use of force by attack 
type
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This is likely a product of decades of American air superiority. US fight-
ers and bombers have dominated the skies against enemies with limited 
anti- aircraft resources. Only a few pilots have been shot down in recent 
conflicts, with most aerial casualties coming from friendly fire and acci-
dents. Moreover, survivability is high for combat aircraft. Since the end 
of the Cold War, many pilots who have been shot down by enemy fire 
have managed to escape and were later rescued. As long as the US mili-
tary is preoccupied with fighting insurgents and terrorists, the comparative 
risks associated with drones and inhabited aircraft will continue to be low. 
These will only change substantially if the United States begins operations 
against conventional enemies, though even in this case the public’s back-
ground assumptions about risk may persist until the country begins losing 
pilots in action.
Returning to the debate over the morality of drone warfare, the close 
relationship between attitudes toward both types of aircraft is evidence 
that the real challenge related to the disappearance of casualty aversion 
is not coming from drones. Rather, it is a result of asymmetric balances 
of power between opposing belligerents. So long as inhabited aircraft are 
virtually invulnerable from enemy fire, they present roughly the same ad-
vantages as drones. The possibility of harming pilots onboard aircraft does 
not matter much when the pilots are rarely harmed in practice. The ability 
to circumvent feelings of casualty aversion are therefore not fixed and un-
changing. They depend heavily on enemy military capacities. Expanding 
on this, other vehicles that offer similar asymmetric advantages or height-
ened survivability for crews could have the same capacity to moderate per-
ceived risks as drones themselves.
In terms of bypassing casualty sensitivity, the unique advantages drones 
offer will only be strongly felt when comparable inhabited vehicles are 
threatened. As discussed in chapter 1, current generation drones will prob-
ably have limited utility in these conflicts because they are more suscep-
tible to enemy aircraft and anti- aircraft systems than planes with onboard 
crews, which are faster and have more sophisticated countermeasures. 
Thus, the advantages drones confer when it comes to generating a consen-
sus for war will probably be most valuable when leaders are less likely to 
consider these to be the optimal means of attack.
Table 3.2 takes up the issue of casualty sensitivity more systematically. 
It reports the results of four ordered logistic regression models, using sup-
port for the attack as the dependent variable. Models 1 and 2 use data 
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from the representative YouGov sample; models 3 and 4 use data from 
the Mechanical Turk convenience sample. In model 1, the only indepen-
dent variables included are dichotomous measures of assignment to the air 
strike or ground troops conditions. Model 2 adds the covariates outlined 
in our pre- analysis plan. Models 3 and 4 report similar analyses for the 
convenience sample; model 3 uses the same covariates as model 2, while 
model 4 adds the covariates that previous research suggests will produce 
results most similar to those in the representative sample. Across the four 
models, coefficients on the air strike variable are not significant, indicating 
that, on average, respondents in our two samples did not systematically 
prefer drone strikes to attacks from manned aircraft. The coefficients on 
the ground troops variable are negative and statistically significant in all 
four of the models. Our respondents, then, do prefer that attacks be car-
ried out by drones rather than by ground troops.
Turning briefly to the control variables, we see results that are broadly 
consistent with previous work on support for the use of force. Individu-
als whose party identification is Republican express more support for 
attacks in models 2 and 3. This variable is not significant in model 4, but 
the measure for political ideology it includes is positive and significant, 
indicating that more politically conservative respondents are willing to 
engage in the use of force. Individuals who are older also express more 
support for military action, as indicated by the age variable in models 2 
and 3 and the square of this variable in model 4. Women are less likely 
to express support for the attack, although this variable is only significant 
in the convenience sample.
The final row of table 3.2 reports the odds ratios for the ground troops 
variable in models 2, 3, and 4. These indicate the change in the likelihood 
that a respondent would select the highest level of the dependent variable 
(“definitely attack”) compared to all of the six lower levels of support for 
military action, holding all other covariates at their means. This sort of 
comparison is a meaningful one, as we saw in figure 3.1 that pluralities of 
respondents in each of the conditions endorsed launching the attack that 
they read about. For model 2, for example, individuals who read about the 
use of ground troops were 28 percent less likely to offer the fullest degree 
of support for the attack than those who read about the drone strike. The 
corresponding odds ratios for models 3 and 4 are of similar magnitude.
We saw in figure 3.1 that there are small but discernible differences in 
the attitudes of respondents based on the content of the news story they 
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read, with those who read about an attack by drones being more willing 
to support the use of force. The statistical analysis sheds additional light 
on this relationship. It tells us that the differences we observe in figure 3.1 
between respondents assigned to the drone and ground troop treatments 
are statistically significant (albeit at the p < .10 level in model 1), but that 
respondents who read about drone strikes and air strikes offered similar 
levels of support for the planned attack. This relationship holds when we 
include control variables such as party identification, meaning we can be 
more confident that it is the attack type and not some difference in indi-
TABLE 3.2. Ordered Logistic Regression Models of Attack Type and Support for the 
Use of Force
Representative Sample Convenience Sample
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Air strike .03 .10 −.19 −.19
(.14) (.15) (.13) (.13)
Ground troops −.24* −.33** −.46*** −.42***
(.14) (.15) (.13) (.13)
Gender −.10 −.18* −.19*
(.12) (.10) (.11)
Party identification .11*** .24*** .07
(.03) (.03) (.05)
Age .03*** .02*** −.05
(.004) (.005) (.03)
Education −.09** .06 .03
(.04) (.04) (.04)












Observations 994 947 1,202 1,197
Log likelihood −1,603 −1,471 −2,083 −2,047
Ground troops odds 
ratio
.79 .72 .63 .65 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.
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vidual characteristics that determines different levels of support for the 
attack across treatments.
We also see that the relationship is similar in both the representative 
YouGov sample and the convenience Mechanical Turk sample. This will 
prove important in subsequent chapters, where we rely on additional con-
venience samples to assess our empirical expectations. The fact that re-
spondents in both respondent pools respond in similar ways suggests that 
the findings of our later chapters have the potential to generalize from 
our online samples to more representative groups. These experiments in-
dicate that drones have an incremental effect on attitudes and that, as we 
saw in chapter 2, other factors continue to exert powerful influences over 
support for the use of force. Thus, while we argue that the risk of drones 
circumventing casualty aversion has been overstated, we do think that it is 
important to treat the availability of drones as being one consideration in 
the overall explanation of what directs public opinion when the country is 
contemplating war.
To this point, our analysis is consistent with the idea that individu-
als are a bit more willing to express support for an attack carried out by 
drones than one carried out by ground troops. But this sheds less light on 
why people favor drones. In chapter 1 we suggested three reasons for this 
relationship. The first is that drones eliminate the risk of military casual-
ties, and a great deal of research concludes that avoiding such harm is 
an important consideration when Americans assess the utility of military 
force. A second is that, given drones’ technological capabilities to loiter for 
long periods and to collect intelligence on targets in real time, individuals 
might favor drones because they are seen as a highly selective type of mili-
tary force that is more likely to achieve battlefield objectives. A third, and 
related, reason is that these capabilities may reduce the chance that drones, 
compared to other attack types, will cause civilian casualties.
We assessed these arguments by asking respondents how likely they 
thought that the attack described in the news story they read was to result 
in military casualties, a successful attack, and civilian casualties. Figures 3.2 
through 3.4 plot responses to these questions from respondents from our 
representative sample. In figure 3.2, we see that respondents were consid-
erably more likely to expect military casualties if they read about an attack 
by ground troops than by aircraft or drones.56 This is consistent with the 
proposition that avoiding such harm influenced the degree to which they 
supported the attacks. However, no such relationship exists for mission 
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success (figure 3.3)57 or civilian casualties (figure 3.4),58 indicating that 
the type of attack exerted little influence on expectations regarding these 
outcomes. The absence of a relationship between perceptions of mission 
success and civilian casualties reinforces this point. The fact that these two 
factors do not vary systematically across treatments, while the expectation 
of military casualties does, is consistent with our expectation that the latter 
is an important reason why respondents were more supportive of attacks 
with drones than with ground troops.
These finding suggest that military casualties matter for respondents’ 
support for the attack. These experiments, however, are not definitive on 
this point. The reason for this is that respondents in the drone strike and 
air strike conditions were provided with information suggesting that mili-
tary personnel would face low risks of harm if the attacks took place, so the 
relationship depicted in figure 3.2 could simply reflect this feature of the 
experiment.59 However, we saw in the conjoint survey experiment in chap-
ter 2 that similar patterns hold when information about military casualties 
is not included, indicating that our findings in this chapter are unlikely to 
be a result of this specific design choice.
Fig. 3.2. Estimates of 
military casualties by 
attack type
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Conclusion
It is important to reiterate here that our experiments in this chapter and 
throughout the book focus on how casualty aversion influences the pub-
lic’s support for new military ventures. The experiments respondents read 
involve the initiation of wars or the expansion of ongoing conflicts into 
new areas. Initial support for war may not always be a good indicator of 
whether a war will continue to be popular over the long term. As Mueller 
points out, the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq had considerable support 
early on and yet became unpopular once hostilities began.60 The level of 
support for a new intervention could therefore drop substantially once the 
costs become real, especially if these deviate from what elites have prom-
ised. Burk even says that the core problem of casualty aversion is not build-
ing the support to start an intervention but rather “The worry is that public 
support for missions, which seems sufficient, will quickly evaporate when 
faced with American casualties.”61 However, this is likely an overstatement. 
As we saw earlier, many commentators link casualty aversion to a loss of 
American deterrent power (which is premised on inhibiting the initial use 
Fig. 3.3. Estimates of 
civilian casualties by 
attack type
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of force that we test here) and credit this feeling with producing a spate of 
low- intensity military operations since the Vietnam War, as well as causing 
a general reticence to fight when American interests in doing so were weak.
Of course, there is an even more important reason for looking at the 
beginning of conflicts rather than at changes in support for ongoing wars. 
Thus far our only experience with American drone strikes has come in 
the context of a War on Terror that is difficult to characterize as a single 
coherent war, at least not in the same sense that Vietnam or Somalia were 
self- contained wars. As discussed in chapter 1, drone strikes have been 
characterized not by sustained operations but by sporadic attacks taking 
place around the world and against an ever- changing array of targets. In 
this context, judgments about the permissibility of fighting must often be 
made on a case- by- case basis. They continually arise as attacks expand geo-
graphically and as new targets are selected. That is to say, during the War 
on Terror, the American public continually faces new conflict scenarios 
akin to those we describe in the experiments even though these strikes are 
ostensibly part of an ongoing war.
Recall that one of the central concerns among those who consider ca-
sualty aversion to be an unfortunate limitation on American foreign policy 
Fig. 3.4. Estimates of 
success by attack type
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was that it (or at least perceptions of it) prevents the United States from 
coercing rivals. Whether the United States actually engages in coercive 
deterrence will depend heavily on whether elites sense that they can risk 
committing military forces and still be assured of public support. The en-
during gap between elite perceptions of civilian casualty sensitivity and 
the public’s willingness to sustain some losses is therefore an important 
consideration when anticipating what effects public opinion will have on 
policymakers’ choices. Our experiments do not gauge elite attitudes to-
ward drones, yet this issue of elite perception and its relationship to casu-
alty aversion shows that any effects of public opinion will continue to be 
influenced by and mediated by elites. The consequences of casualty sen-
sitivity for the American capacity for deterrence are therefore apt to vary 
considerably depending on the views of American officials and of those on 
the receiving end of coercion.
It is also important to be aware that the effects of casualty sensitivity 
may vary over time and continue to change as the public gains familiarity 
with drones. Levy argues that sensitivity to losses only empowers civilians 
in the short term, and that over time the restrictive force of public opin-
ion dissipates as the military seeks ways of circumventing it. In particular, 
military elites may attempt to speed up the decision- making process to 
outpace public opinion formation, create contingency plans that weaken 
civilian oversight, or increase their influence over the decision- making pro-
cess. Drones themselves may arguably be one means of re- empowering the 
military and intelligence services, as they seem to fit closely with the pro-
cess Levy describes as reducing risks to soldiers with the goal of increasing 
the military’s freedom of action. Drone warfare could therefore be a conse-
quence of casualty aversion and an effort to reassert the military’s ability to 
wage war without being constrained by external pressures.
Although Levy sets out to challenge the dominant understanding of 
casualty aversion, his analysis supports the general conclusion that critics 
of drone warfare tend to draw from that literature: that drones threaten 
to produce a dangerous drop in civilian concern over the costs of military 
actions. With this in mind, we should not assume that support for drones 
compared to other types of military force will remain consistent over time, 
and we should continually revisit this topic to gauge shifts in public opin-
ion. This will be especially important following any major security events 
that can dramatically reorient national security priorities, as the War on 
Terror did.62
The focus on the effects of military casualties in this chapter is essential 
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for determining whether the casualty aversion thesis is plausible and what 
effects casualty sensitivity may have on the future of American drone oper-
ations. By isolating this factor and testing it apart from those we discussed 
previously, it is possible to confirm that judgments of prospective military 
operations are informed by assessments of military casualties, but that the 
effects of casualty aversion on overall levels of support for war is small. 
Over the following chapters we will introduce other factors that produce 
a more comprehensive account of how it operates and what effects it will 
have on the future of American military operations.
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Chapter 4
Drones and Policy Objectives
American combat drones have been used extensively to target militants 
and terrorists in countries such as Pakistan and Somalia. Less frequently 
noticed is that they have also been employed for other purposes. As we 
discussed in the first chapter, the United States used drones during the 
civil war in Libya in 2011. At the time, there were no terrorist organiza-
tions there that seriously threatened the United States. Instead, the goal 
of the intervention was to assist the rebels seeking to overthrow Muam-
mar Gaddafi. American officials believed that without decisive action on 
their part, the Gaddafi regime was likely to massacre civilians, and they 
cooperated with other countries to weaken Gaddafi’s forces and to impose 
a no- fly zone.1 Drone strikes in the war in Afghanistan have been used to 
target armed groups, such as the Taliban, that threaten American ground 
troops in the country.2 But an additional goal of such strikes has been to 
bolster the Afghan government in its struggle with the Taliban. In Libya, 
then, drones were used to bring about regime change and prevent a hu-
manitarian disaster; in Afghanistan, they were used to prevent the violent 
overthrow of an ally. This indicates that drones can play an important role 
in a broad range of missions beyond the targeted killings with which they 
are most commonly associated.
Combat drones have not been employed in conventional conflicts with 
states and are currently less suited for this role because of their vulner-
ability to enemy aircraft and air defense systems.3 Nevertheless, the United 
States is investing heavily in developing drones that could penetrate op-
ponents’ air defense and launch attacks against ground targets or ships.4 
While drones have been used most extensively to counter terrorist groups, 
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there have already been cases where they have been employed to achieve 
other political objectives, and in the near future the range of operations 
that drones could undertake may expand rapidly as their technological 
capabilities are developed further. In this chapter, we investigate if and 
how the type of mission, or principal policy objective, influences public 
support for military action when drones are employed.
We also consider how policy objectives shape Americans’ willingness 
to bear losses. Casualty aversion is generally described as constraining uses 
of force and forming a barrier against the initiation of wars, often with-
out any discussion of whether the type of war in question will influence 
public support.5 Those who discuss the possibility that drones may lower 
inhibitions against initiating wars generally do not account for the many 
different reasons why wars are waged and how these reasons may affect 
the public’s willingness to fight and sustain casualties. This leads critics of 
drone warfare to characterize the technology as increasing the incidence of 
wars or lowering inhibitions against fighting as though the objectives being 
pursued have no influence on public opinion. This chapter demonstrates 
that public support for wars is a complex phenomenon, and that other 
considerations aside from the anticipated numbers of military casualties 
can influence people’s support for fighting. Drones may help to avoid the 
antiwar sentiment generated by casualty aversion, but this has limited in-
fluence on the overall levels of support for fighting when important policy 
objectives are at stake.
Distinguishing between types of wars is also essential for understand-
ing the political, moral, and legal implications of drone use. All wars are 
not equal. One war might be seen as less morally and legally justified than 
another, and the desirability of the political goals being pursued may vary.6 
Critics of drone warfare tend to imply that all efforts should be made 
to avoid war under all circumstances and that any effect drones have on 
facilitating combat is undesirable. Conversely, those who support drone 
warfare tend to emphasize drones’ ability to conduct selective attacks while 
downplaying the possibility that those attacks may lead to more aggressive 
wars. In both cases there is little attention to the underlying reasons for 
fighting or how the justification for war may change depending on the 
circumstances. It is not enough to know whether drones make it easier to 
initiate wars; we must know whether they make it easier to initiate just or 
unjust wars in particular.
Wars should usually be avoided, but they are sometimes necessary, and 
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it is therefore best to adopt a more pragmatic attitude when assessing the 
implications of drone warfare and the effects of casualty sensitivity more 
broadly. Judgments about whether inhibiting or enabling wars is good or 
bad must be made on a case- by- case basis with careful attention to the 
reasons for fighting and the availability of nonviolent alternatives. This 
shifts the moral and legal discussion of drone use away from the machines 
themselves and onto the people who will authorize drone strikes. Accept-
ing that attacks are sometimes warranted makes it imperative to determine 
whether attitudes toward drone operations will be shaped by prudential 
calculations about when wars are necessary and justified, or by the ease of 
conducting attacks. If support for drone strikes is influenced by the value 
and legitimacy of the objective being pursued, then we should expect pub-
lic opinion to manifest a fairly responsible attitude about drone use. On 
the other hand, if the public is sensitive to casualties but not to the reasons 
for fighting, then drones strikes could potentially achieve the same level of 
support regardless of whether there are good reasons for fighting.
We build on a large body of research that categorizes different types 
of wars in terms of their principal policy objective (PPO). PPOs can be 
grouped into four general types: counterterrorism, foreign policy restraint, 
internal political change, and humanitarian intervention. Theoretically, 
organizing conflicts in terms of PPOs provides a way of mapping how 
support for drone strikes is influenced by the kinds of conflicts in which 
drones could be used. Methodologically, the literature showing how PPOs 
influence support for wars involving ground forces and air strikes facili-
tates comparisons between our own research and previous studies explor-
ing other influences on public opinion. We build on the insight that wars 
that are perceived as being more important for national security tend to 
receive higher levels of support. We expect that PPOs will affect the will-
ingness to use drones and that support for them will be particularly strong 
for counterterrorism operations because of the prominence of terrorism as 
a security threat.
In this chapter, we contribute to existing work regarding PPOs to in-
vestigate two expectations, summarized in table 4.1. The first is that the 
pattern of greater support for drone strikes that we found in chapters 2 
and 3 for counterterrorism operations is replicated for other PPOs. As 
we discuss below, this relationship is not straightforward; there are plau-
sible reasons to think, for example, that pilot invulnerability in particular 
could make drones especially popular for less intensive military engage-
82  Drones and Support for the Use of Force
ments. The second conjecture is that the additional support for the use of 
force that materializes when drones are employed is actually the smallest 
for counterterrorism operations. In the contemporary era, terrorism is the 
most direct armed threat to the security of the United States. For this rea-
son, we expect individuals to be more willing to incur costs, such as mili-
tary casualties, to counter terrorism than they are to address other threats. 
The survey experiment that makes up the empirical section of the chapter 
finds strong support for the first conjecture, and less overwhelming but 
consistent support for the second. In the conclusion, we discuss some of 
the implications of these findings, including that drones appear to make 
all types of combat politically easier and thus could, at the margin, enable 
leaders to engage in more wars of more types in the future.
Drones and Principal Policy Objectives
A central criticism of drones is that the pilot invulnerability and selectivity 
they allow will lower inhibitions against initiating wars. Most of the com-
mentators who raise this concern do so without considering how different 
types of PPOs could influence public opinion. Their work implies that 
there should be a consistent pattern of drones circumventing limits on 
support for the use of force, and therefore producing greater willingness 
to wage wars compared to when piloted aircraft or ground forces are used, 
regardless of the reasons for fighting. If drone warfare indeed renders the 
population complacent and disengaged, then the PPO may not matter at 
all, since a disengaged public would be indifferent whatever the circum-
stances surrounding an operation. Our findings across multiple experi-
ments challenge the assumption that drones produce an acquiescent and 
uncritical citizenry and lead us to suggest that a more plausible expecta-
tion: that the pattern of greater support for drone strikes than other types 
of force persist across military operations in pursuit of different PPOs. If 
TABLE 4.1. Principal Policy Objective Expectations
Expectation 4.1: Individuals will express greater support for prospective military mis-
sions employing drones compared to other attack types for all principal policy objec-
tives.
Expectation 4.2: Individuals will express greater support for attack types that place mili-
tary personnel at risk when the principal policy objective represents a more important 
national interest.
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this is the case, then we would expect to see that although variation in 
PPOs influences support for war, pilot invulnerability and selectivity will 
guarantee that drones are consistently preferred over alternative methods 
of attack that could put soldiers at risk.
Others suggest that the effects of drones on support for military ac-
tion should vary across PPOs. Brunstetter and Braun are among the few 
commentators who have considered the effects that drones might have 
on different types of military operations. They argue that drones will not 
simply increase the incidence of wars, but rather decrease the likelihood of 
major wars while increasing the likelihood of small wars. Although their 
distinction between major and small wars is not identical to the four types 
of PPOs, their argument does suggest that the characteristics of the con-
flict will alter how drones influence public opinion. Their reasoning is that 
drone use will avert large wars by allowing states to engage in small attacks 
in pursuit of limited objectives and without endangering their military 
personnel. Such attacks would be less apt to escalate into major conflicts 
than attacks involving human soldiers because, due to pilot invulnerabil-
ity, the attacks may not cause any casualties.7 By contrast, Brunstetter and 
Braun contend that small wars will become more frequent because poli-
cymakers and military elites will be more tempted to use force when they 
can wage risk- free asymmetric wars. This is a plausible expectation, but the 
authors do not substantiate it with empirical findings, so more work needs 
to be done to test their hypothesis.
According to Brunstetter and Braun, the absence of casualty aversion 
plays an important role in enabling small wars to take place. Public opin-
ion is less likely to inhibit these types of wars when drones are involved 
than when soldiers may be killed or wounded. This means that casualty 
aversion could be avoided entirely in small wars, even though it would 
continue to act as a barrier against initiating more destructive major wars. 
Although Brunstetter and Braun do not consider how support for drone 
strikes may interact with differences in PPOs, their argument provides a 
basis for thinking that the public will be less likely to favor drone strikes 
when a PPO involves the risk of escalation into a conventional war, as it 
might in foreign policy restraint and internal political change missions, 
than when a PPO would typically lead to a small war, as in the case of 
counterterrorism operations and humanitarian interventions.
Zack Beauchamp and Julian Savulescu agree that pilot invulnerabil-
ity could make it easier for states armed with drones to wage wars, yet 
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they reach conclusions about the desirability of this that differ from most 
other commentators engaged in the debate. As they see it, “the bug is in 
fact a feature” because lowering the threshold for war means that “drones 
have the potential to significantly improve the practice of humanitarian 
intervention.”8 It is difficult to cultivate public support for humanitarian 
interventions because they can have high costs and little or no clear mate-
rial payoff for the intervening state. Ideally, humanitarian interventions 
should not be conducted to benefit the intervening country, as this might 
compromise the moral grounds for intervention and encourage aggression 
under the pretext of humanitarianism. But as Beauchamp and Savulescu 
correctly point out, such benevolent missions are unlikely to be under-
taken unless they are relatively cheap, and they will only be cheap if they 
can be fought using military hardware that can virtually guarantee that 
soldiers will not be killed or wounded. Thus, Beauchamp and Savulescu 
suggest that drones are apt to make the biggest difference in the levels 
of support for war during humanitarian interventions that would be un-
popular if they required the use of ground forces.
As these studies indicate, opinions are divided on the issue of how sup-
port for war may be affected by the type of war being considered as well as 
in their assessments of whether an increased willingness to fight is danger-
ous or morally advantageous. Testing expectation 4.1 will also allow us to 
evaluate the alternative relationships between drones and PPOs developed 
by Brunstetter and Braun and by Beauchamp and Savulescu. We can also 
move beyond these specific predictions to understand how the availability 
of drones will impact public support for other kinds of operations.
Principal Policy Objectives in American Military Operations
Early work on PPOs distinguished between wars aimed at foreign policy 
restraint and wars for internal political change. This distinction was made 
to demarcate conflicts that could have different degrees of perceived im-
portance for national security.9 States wage wars for foreign policy restraint 
when their goal is to prevent an opponent from acting aggressively, either 
by fighting in self- defense or in defense of an ally. Bruce Jentleson, who 
pioneered the study of PPOs, was careful to explain that this does not 
include preventive operations aimed at deterring future aggression; there 
must be a real and active threat that makes war a matter of national inter-
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est. By contrast, a war involving internal political change seeks to trans-
form the domestic power structure or institutions of another state. Such 
wars tend to have a more pre- emptive character since there is no immedi-
ate threat to be countered but rather the presence of some more distant or 
indirect national security interest.
Using polling data, Jentleson shows that foreign policy restraint tends 
to have much higher levels of support than internal political change. This 
trend is particularly strong when it comes to judging a prospective military 
venture when the numbers of casualties and potential for success are uncer-
tain. Jentleson reaches an optimistic conclusion based on these results: that 
the American public will prudently support wars against aggressive states 
while still being reluctant to condone aggressive or unnecessary wars. This 
distinction between foreign policy restraint and internal political change 
highlights an important difference in the degrees to which a war may be 
considered justified. Foreign policy restraint has a more defensive character 
that would more easily satisfy the demands of just war theory and interna-
tional humanitarian law.10 Internal political change is not necessarily ag-
gressive, yet it is more difficult to justify because it goes beyond defensive 
war and pre- emptive war against imminent threats to take on the character 
of preventive war against threats that may not actually materialize.11 Work 
on PPOs was cast as an intervention in an ongoing debate over what forces 
drive policy preferences. According to the “Almond- Lippmann consensus” 
that prevailed in the years following the Second World War, the American 
public is mercurial, lacking clear policy preferences and unable to rigor-
ously evaluate potential courses of action.12 The prudential considerations 
at work in analyses of PPOs contrasted with this view, showing that people 
are capable of carefully evaluating prospective actions and making consis-
tent judgments about these.
Subsequent research by Jentleson and Britton expanded the PPO cat-
egorization to include humanitarian intervention, which they define as 
missions to provide emergency support for people who are suffering from 
a humanitarian disaster. Interventions may be aimed at not only provid-
ing protection against acts of political violence but also environmental ca-
tastrophes.13 Jentleson and Britton argue that support for humanitarian 
interventions tends to fall somewhere between foreign policy restraint and 
internal political change. Humanitarian interventions have lower levels of 
support than the former because they are not seen as being as necessary 
for the protection of national security, but they are more popular than 
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internal political change missions that lack the moral status of humanitar-
ian operations.
Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler generally substantiate Jentleson and Britton’s 
findings, especially the conclusion that Americans make reasoned calcu-
lations about when to support war. They contend that Americans may 
lack detailed knowledge of what is at stake in foreign conflicts as well as 
knowledge of the contested areas, but that they are nevertheless capable of 
weighing the costs and benefits of military action when these are presented 
to them. As they put it, “[t]he public may not be very good at quiz bowl 
questions about international current events, but the public as a whole has 
stable and reasonable opinions that change in response to changes in the 
real world.”14 They challenge what they see as a misconception that mem-
bers of the public cannot make reasoned decisions when they have little 
contextual information, and contend that Americans are good at weighing 
the immediate costs and benefits that are presented when politicians make 
the case for war.
Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler also update the study of PPOs by pointing out 
the importance of including counterterrorism operations as a new form of 
foreign policy restraint, and they find that this type of mission receives the 
highest levels of support, followed by humanitarian intervention, and then 
internal political change. However, they argue that this ranking should 
not be treated as a fixed characteristic of public opinion. As they see it, the 
emergence of different types of threats could cause the relative interest in 
the PPOs to change. They speculate that policymakers’ framing of threats 
could also influence the ordering of support for PPOs.15 This is a critical 
insight. It indicates that the ranking of PPOs is not immutable but rather a 
reflection of the security context and more general patterns in the public’s 
outlook toward potential threats. We may therefore expect to see shifts in 
PPOs popularity over time as threats and preferences change.
Some have challenged these findings, offering other explanations for 
variations in public support for past conflicts. One plausible alternative 
explanation is that attitudes are not responsive to the PPOs themselves 
but rather to the rhetorical framing of conflicts in terms of PPOs. By 
this account, some informed members of the public may be influenced 
by the conflict objectives while others who are less concerned with mat-
ters of foreign policy will respond to how elites justify military operations 
and how clearly they articulate the reasons for fighting. This means that 
“[w]hile well- informed citizens are likely to evaluate the policy for what it 
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is, a majority of Americans will buy what the White House sells them.”16 
This exposes the critical difference between how a conflict is framed and 
the real reasons why it is being waged, raising the possibility that conflicts 
can be misrepresented in an effort to make the case for war. Neverthe-
less, this finding substantiates the conclusion that PPOs are important to 
the public by showing that they influence support for war regardless of 
whether the PPOs are genuine or misrepresented.
A central finding in work on PPOs, then, is that opinions about the 
importance of a conflict accounts for differing levels of support and that 
perceptions may change over time, either as a consequence of real shifts in 
national priorities or in response to elite rhetoric. If this is the case, then 
we should expect variation in which PPOs are supported over time as the 
security landscape shifts and new threats emerge. Such shifts have occurred 
over the course of research on the relationship between PPOs and public 
opinion. When Jentleson first tested his theory, the United States was en-
gaged in its Cold War mission of containing Soviet influence, a task that 
made foreign policy restraint appear to be an important objective even 
when acts of aggression where carried out against other countries. Jentle-
son and Britton analyzed support for humanitarian interventions in their 
follow- up research because of the United States’ post– Cold War involve-
ment in small wars that were meant to protect marginalized groups or to 
stabilize conflict zones.
In the current era, we expect that the three other PPOs will have de-
clined in importance relative to counterterrorism operations. The threat 
of terrorism, first from al Qaeda, then from Islamic State, has defined US 
security policy throughout the period when combat drones have been em-
ployed. The link between this PPO and drone strikes is so strong that even 
studies making inferences about future drone operations tend to assume 
that these will take place in a counterterrorism context.17 And many of the 
moral concerns that critics direct against drones apply not so much to the 
machines themselves but to the ongoing practice of using these weapons 
platforms to strike at suspected terrorists who, lacking advanced military 
hardware of their own, are powerless to retaliate.18
This is the logic behind our second expectation, which holds that the 
public will be more willing to countenance forms of military action that 
risk soldiers’ lives— such as air strikes and the use of ground troops— when 
the PPO is of central importance to the national interest. We base this on 
the insight that casualty aversion will form a barrier against certain types 
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of military operations and not others, and that the effects of casualty aver-
sion will vary considerably depending on the mission. Mueller argues that 
casualty aversion and mission type are closely linked.19 He contends that 
the American public was fairly amenable to sending soldiers into foreign 
countries during the Cold War because this was seen as advancing the con-
tainment strategy that appeared to be vital to the country’s national secu-
rity. Public support for those wars came not from the immediate objectives 
being pursued but from the overall goal of preventing a more serious threat 
from materializing, and the feeling of urgency surrounding those missions 
helped to maintain higher levels of support than would have been possible 
in costly wars that were seen as unimportant.
Smith reaches a similar conclusion. He argues that casualty aversion is 
affected by the extent to which a conflict advances national interests: “The 
explanation for the greater prominence of the casualty factor in the 1990s 
is simply that for democratic Western nations, most conflicts did not en-
gage national interests at all deeply.”20 He describes humanitarian interven-
tions like those in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda as being particularly good 
examples of the difficulty of sustaining popular support for nonessential 
missions.21 In each case, there was not a strong justification for putting 
American soldiers at risk of being killed or wounded, as there had been 
during the Cold War. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler show that perceptions of 
the importance of American military casualties in Iraq are influenced by 
the perceived necessity of the mission there, and in particular by the im-
portance of Iraq as part of the War on Terror. “[W]e find that those who 
believe that the war in Iraq is the ‘central front’ in the war on terrorism are 
10 percent more likely to tolerate 1,500 casualties than a respondent who 
believes that Iraq is a distraction from the war on terror.”22 This also indi-
cates the importance of PPOs in general, since the disagreement between 
those who see a link between Iraq and the War on Terror and those who 
do not is a matter of whether the conflict is a counterterrorism operation 
or an internal political change.
Principal Policy Objective and Support for the Use of Force: 
Survey Experiments
Research on the reasons driving support for war typically looks at the in-
fluence of mission type on support for war using polling data collected 
before, during, and after actual conflicts. This provides an excellent per-
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spective on how public opinion shifts in response to real events, yet it 
sometimes leaves unanswered questions when it comes to accounting for 
the causal mechanisms underlying those shifts. It is difficult to tell the 
extent to which opinion was influenced by the mission, by low casualty 
tolerance, or by some other factors. Experiments provide a way of more 
precisely determining the extent to which PPOs affect support for a war by 
isolating their influence and holding other considerations that might affect 
support for war constant. Experiments also allow us to vary the weapons 
and tactics used to achieve a PPO to determine its influence on public 
opinion relative to casualty tolerance.
To assess this chapter’s two expectations, we conducted an experiment 
based on hypothetical news stories. The news stories varied two elements 
(see the chapter appendix for the complete wording of each treatment as 
well as the questions that comprise the survey instrument). The first was 
the attack type and is very similar to the experiments reported in chapter 
3. The attack type could take one of three forms: a drone strike, an air 
strike from a piloted aircraft, or the use of ground troops. Consistent with 
the casualty- aversion idea discussed above, the treatments had different 
information about the risk that American military personnel would face. 
The drone treatments stated that “the use of unmanned drones means that 
no American military personnel would be placed at risk.” The air strike 
treatments, in contrast, included information that the target of the strikes 
were believed to lack weapons capable of attacking aircraft, suggesting a 
low possibility of military casualties. The ground troops news stories did 
not mention if these troops faced any danger.23
The second element that varied across the treatments was the purpose 
or goal of the use of force and is modeled after similar treatments used in 
other research on public opinion and foreign policy.24 The counterterror-
ism treatment described an al Qaeda branch operating in Yemen, with 
plans to place bombs on American airliners and in the mail. The proposed 
attack involving drones, air strikes, or ground forces would be directed at 
the al Qaeda bases with the primary goal of killing the organization’s lead-
ers before they could launch an attack against the United States. Thus, the 
scenario closely parallels the kinds of targeted killing operations that have 
become common during the War on Terror.
The treatment for foreign policy restraint described Yemen threaten-
ing to attack oil tankers passing through the Persian Gulf using missiles 
launched from within Yemen. This would threaten American interests, as 
well as the global economy, by causing a dramatic increase in oil prices. 
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The story is therefore a case of one state acting aggressively, with costs that 
could lead respondents to sense that American national security was under 
threat. The proposed attack would be directed at the missile installations 
and would not have any larger objectives, such as degrading the military or 
replacing the government.
The internal political change treatment stated that a pro- American gov-
ernment in Yemen was in danger of being overthrown by a rebel group 
operating within the country. It said that the rebels had already defeated 
government military forces in several battles and that they were nearing 
the capital. The American intervention was being requested by the govern-
ment and would attack the rebel leaders.
The humanitarian intervention treatment described Yemen’s military 
committing atrocities against ethnic minorities within the country. It said 
that the actions had been condemned by international human rights or-
ganizations and that those organizations were also calling on the United 
States to launch a military operation. This framed the intervention as be-
ing important on moral grounds. We were careful to not give respondents 
any indication that an intervention could benefit the United States or its 
allies or that it could lead to a protracted counterinsurgency operation. The 
prospective attack would only be launched against military bases housing 
the soldiers who were committing the atrocities, without any goals of oc-
cupying the country or reforming its government.
Combining these two elements— type and objective of military force— 
produces a total of twelve treatments. Roughly three hundred respondents 
were randomly assigned to read each of these stories. They then answered 
questions about their reactions to the planned use of force, including the 
degree to which they supported the attack, the importance of the policy 
objective, their estimates of the number of military casualties that would 
result, general attitudes regarding the wisdom of the use of force, and de-
mographic questions such as party identification, age, gender, and so on. 
The experiment does not directly distinguish between support for military 
force (i.e., a desire to attack) and lack of opposition (i.e., an unwillingness 
to question the attack). However, distinguishing between levels of inten-
sity for supporting a policy helps to address this issue by allowing those 
with intense feelings to strongly agree or disagree and those with weak feel-
ings somewhat to agree or disagree as a way of signaling that they would 
not block the use of force.
As we pointed out in chapter 3, Yemen is a useful case for testing fic-
Drones and Policy Objectives  91
tional conflict scenarios because it is in the unique position of seeming like 
a plausible threat even though Americans are relatively ignorant of it. It is 
doubtful that Yemen would threaten US shipping in the Persian Gulf, or 
even that it would be able to do so. However, given Americans’ low level 
of knowledge about Yemen,25 it is unlikely that many respondents have 
any sense of the country’s military capacities or its interests when it comes 
to oil shipments. News coverage of the country identifies it as a terrorist 
sanctuary, but rarely comments on its military capacities or strategic goals.
It is more plausible that Iran would pose the kind of threat we describe, 
but identifying it as the target of our fictional strike would complicate our 
ability to draw conclusions about the influence of attack type and PPO on 
support for the use of force. Iran is a far more prominent security threat, 
especially given the ongoing controversy about its nuclear enrichment pro-
grams. It is also apt to raise partisan disagreements because of Democrats’ 
efforts to rebuild relations with the country and Republicans’ preference 
for reinstating the sanctions regime against its nuclear program.26 This 
means that although people who stay informed about Middle Eastern pol-
itics may see Yemen as a less realistic setting for some of the scenarios we 
describe, it is a better setting from a methodological perspective because it 
helps to avoid the difficulties that would come from a case with a higher 
profile or stronger connotations.
To this point, we have argued that military casualties are an impor-
tant cost of conflict that influences attitudes regarding the use of force. 
As with the experiments in chapter 3, we expect respondents’ estimates 
of the number of military casualties will vary by attack type. Respondents 
should expect that the lowest number of military casualties will result from 
a drone strike, since these news stories make it explicit that military per-
sonnel will face no risk of physical harm. Treatments involving air strikes 
should lead to higher expectations of military casualties. Even though 
these conditions state that the target of the attack is not believed to have 
weapons capable of threatening military aircraft, respondents might still 
expect that the chance of military casualties could be higher. Respondents 
might worry that the target has, unknown to the United States, acquired 
anti- aircraft weapons, or that casualties could result if the aircraft were to 
malfunction over enemy territory. Respondents’ expectations of military 
casualties should be highest in the treatments that describe an attack by 
ground troops. Although these news stories make no mention of the risks 
that military personnel face in such situations, it should be straightforward 
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for respondents to infer such risks from the information they read.
To assess how assignment to different treatments influenced estimates 
of military casualties, respondents were asked if they expected no military 
casualties, between 1 and 10 casualties, or between 11 and 100 casualties if 
the attack described in the news story they read were to be carried out. Fig-
ure 4.1 summarizes answers to this question. We see a pattern, consistent 
with our expectations and the findings in chapter 3, in which respondents 
assigned to the drone strike treatments expected the fewest casualties, fol-
lowed by those assigned to air strike treatments and then the ground troop 
treatments. Importantly, differences across treatments for the same type of 
attack are small. This indicates that the information in the treatments in-
fluenced respondents’ expectations of military casualties in the same man-
ner that we saw in chapter 3 and that this pattern holds across the different 
objectives of military action.
We next turn to assessing the influence of attack type and PPO on sup-
port for the use of force. The percentages of respondents in each treatment 
who selected each possible response to the question asking them to express 
their level of support for the attack are depicted in figure 4.2. A more 
systematic analysis is presented in table 4.2. Four models are reported in 
the table. Each uses the variable support for the attack as the dependent 
variable. The independent variables for each model include dichotomous 
Fig. 4.1. Casualty expectations by attack type and principal policy objective
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variables indicating assignment to an air strike or ground troops treatment. 
This means that the coefficients on these variables estimate how assign-
ment to these treatments alters support for the use of force compared to re-
spondents assigned to the drone strike treatment. The models also include 
gender, education, party identification, age, and minority status covariates 
and are estimated using ordered logistic regression.
Two patterns emerge from figure 4.2 and table 4.2. First, consistent 
with expectation 4.1, we see that drones strikes garner more support than 
do ground troops for each PPO. This means that the effect of drones on 
attitudes is not limited to counterterrorism operations; instead, the tech-
nology leads to more support for any military objective. Second, the data 
is consistent with expectation 4.2, as counterterrorism operations received 
greater approval, regardless of the type of force being used, than any of the 
other principal policy objectives. Even using ground forces in counterter-
rorism operations, which our respondents believed created a greater risk of 
harm, received more support than drone strikes or air strikes in support 
of any of the other PPOs. Taken together, these results demonstrate that 
respondents were more likely to risk soldiers’ lives in certain types of mis-
sions than others. In particular, there was a much higher risk tolerance 
when it came to counterterrorism operations than the other types of op-
erations. This is evidence that the PPO has a strong influence on when the 
public will support drone strikes, or any other means of attack.
It is important to note that the pattern becomes more complicated 
beyond the “Strongly Approve” response, indicating that the lack of oppo-
sition shown by those with more mixed “Somewhat Approve” and “Some-
what Disapprove” responses is less consistent than the stronger feelings of 
support. Air strikes received lower levels of overall opposition than drones 
in internal political change and humanitarian intervention missions, while 
the levels were roughly equal for counterterrorism, and drones were less 
objectionable in foreign policy restraint. It is not clear why these differ-
ences exist, as they do not follow a clear pattern. It may reveal that those 
with weaker preferences about attack type are either less concerned about 
how military operations are carried out and more prone to inconsistent 
judgments because of their comparative disengagement. Whatever the ex-
planation, the variation in the two intermediary levels of support does not 
track with the predicted casualties (i.e., there is less opposition to drones 
in foreign policy restraint operations even though respondents did not 
perceive these missions as being significantly more dangerous than the oth-
Fig. 4.2. Support by attack type and principal policy objective









Air strike −.239 −.005 −.567*** −.316***
(.161) (.161) (.156) (.159)
Ground troops −.463*** −.689*** −.768*** −.777***
(.160) (.169) (.153) (.160)
Gender −.409*** −.171 −.473*** −0.173
(.134) (.134) (.127) (.131)
Education −.142 −.022 −.414 −.812
(.314) (.314) (.278) (.306)
Party identification 1.183*** .701*** 1.392 1.12***
(.218) (.224) (.211) (.226)
Age .02*** −.011*** −.004 −.001
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.006)
Minority .223 −.119 .082 .062
(.156) (.165) (.149) (.152)
Likelihood ratio 1,908 1,908 2,130 1,999
AIC 1,928 1,928 2,150 2,019
Observations 833 806 870 854
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.
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ers). From this we can at least conclude that the lack of opposition is prob-
ably not being influenced by casualty expectations.
To this point, we have found that attacks from drones receive more 
support than do attacks involving ground troops across different PPOs and 
that respondents are more willing to risk incurring casualties for counter-
terrorism objectives. But how large is this effect? Does the availability of 
drones sharply increase support for the use of force? Using the regression 
models from table 4.2, we calculated the predicted probability that a re-
spondent would select each of the four levels of the dependent variable 
measuring her or his support for the attack carried out by a drone, holding 
all other variables constant for each PPO. We then repeated this exercise 
for respondents whose treatment assignments described the attack as being 
carried out by ground troops. Subtracting the latter value from the former 
provides an estimate of the difference in the predicted probability of each 
level of the dependent variable for respondents in the drone and ground 
troop treatments. Figure 4.3 graphs these changes for each PPO. For each 
PPO, respondents were more favorable to attacks by drones than by ground 
troops. However, there are noticeable differences in the size of these effects 
across PPOs. For the internal political change, foreign policy restraint, and 
humanitarian intervention treatments, reading about an attack by ground 
troops reduces the likelihood that a respondent will “strongly agree” or 
“somewhat agree” with the decision to launch the attack by between 15 and 
20 percent. The effect of an attack by ground troops compared to drone 
strikes was about half this size for respondents who read about a counter-
terrorism operation. In other words, while respondents in the counterter-
rorism group also preferred drone strikes to the use of ground troops, they 
were considerably more willing to endorse attacks with troops.
The chapter’s second expectation offers two reasons for the compara-
tively high levels of support for counterterrorism operations. First, terror-
ism has been the most prominent threat to national security since 9/11, 
with new terrorist plots being continually uncovered and governments 
around the world making a concerted effort to kill or capture suspected 
terrorists before they can strike. Even conventional military operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have been framed as contributing to the Global War 
on Terror.27 The importance attached to counterterrorism operations prob-
ably had a profound influence on respondents’ conceptions of national 
security priorities.
Second, the counterterrorism scenario was the only one that involved 
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an immediate threat to American national security. The fact that planes and 
the mail service would be used as the delivery vehicles for an attack would 
have been particularly threatening given terrorists’ previous use of these 
methods to carry out attacks within the United States. To determine if 
this is the case, we asked respondents the following question: “The United 
States faces many challenges today, at home as well as overseas. Among 
these challenges, how important do you think it is to address the problems 
discussed in the news story you read earlier?” Responses for each treatment 
are depicted in figure 4.4, where we see that considerably more respon-
dents identified all of the counterterrorism objectives as very or somewhat 
important than they did for the remaining PPOs. Looking more closely at 
the patterns of coefficients in table 4.2, we see that respondents assigned 
to the counterterrorism and humanitarian intervention treatments offer 
as much support for the planned operation when it employs air strikes 
as when it uses drone strikes. This indicates that these respondents were 
Fig. 4.3. Ground troop changes in predicted probabilities of supporting attack
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willing to place air crews in some danger to achieve these objectives, but 
on average were less willing to do so when the objective involved internal 
political change or foreign policy restraint.
There was more overlap in the levels of support for the other types 
of operations. We did not see the large differences in support across the 
foreign policy restraint, humanitarian intervention, and internal political 
change treatments that one might expect from Jentleson and Britton’s work 
on PPOs. This may be due to the way we described the objectives. The in-
ternal political change mission was described in ways that made American 
intervention appear to be benevolent— an effort to help a beleaguered ally 
against rebels. Had the scenario described the rebels in favorable terms or 
Fig. 4.4. Support for attack
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provided some indication that the government being protected was cor-
rupt or abusive, then we would probably have seen a significant drop in 
the levels of support.
Support for internal political change might also have been lower if the 
mission was to depose an existing government, as this might carry more 
risk of escalation and be seen as less politically defensible than efforts to 
protect a government against rebels. The possibility for variation here 
again highlights the importance of being attentive not only to the differ-
ences between PPOs but also to the various reasons why each PPO might 
be pursued. Even when focusing on a specific type of PPO, the perceived 
moral and legal legitimacy, as well as the perceived centrality of the mission 
to national security, could vary considerably.
Even though our results differ slightly from Jentleson and Britton’s 
findings, our experiments confirm those authors’ claim that the American 
public does calculate the costs and benefits of prospective policies. The 
degrees of support coincided with the severity of the threat to national 
security identified by the respondents in our experiment. The counter-
terrorism scenario introduced a clear and plausible threat, while the next 
most popular intervention was directed at the less immediate, though still 
very serious, threat of economic disruption. The internal political change 
scenario did not describe any benefits to American security, yet the act of 
helping a foreign government did suggest that the United States might be 
looking out for its interests by building or strengthening relations with an 
ally. Finally, the humanitarian intervention not only failed to describe any 
benefits but also put the United States on the side of marginalized people 
who would have little to offer as allies.
The low approval for humanitarian interventions regardless of the 
weapons being used is evidence that casualty aversion is not the only ob-
stacle preventing states from getting involved in these types of conflicts. 
The risk of sustaining casualties certainly plays some role in shaping sup-
port for humanitarian interventions, as evidenced by the lower levels of 
support for committing ground forces than drones or manned aircraft, yet 
it is clear that even relatively low- cost interventions are unpopular. This 
supports Jentleson and Britton’s contention that conflicts that are less es-
sential to national security will generally receive less support and that the 
public will not favor military operations that seem unnecessary.
The pragmatic attitude toward wars is important for evaluating the 
consequences of casualty aversion discussed in chapter 3. It is revealing 
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that research on casualty aversion and criticisms of warfare tend to reach 
much different conclusions from their shared belief that citizens of con-
temporary democracies have a low tolerance for costly wars. Most critics of 
drones see casualty aversion as a positive development that discourages war 
and provides greater democratic accountability. By contrast, other com-
mentators regret this phenomenon because it limits the United States’ ca-
pacities for deterring enemies and for launching attacks when necessary.28
The difference between these attitudes seems to be rooted in different 
conceptions of how and when the United States will wage wars. Those who 
are concerned about casualty aversion interfering with American foreign 
policy or who think it is not a serious barrier against fighting often seem to 
envision American wars as actions taken against unjust aggressors or as the 
military rescuing beleaguered populations during humanitarian interven-
tions. By contrast, critics of drone warfare strongly imply that wars should 
be avoided and focus much of their attention on abuses of US military 
power. They are particularly sensitive to immoral, illegal, or politically in-
expedient actions performed during the War on Terror.29
Future conflicts fought using drones will doubtless take many different 
moral valences. Some may be unjust, aggressive wars. Others may be be-
nevolent or defensive. Most will probably be morally ambiguous conflicts 
the character of which will be continually debated, which seems to be the 
norm for most conflicts. There is rarely a consensus on when America’s 
wars are justified, even among just war theorists.30 The inevitability of dif-
ferent types of conflicts with divergent moral and legal implications sug-
gests that pilot invulnerability will not be simply good or bad but that it 
may instead assist in achieving PPOs that differ in their moral character 
and political importance. Greater support for drones compared to other at-
tack types may be desirable or undesirable depending on the circumstances 
of a particular conflict. The morality of drone warfare will rest heavily on 
how drones are used and when, which puts a great deal of responsibility on 
the elites who choose when to launch attacks. It also places responsibility 
on the public, which will have to make decisions about when to support 
the use of military force.
In practice, the shifts in public opinion of this magnitude are alone 
likely to decide whether a particular war is waged only under certain 
treatments. Decisions about initiating wars are not made directly by the 
American public but rather by elected officials whose decisions may be 
insulated from or unresponsive to citizens’ attitudes. Thus, public opinion 
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will matter to the extent that changes in it can influence policymakers 
and alter their decisions. Voters may decide to punish policymakers who 
wage unpopular wars by removing them from office.31 However, it seems 
unlikely that any shifts in public opinion that could be caused by using 
drones instead of ground forces or piloted aircraft will have great influence 
on policymakers’ decisions if they are determined to go to war. A decision 
that increases opposition is probably unlikely to affect a policymaker’s elec-
tion prospects, especially when it is weighed against other decisions that 
person has made.32
The effect that drones have on support for war is likely to make them 
attractive weapons for politicians who are concerned with sustaining their 
popularity or who are not strongly committed to the use of force. The shift 
in public support that drones produce may not be enormous and may 
not be sufficient to change public opinion about a war, yet it is neverthe-
less just one of the many advantages that make drones attractive weapons. 
As Sauer and Schörnig correctly point out, there are multiple reasons for 
preferring drones over other weapons and tactics, such as their ability to 
loiter over targets and their comparatively low cost.33 Nevertheless, based 
on our experiment, it appears that the predictions about drones under-
mining democratic accountability are probably too strong. Because drones 
produce moderate increases in support for war, greater reliance on them 
will probably be unable to silence anti- war voices. This is evident from 
figure 4.2, which shows that roughly 20 to 40 percent of respondents did 
not want to launch drone operations despite the invulnerability of soldiers 
operating them. Such consistent opposition to military operations from 
that many respondents is evidence that politicians will continue to have 
strong incentives to pursue peaceful strategies of conflict resolution in an 
effort to satisfy those citizens.
Conclusion
This chapter takes a step toward building a more sophisticated understand-
ing of how drone technology shapes support for war by exploring the in-
fluence of principal policy objectives. Accounting for the divergent levels 
of support across PPOs is useful when assessing what effects drones will 
have on support for future military operations and whether these weap-
ons platforms will allow policymakers to escape some of the constraints 
Drones and Policy Objectives  101
arising from casualty aversion. Furthermore, the differences between the 
support for different PPOs in our study compared to others shows that 
there is scope for variation within each PPO depending on what a specific 
operation aims to achieve. This all points to respondents making reason-
ably prudential judgments about prospective military ventures, granting or 
withdrawing support on a case- by- case basis.
Our results in this chapter indicate that attacks with drones receive 
more support than does the use of ground troops and, in some PPOs, air 
strikes. Choosing drones over these alternatives can offer enough of a boost 
in support to make drones popular for policymakers and to possibly even 
tip the balance of public opinion when there is a narrow divide between 
pro- and anti- war positions. But we also caution against overstating the 
effect of this finding. In many instances the added support that can be 
gained by choosing drones will not decide whether the country goes to 
war. Drones may therefore help to evade the effects of casualty aversion, 
but may not alone produce any serious changes to civic engagement or 
grant policymakers free rein over military affairs. Moreover, our results 
show that a substantial number of respondents oppose fighting regardless 
of whether the risks to soldiers can be eliminated. In the following chapter 
we will build another level onto this account of what drives support for 
drone strikes by looking more carefully at whether variations in the likeli-
hood of mission success matter and whether there is a “moral hazard” of 
drones making it too easy to fight wars when the chance of victory is low.
Throughout this discussion we have also pointed to the issue of fram-
ing. Our experiments give respondents the information needed to assign 
prospective operations into a particular PPO, yet there is no guarantee that 
framing by media elites or policymakers will be accurate. There will always 
be a risk of a less popular mission type being misrepresented, such as for-
eign policy restraint being characterized as essential for counterterrorism. 
Given the effect of PPO on preferences for war, it is vital to be attentive 
to how conflicts are framed and to critically evaluate the case for fighting.
How elites frame a conflict, then, could influence the effect of drones 
on support for war. “Elite cues” approaches to public opinion hold that 
people generally respond to wars in ways that mirror their party affilia-
tions: “partisan political actors, not ordinary citizens, balance costs and 
benefits when deciding to lend support to military action. The public 
may appear ‘rational,’ but only by following elites who share their basic 
political predilections.”34 This would mean that people generally do not 
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form their own opinions about when wars are justified. Rather, they sim-
ply adopt the views of elites, who are really the ones that make decisions 
about when to fight.
We have not sought to assess the role of elite cues here, but it is possible 
to draw several conclusions about the effect cuing has on support for drone 
strikes in particular. First, if Americans are responsive to elite cues and have 
fairly low competence for making their own decisions about when to sup-
port or oppose wars, then this is a problem that predates the widespread 
use of drones. Berinsky finds support for this theory in evidence gathered 
during the Second World War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 
First Gulf War, as well as the early years of fighting in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. These cases all predate drone warfare. Second, if public support for 
war is largely unaffected by casualty sensitivity or PPOs, then the general 
conclusions we have reached would still hold true. Drone warfare should 
not have a major influence on the incidence of war; casualty aversion 
would not be able to restrict policymakers’ war- making powers nor would 
it be reduced by the use of drones; and support for using drones would be 
highest when policymakers cue their supporters to take a particular threat 
seriously, as they have done by emphasizing the threat of terrorism.
The pattern that is evident in the levels of support for using drones, 
piloted aircraft, and ground forces shows that there is a continuum of sup-
port for military force that extends across the range of weapons and tactics 
that may be employed. One possibility for future research is to include a 
more diverse assessment of the weapons and tactics used by the US mili-
tary to see how much this pattern is sustained. There may be gradations 
of support between the three types of attacks we explore. For example, 
support for the use of special operations forces could fall somewhere be-
tween support for an attack involving conventional ground forces and an 
air strike. Alternatively, it is possible that support for war could further 
diminish or increase as other weapons and tactics are introduced. The de-
ployment of large numbers of soldiers to directly engage in combat could 
be less popular than the deployment of smaller numbers of soldiers serving 
in advisory roles. One could also argue that the PPO theory and casualty- 
aversion theories are incorrect, or at least that they are not the primary 
forces shaping attitudes toward wars.
Because drones have only been used on a large scale in counterterror-
ism operations, it can be difficult to separate their use in the War on Terror 
from the potential uses they might have in other types of conflicts. This 
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is reflected in the extensive literature on drone use discussed in chapter 1. 
Critics often condemn the use of drones to conduct targeted killings as 
though these were inherently linked; the circular logic uses the evidence 
of American military overreach in the War on Terror as evidence against 
drones and uses the proliferation of drones as evidence that the War on 
Terror is out of control and counterproductive.35 The concern that drones 
may lower the threshold for war is also closely associated with the War 
on Terror, as drones have facilitated attacks against suspected terrorists in 
Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia, attacks that might not have taken place if 
drones were not available.
It is impossible to predict how drones will be used in future conflicts, 
especially those involving PPOs other than counterterrorism. However, 
based on our experiments, it seems that the American public will probably 
support the use of drones in other types of operations, including attacks 
against state military forces. It is also likely that unless there is a marked 
shift in the kind of PPO that is seen as most necessary for the protection 
of national security, the government will not have quite as much freedom 
of action when deploying drones for reasons other than counterterrorism. 
While counterterrorism operations involving drones receive relatively high 
levels of support, the use of drones to attack foreign states or to strike rebel 




Drones and Moral Hazard
The United States launched hundreds of drone strikes against suspected 
terrorists in at least seven countries between 2001 and 2016. Government 
officials have justified these attacks on the grounds that they were essen-
tial for preventing terrorism, and they argued that no peaceful alternatives 
were available. Their goal was to demonstrate that clear and imminent 
threats compelled defensive military action and that drones’ selectivity 
made them a less costly means of attack than the alternatives. However, 
critics challenge these claims, arguing that the attacks failed to achieve 
their strategic objectives, that less violent options were available, and that 
confidence in these new weapons platforms has led the United States to 
fight unnecessary wars that may ultimately produce more terrorists than 
they eliminate. These arguments highlight the possibility that drones have 
allowed the United States to wage counterproductive or unnecessary wars 
that go beyond what is necessary for self- defense— potentially intensifying 
the War on Terror and destabilizing international security. In particular, 
they indicate that the United States may be using drones to launch military 
strikes even in instances when nonviolent diplomatic alternatives still have 
some hope of success or could even be more effective.
Over the previous chapters we have considered some of the ways drones 
could influence support for military operations, and we have shown that 
many different factors may jointly shape public opinion. We have also 
raised some of the most plausible arguments for thinking that drones 
could lower inhibitions against fighting and argued that an understand-
ing of the roles of casualty sensitivity, principal policy objectives, and the 
means of attack is essential to evaluate when Americans support drone 
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warfare. These issues usually take a central place in explanations of when 
Americans support wars. Nevertheless, we have thus far omitted several 
key details that are essential for situating prospective attacks in the larger 
political and strategic context: whether the attacks will succeed and how 
the availability of nonviolent alternatives may alter opinions. In this chap-
ter we add another layer to our account of the forces shaping attitudes to-
ward drone warfare by taking up the issue of how expectations of mission 
success influence Americans’ willingness to launch attacks.
Previous research has shown that anticipations of success may have a 
powerful influence on determining overall support for military actions. 
Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, in particular, have sought to demonstrate that 
anticipated success shapes the American public’s willingness to support 
conflict.1 Although they do not test this claim with reference to drones 
specifically, their research indicates that anticipated success could increase 
enthusiasm for drone strikes, just as it seems to increase enthusiasm for 
military operations in general. Drones’ selectivity could raise the predicted 
chances of success if it leads individuals to conclude that drones are more 
effective than the other weapons or tactics that could be used. This would 
be a reasonable inference given the efforts President Obama and other 
senior American officials made to present drones as ideal counterterrorism 
tools. Thus, the use of drones could give the public greater confidence in 
victory if the selectivity these machines offer seems to increase the odds of 
winning while also decreasing the potential costs of fighting. Increasing 
efficacy while reducing risks may be the kind of win- win scenario that 
would make drone strikes far more attractive than alternative means of 
fighting— and possibly even more attractive than nonviolent methods of 
conflict resolution.
This relationship between drones and predicted success— the possibility 
that the perceived effectiveness of drones could increase the public’s willing-
ness to use them and that increased odds of winning could build support for 
more wars— leads to one of the most serious potential risks associated with 
drone warfare. Kaag and Kreps advance the idea that drone technology cre-
ates what they term a “moral hazard.” A moral hazard exists when a person 
may be tempted to take greater risks because the associated costs of failure 
are low. Because drones permit force to be used with no chance of military 
casualties, their availability should also increase an individual’s support for 
“risky or morally questionable behaviors because he or she does not have to 
face the consequences of these actions.”2 Drones may therefore allow states 
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to engage in wars that are less likely to succeed simply because the harmful 
consequences of fighting can be shifted onto foreign populations.
This same concern is echoed throughout critiques of American drone 
strikes, often with the help of other concepts that also point out that 
drones’ increased selectivity could paradoxically cause an escalation of 
violence. As we show, the threat of moral hazard is probably the most 
pervasive moral critique of drone warfare. The widespread appeal of this 
argument makes it an important subject for experimental research. In this 
chapter we contribute to research on the relationship between mission 
success and support for war, and we evaluate the plausibility of drones 
creating a moral hazard with an experiment focusing on how support for 
attacks changes depending on what alternative approaches to conflict reso-
lution are available. Testing support for war in this way makes it possible 
to gauge whether people become more aggressive, or at least more willing 
to incur the costs of fighting, when the adverse consequences of war can be 
minimized by drone technology.
Table 5.1 summarizes our expectations regarding how drones influence 
estimates of battlefield success and moral hazard. Our results show that pre-
dictions of success are relatively stable across different methods of attack. 
Regardless of whether drones really are more or less effective than other 
types of military force, the American public does not perceive them as be-
ing any more or less effective. Even more importantly, we find that drones 
do not appear to create a moral hazard. Respondents showed roughly the 
same levels of support for military operations involving drones, piloted 
aircraft, or ground forces as the availability of nonviolent approaches for 
defusing a conflict changed. Respondents did not, as the moral hazard 
argument would suggest, become more willing to launch unnecessary 
strikes simply because drones were available to conduct these at a low cost 
to American military personnel. This undercuts one of the strongest and 
most commonly cited reasons for opposing drone warfare. The threat of 
moral hazard is therefore overstated in arguments against drones, at least 
when it is framed in terms of the American public’s risk preferences.
TABLE 5.1. Mission Success Expectations
Expectation 5.1: Drones will lead individuals to believe they are more likely to achieve 
their battlefield objectives than other types of military force.
Expectation 5.2: Support for an attack that takes place despite the availability of peace-
ful alternatives will be higher when drones are involved.
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Success and Support for War
Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler’s research coincides with our findings in previous 
chapters that casualty aversion and PPOs matter when it comes to shap-
ing public opinion, but they contend that expectations of success play an 
even larger role in determining attitudes toward military operations. They 
argue that the American public is willing to support costly wars if there are 
grounds for thinking that the war will achieve its goals. Experiments they 
conducted on support for hypothetical interventions in Yemen revealed 
that “moderately high prospects for success may be sufficient to maintain 
public support, while casualties did not curtail support until they reached 
fairly high levels.”3 This demonstrates that casualty sensitivity does influ-
ence public opinion, but that this and other causal factors can actually be 
outweighed by the lure of victory or the fear of defeat.
Although they do not test public support for drone strikes specifically, 
Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler’s work indicates that expectations of whether an 
attack will achieve its objectives are important to bear in mind when test-
ing attitudes toward drones. The desire for success appears to be a general 
preference that remains consistent regardless of what specific weapons or 
tactics are employed. But if certain weapons or tactics are more effective 
than others (at least in the sense that they raise the perceived likelihood of 
success), they could help to bolster public support. Their research suggests 
that the ability drones have to reduce American military casualties may be 
superfluous, or at least unnecessary, when it comes to building public sup-
port to wage a war if policymakers can demonstrate that they make success 
more likely. That is to say, leaders may continue to employ ground forces 
in future attacks and forgo the use of drones provided there is confidence 
in victory and losses are kept to a tolerable level. Conversely, their results 
also raise the possibility of drones being used to maintain support for mili-
tary operations when a good outcome seems unlikely. This makes it crucial 
to be able to distinguish between the effects of casualty aversion and evalu-
ations of mission success and to compare the relative weight of these causal 
mechanisms when formulating a theory of support for drone strikes.
Anticipations of success simplify the temporal issues we confronted in 
previous chapters. Recall that there is disagreement on the issue of whether 
casualty aversion emerges primarily during a war and builds as the costs of 
fighting are realized, or whether it is an anticipatory phenomenon that pre-
vents or limits prospective military operations. The former deals with real 
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costs of fighting while the latter depends on predictions. When it comes to 
the anticipations of success, judgments are always predictive. Regardless of 
whether they come before or during a conflict, they require an imaginative 
leap into the future. There may be more evidence based on information 
from past wars, yet even then the judgment retains its future orientation. 
As the authors say of the Iraq War, “respondents’ beliefs about whether the 
U.S. would succeed in Iraq tend to be prospective in nature. The retro-
spective judgments about weapons of mass destruction and Hussein’s links 
to al- Qaeda were not causes of respondents’ beliefs about the likelihood 
of success.”4 By positing anticipated success as the decisive influence on 
support for war, Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler provide a compelling way of 
explaining public opinion regardless of how far a conflict has progressed 
or whether it has even started. This simplifies the search for causation and 
makes it possible to gauge support for prospective and ongoing wars using 
the same experiments.
One challenge that Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler’s research raises is de-
termining the extent to which predictions of sustaining casualties and 
predictions of success overlap. It is not immediately clear whether people 
think minimizing casualties is part of what constitutes success, or whether 
expected casualty numbers are distinct from the criteria that are used to 
evaluate success. They are aware of this challenge and in particular the 
counterargument they face from those who might say that the American 
public is apt to gauge success primarily, or even entirely, in terms of mini-
mizing American military casualties. However, they maintain that this did 
not affect their results. As they explain, “the proportion of respondents 
who stated that the number of U.S. casualties was their measure of Ameri-
can progress toward success was less than 5 percent across eight separate 
waves of surveys.”5 Based on this, we can surmise that expectations of suc-
cess are not identical to expectations of incurring casualties and that these 
two issues should be distinguished as we search for the causal processes 
that drive support for military operations.
Other work has also shown that perceptions of success shape public 
opinion. Gartner tests the relationship between predictions of success and 
casualty estimates and finds support for Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler’s posi-
tion. He discovers that anticipations of the outcome influence Americans’ 
willingness to fight and that this is independent of casualties. He confirms 
this relationship by only mentioning casualties late in a survey experiment, 
after gauging the predicted outcomes.6 This offers additional support for 
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thinking that anticipated success is a distinct causal variable that is largely 
independent of casualty sensitivity and that may therefore produce differ-
ent effects.
Berinsky concludes that success does matter when it comes to deter-
mining support for fighting, but he says that the perception of success 
“is heavily influenced by partisanship.”7 He challenges Gelpi, Feaver, and 
Reifler’s contention that success matters and argues instead that attitudes 
toward war are largely dependent on how elites work to mobilize public 
opinion. It is therefore the elite cues that make success or failure salient.8 
Agreement among elites raises the public’s willingness to fight, while par-
tisan divides cause sharp differences in public opinion. In another study, 
Berinsky and Druckman contend that this raises the possibility of revers-
ing the causal direction that Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler identify, making 
support for war the cause of anticipated success, rather than anticipated 
success the cause of support.9
Gelpi has since defended the thesis he and his coauthors advance with 
experiments showing that respondents exposed to news stories about Iraq 
were highly susceptible to the good or bad framing of events that indicated 
the potential for an American victory.10 He did note that partisan identity 
helped to inform starting levels of support and the extent of the change 
in opinion, though with the prospect of success still playing the central 
explanatory role. There is good reason to think that partisan identification 
and perceptions of success both matter when it comes to shaping the over-
all levels of support for war, but because the former appears to influence 
the latter, anticipated success remains the proximate cause that is more 
directly guiding public opinion. The weight of the evidence therefore dem-
onstrates that predicted success is apt to shape public support for military 
operations in general and possibly for drone strikes specifically, regardless 
of what prior conditions influence predicted success.
How Drones Influence the Prospects of Success
The importance of predicted success in the public opinion literature pro-
vides a clear link between this literature and research that is focused on 
drones, as one of the central points of disagreement in research on drones 
is whether they are effective. Proponents of drones contend that these 
weapons platforms are more effective than other weapons and vehicles be-
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cause they can launch highly selective attacks, even against individuals and 
moving targets that would be difficult for long- range missiles or piloted 
aircraft to target.11 They employ relatively light weaponry compared to 
manned aircraft and are able to strike much more quickly than long- range 
precision weapons, eliminating delays between a missile’s launch and its 
impact. Quick and light strikes help to minimize the extent of destruction 
when drones are used to attack, but their selectivity also depends heavily 
on their proficiency with the kinds of preattack surveillance operations for 
which they were originally designed. Drones are able to track and monitor 
potential targets for hours or days to ensure that their weapons are directed 
against enemy fighters. They are even used to track the “patterns of life” 
of known terrorists, which can then be used to locate new suspects who 
follow similar patterns.
Selectivity is particularly important when it comes to avoiding harm 
to civilians and their property. Many of the arguments in favor of drones 
rest on the claim that removing soldiers from the battlefield could make it 
possible to strengthen norms and laws governing the use of force. The rea-
soning is that armed forces that do not risk their personnel in combat gain 
greater control over how and when they fight, which amounts to improved 
opportunities for selective attacks that are only carried out when the risk 
to civilian bystanders is low.12 For example, Byman says that “drones, un-
like traditional airplanes, can loiter above a target for hours, waiting for 
the ideal moment to strike and thus reducing the odds that civilians will 
be caught in the kill zone.”13 The selectivity and pilot invulnerability of 
drones may therefore come together as complementary advantages that 
enable unprecedented compliance with civilian immunity to coexist with 
improved lethality.
Aside from the obvious moral and legal reasons for preventing attacks 
on civilians, increased precision may also generate more pressure on gov-
ernment officials and military personnel to avoid civilian casualties. Beier 
argues that improvements in weapon precision have generated higher 
expectations that civilians and civilian infrastructure will be spared dur-
ing attacks and that the public will not tolerate indiscriminate violence, 
a point to which we return in the next chapter.14 Shane reaches a similar 
conclusion and contends that drones may be partly responsible for sensi-
tizing the public to civilian casualties with promises of being able to target 
individual enemy combatants.15
These assessments appear to be borne out by the debate over drone 
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strikes. Critics blame drones for inflicting as many as 800 civilian casual-
ties in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, though some cite numbers much 
higher than this.16 Even the high estimates tend to be relatively small 
compared to those from previous conflicts or recent ground combat oper-
ations in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to the US military’s estimates, 
around 66,000 civilians were killed in Iraq between 2004 and 2009.17 
This is far more than the losses inflicted by drones throughout the Bush 
and Obama presidencies. Moreover, the military’s Iraq casualty estimate 
is lower than many of those offered by independent sources,18 suggest-
ing that the true gap between casualties inflicted by ground forces and 
drones could be much larger. Vocal opposition has plagued drones since 
they were first armed even though they inflict low casualties compared to 
ground operations like the one in Iraq, which lends support to the idea 
that increasing precision and reducing civilian casualties is not enough to 
mollify the public.
The selectivity of drone strikes may be especially advantageous when 
it comes to creating the conditions for lasting peace in destabilized ar-
eas. One of the most serious challenges in counterterrorism and coun-
terinsurgency is defeating committed enemy fighters while also gaining 
the support of civilian populations.19 The American counterinsurgency 
doctrine unveiled in 2006 prioritizes the goal of cultivating indigenous 
support and enlisting local people as allies in the war effort, or at least en-
suring that they withhold support from opponents.20 Drones may plau-
sibly advance this goal if they are able to strike at enemy fighters without 
harming civilians or damaging their property. After all, limited strikes 
that only target enemy combatants are apt to have a more modest cost to 
America’s image in contested areas than more aggressive operations that 
inflict heavy casualties.
Drones not only hold important advantages when operating inde-
pendently but could also improve the effectiveness of other units when 
used in conjunction with them. The relatively low costs of building and 
maintaining drones, as well as the absence of onboard pilots, make it 
possible to carry out attacks against well- defended targets that may be 
too dangerous for manned aircraft to pursue. Existing drones may be 
too vulnerable to air defense systems to be useful in this role,21 but as 
future generations of these aircraft become more advanced they might be 
used alongside manned aircraft and sent on hazardous missions without 
placing pilots at risk. Drones’ ability to stay airborne for long periods 
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of time would make them ideally suited for supporting ground forces 
with accurate intelligence and close air support. They could also help to 
coordinate other support units, such as by locating targets that can be 
attacked by artillery or manned aircraft carrying heavier ordnance. For 
now, this is only speculative, but it is a plausible future scenario consid-
ering the popularity of tactical reconnaissance drones among American 
ground forces and the money that has been invested in exploring ways 
that combined- arms operations could be conducted.22
Advocates characterize drones as an invaluable means of eliminating 
key members of terrorist organizations, especially those in leadership roles, 
and rendering the organizations incapable of functioning.23 This strategy 
may be a way of eliminating terrorist threats without sending ground forces 
to occupy foreign territories and possibly without even killing lower level 
members of terrorist organizations. In 2013 President Obama defended 
the strikes by saying that “[d]ozens of highly skilled al Qaeda commanders, 
trainers, bomb makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield.”24 
He went on to emphasize that these people were all imminent threats who 
had to be killed for national self- defense. “Plots have been disrupted that 
would have targeted international aviation, U.S. transit systems, European 
cities and our troops in Afghanistan. Simply put, these strikes have saved 
lives.” The administration’s defense of drones has consistently depended on 
this argument that they succeed in defending the United States and its al-
lies against terrorists who would have otherwise carried out deadly attacks.
Opponents of drone warfare have countered these arguments by at-
tempting to show that drones are generally ineffective and may even exac-
erbate military and political challenges. Some counterinsurgency theorists 
have argued that despite their capacity for carrying out precise attacks, 
drones are problematic because they alienate potential supporters. David 
Kilcullen and Andrew Exum contend that drone strikes are counterpro-
ductive when used to carry out targeted killings against terrorist leaders.25 
They argue that drones create a “siege mentality” among foreign civilian 
populations, generate outrage in the areas where they are used, and allow 
technology to replace strategy. The first and second processes result in de-
clining support for the United States and reduced willingness to cooperate 
in the future. The third process leads to a decline in military effectiveness 
that could make it more difficult for American forces to win the War on 
Terror. These conclusions about the ineffectiveness of drones have been 
taken up by many critics of drones and targeted killings more broadly.26 
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They have gained a special weight because of the authors’ contributions to 
forming United States military policy. Kilcullen is one of the leading theo-
rists behind the style of population- centric counterinsurgency operations 
the United States military conducts and was an advisor to General Pe-
traeus, while Exum is an army veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Michael Boyle raises even more serious strategic and political objections 
to drone warfare, arguing that the use of drones in countries that are strug-
gling against domestic insurgencies, such as Yemen, Pakistan, and Soma-
lia, undermines those states’ legitimacy and prevents them from developing 
more effective security institutions. He reasons that “drones provide a power-
ful signal to the population of a targeted state that the perpetrator considers 
the sovereignty of their government to be negligible,”27 which in turn builds 
domestic opposition to the state and generates greater support for terrorist or 
insurgent organizations. By this account, drones may be counterproductive 
under many conditions, especially in the type of counterterrorism scenario 
that received the most support in our experiments in earlier chapters. Other 
commentators have argued that relying on drones will increase military 
asymmetries, thereby forcing any belligerents on the receiving end of drone 
strikes to resort to terrorism in a desperate attempt to survive.28
It is unclear whether these assessments of the strategic effects of drone 
use are correct, and indeed this is beyond the scope of our research on 
how drone warfare interacts with public support for war. However, the 
debate over whether drones help or hinder the pursuit of military and 
political objectives raises the question of what the American public expects 
to happen when drones are used and how the expected effects could feed 
into use of force preferences. Predictions of success in drone strikes com-
pared to other types of attacks will provide deeper insight into the public’s 
overall attitude toward this type of warfare and whether drones strikes are 
perceived as affecting the outcome of conflicts. This leads us to our first 
expectation for this chapter: the American public will believe that drones 
are more likely to achieve their battlefield objectives than are other types 
of military force.
The Effects of Moral Hazard
Expectations of success or failure in military operations are not mere 
guesses at what the future may bring. They affect present decisions, possi-
Drones and Moral Hazard  115
bly in ways that change the criteria for when military force is warranted. It 
is here that the effects of moral hazard need to be considered. The concept 
of a moral hazard has its origins in the insurance industry, and it is worth 
briefly considering how it developed to appreciate its mechanisms and its 
potential consequences. Originally the term referred to the possibility that 
having coverage for a particular type of harm might make people less vigi-
lant in guarding against it. As Rubinsten and Yaari explain, “the insurer 
cannot observe certain actions taken by the insured” and this “creates an 
incentive for the insured, once insurance is purchased, to act in a matter 
that is liable to enhance the likelihood of a large claim being filed.”29 As 
they characterize it, the problem follows from the challenge of observing 
those who buy insurance. Any status or behavior that was recorded before 
purchasing insurance may change as a result of being insured, invalidating 
the initial estimates. This casts the problem from the insurer’s perspective. 
For the insured, the problem is one of feeling freer because of the security 
of shifting the risk onto someone else. Here the problem is not so much 
about monitoring as it is about displacing responsibility. Seen from either 
perspective, the moral hazard is potentially dangerous because it leads the 
insurer into a riskier investment and the insured into riskier behavior.
The concept of risk plays an important role in creating a moral hazard, 
as it essentially refers to transference of risk from one party to another and 
the possibility that risks may become magnified because of the insured 
party’s relative freedom from negative consequences. Information asym-
metries are also important to creating moral hazards. The person who takes 
insurance coverage may be unaware of the costs that carelessness may have 
on the insurer, while the insurer may not be able to predict how the risk 
calculus will change as a result of the insurance policy. Evaluating moral 
hazard therefore demands a careful look at the forces shaping risk evalu-
ations and the mechanisms for oversight that could potentially prevent a 
more risk- acceptant stance from emerging as the costs of one actor’s mis-
takes are displaced onto another.
Interest in moral hazard has spread far beyond insurance to become a 
more general challenge of managing the behavior of individuals and or-
ganizations. The concept has become especially prominent in economics, 
giving rise to countless applications. For example, there is the moral hazard 
that financing a company will give it greater freedom to make irrespon-
sible choices or that deeming a bank is “too big to fail” will make it more 
confident in issuing risky loans.30 There are ways of limiting the effects of 
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moral hazard experienced by insurance companies, such as with the im-
proved monitoring provided by car navigation computers or more rigor-
ous follow- up procedures.31 The insurance business has progressed by find-
ing ways to reward the insured for tracking behavioral changes, but that 
strategy may be difficult to replicate in other domains. It is particularly 
challenging to monitor this phenomenon as it is manifest in the collective 
decisions made by entire organizations, decisions that can be inherently 
difficult to identify because of the multiple actors involved.
A similar process affects technological innovations through what is 
known as the Peltzman effect. This name comes from Sam Peltzman, who 
documented the phenomenon in car safety regulations.32 Improvements 
in a machine’s safety may cause corresponding changes in how a machine 
is used, and this may ultimately make the machine more dangerous. For 
example, improvements to car seatbelts, brakes, or steering can lead driv-
ers to feel more confident, thereby increasing their willingness to drive 
dangerously. In one book on the subject, Greg Ip blames everything from 
financial crises to car crashes on the increases in risk acceptance that rou-
tinely follow from the sense of security that safety innovations provide.33 
In each instance, perceptions of safety end up generating risky behavior 
that can potentially erode any gains that were made and may even lead 
to a greater number of accidents. As with moral hazard, the underlying 
concern is that efforts to manage risks may be counterproductive if they 
encourage greater risk acceptance and facilitate the displacement of that 
risk onto others.
Are Drones a Moral Hazard?
Kreps and Kaag argue that drones create a moral hazard by making it 
possible for their users to wage wars without experiencing the full costs 
of fighting. Drone warfare shifts the burdens of war onto others, first, the 
authors maintain, because drones are particularly dangerous for civilians, 
and second because pilot invulnerability makes it virtually impossible for 
their users to experience the human costs that are typically associated with 
armed conflicts. Kreps and Kaag go on to argue that the transference of 
risks makes risky behavior more attractive, allowing drone users to increase 
the scope and frequency of their military operations with deadly conse-
quences that are not felt domestically. They cite the American targeted 
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killing program as an example of this. Because the American military can 
launch drone strikes in foreign countries with impunity, it is drawn into a 
false sense that this violence is effective for countering terrorism:
Killings and signature strikes have always been in the repertoire of 
military planners, but never, in the history of warfare, have they cost 
so very little to use. Historically, there have been significant risks 
associated with these types of military activities. First, a nation- state 
had to risk its soldiers or operatives. And if it risked the lives of 
soldiers, it risked public censure if these individuals were killed or 
captured. And if such a strike was successful and publicly endorsed, 
there was still the risk of retribution. Drones have allowed some 
governments to obviate most, if not all, of these costly risks. As US 
military forces acquire more autonomous drones and hire private 
security firms to operate them, these killings will become even less 
expensive for the American citizenry.34
To some extent, the moral hazard that Kreps and Kaag identify is con-
tained within the government, affecting those who are directly responsible 
for military affairs. They maintain that policymakers and members of the 
military are susceptible to the moral hazard because they lack the moral 
sensitivity needed to understand the problem and are compelled by the 
benefits of drone warfare to underestimate the magnitude of the risks be-
ing borne by others. Nevertheless, because citizens in a democracy are in 
a position to influence decisions to use force, the moral hazard affects the 
American public as well. The civilian public may take on a false sense of 
confidence in the country’s ability to wage wars without bearing the costs 
of fighting, which may in turn make people more willing to initiate wars 
that impose high risks on foreign populations and more willing to wage 
wars that have dubious prospects of success simply because they are rela-
tively risk- free.
More general findings about how states and political leaders re-
spond to risks provide grounds for thinking that the moral hazard is 
genuine. Kahn describes a “paradox of riskless warfare” that emerges 
when technological advancements or political decisions result in radi-
cal asymmetries of risk between opposing belligerents. He contends 
that war can only truly qualify as war when there is “reciprocal im-
position of risk” between combatants on opposing sides, and that 
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“[w]ithout the imposition of mutual risk, warfare is not war at all.”35 
This is paradoxical because Kahn recognizes that there are powerful in-
centives driving states to pursue advantages over their opponents, even 
as these could potentially become radical risk asymmetries that violate 
the logic of war. This goes beyond Kreps and Kaag’s concern about 
drones making it easier to wage wars to present an existential concern 
about sustaining the concept of war itself.
Many other commentators invoke similar arguments against drones, 
though often without explicitly mentioning moral hazard or the Peltzman 
effect by name. It is worth considering a few examples of this to appre-
ciate how pervasive this reasoning is and to see the subtle variations in 
the mechanisms that are described. It is also revealing that this argument 
is largely speculative, resting on the assumption that the logic of moral 
hazard can be generalized from other fields of research without empirical 
findings specific to drones.
Chamayou follows Kreps and Kaag in arguing that greater reliance on 
drones could make it easier to launch wars and more difficult for civilians 
at home to perceive the effects of violence. “Freed from the constraints 
imposed by reciprocal relations, will the drone masters be able to continue 
to demonstrate virtue and to resist the temptation to commit injustice 
with virtually no sanction imposed?”36 This way of phrasing the problem 
emphasizes the central question of whether those using the drones will, in 
the absence of costs imposed by opposing belligerents, be able to restrain 
themselves. This highlights the salience of whether public opinion will be 
sensitive to moral, strategic, or other considerations that will urge restraint 
even when the risk of sustaining casualties is low or when peaceful alter-
natives are available. Chamayou’s reasoning is plausible based on other 
studies of moral hazard, but he does not test whether this problem applies 
to drones.
Assessing the effects of drones on perceptions of risk also addresses 
broader concerns in research on risk management in military affairs. Shaw 
contends that the United States and other advanced militaries are respon-
sible for a phenomenon he calls “risk transfer militarism,” which is charac-
terized by a style of fighting that shifts danger away from soldiers and onto 
civilians, enemy combatants, and local allies.37 The decision to transfer 
risks is evident in the reliance on bombing and other types of violence that 
reduce soldiers’ vulnerability, such as drones. These weapons not only pre-
vent the American military from endangering soldiers in combat but also 
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lead it to rely more heavily on allies who can provide ground forces and 
whose soldiers are therefore open to being injured or killed. Seen from this 
perspective, the moral hazard presented by drones may be a manifestation 
of a broader strategic and political decision about how the United States 
seeks to distribute the risks of war and, in doing so, generates the new 
danger of losing contact with the horrors of violence.
Similar arguments inform a large body of research attempting to come 
to terms with what it means to fight wars when the soldiers and civil-
ians are insulated to such an extent that real war transforms into a “simu-
lation,”38 “virtual war,”39 “virtuous war,”40 “war without warriors,”41 or a 
“spectator sport.”42 These claims commonly point to drones as one of the 
primary culprits in transforming attitudes toward violence. Because these 
weapons platforms offer both pilot invulnerability and target selectivity, 
they are described as the logical outcome of American or Western stra-
tegic preferences. By mediating the experience of war and only showing 
the effects of bombs and missiles through a computer screen, drones raise 
still more concerns of cultivating the kind of detached sense of risk that is 
blamed for making war too easy. Here the concern is not with war itself 
but rather with a particular kind of war: unnecessary war that would not 
take place were it not for the public’s distorted perceptions. If this type of 
war only happens because it is easy, rather than because it is necessary for 
national self- defense, then there must be peaceful alternatives that would 
become apparent by shattering misperceptions.
Some wars may be largely unavoidable. A country that is invaded by 
a hostile foreign state has little choice but to take up arms in self- defense. 
There is, therefore, little likelihood that moral hazard or related disruptions 
to risk assessment will cause defensive wars. If moral hazard is a genuine 
concern, its effects should be clearest when it comes to what are sometimes 
called “wars of choice.” These are wars that states initiate even when there 
are alternatives to fighting. As Haas explains, “wars of choice tend to in-
volve stakes or interests that are less clearly vital, along with the existence 
of viable alternative policies, be they diplomacy, inaction, or something 
else but still other than the use of military force.”43 Moral hazard is most 
serious in these cases, where a war might not have happened if not for the 
distortions in risk assessment brought about by the capabilities of drones. 
This leads us to the second expectation we explore in this chapter: support 
for an attack that takes place despite the availability of peaceful alternatives 
will be higher when drones are involved.
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Drones and Moral Hazard
This chapter’s first expectation holds that the technological capabilities of 
drones will lead individuals to believe that their battlefield objectives are 
more likely to be met with drones than with other types of military force. 
To assess this expectation, we analyze responses to a question included in 
the survey experiment with a representative sample of American adults 
introduced in detail in chapter 3. Recall that this experiment randomly 
assigned respondents to read a news story describing a planned attack on 
terrorist compounds. The respondents read stories that described the at-
tack as being conducted by drones, air strikes, or ground troops. They then 
answered questions measuring their responses to the news article. One of 
these items asked respondents to indicate how likely the attack would be to 
achieve its military objectives. Responses fell on a seven- point scale rang-
ing from “extremely likely” to “extremely unlikely” and are summarized in 
figure 3.4. Our first expectation in this chapter is that the percentage of re-
spondents expecting the attack to have a higher chance of success would be 
considerably greater for those who read about drone strikes than for those 
who read about an air strike or a ground invasion. This is clearly not the 
case. The distribution of responses is remarkably similar across the three 
conditions, and a statistical test indicates that there are not significant dif-
ferences among the three groups of respondents. This suggests that, on 
average, the public does not attribute clear or obvious advantages to drones 
over other types of military force.44
To gain more traction on this issue, we also conducted a survey ex-
periment designed to assess the degree to which individuals fell victim to 
moral hazard when considering the utility of drone strikes, using respon-
dents recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.45 Our experiment builds 
on work by Aaron Hoffman and his colleagues. They show that existing 
experimental and public opinion studies of military success systematically 
overstate support for the use of force. The reason is that these works typi-
cally do not discuss alternatives to American military action. Experiments 
follow a pattern of presenting respondents with a range of military options 
to choose from but do not provide information about what nonmilitary 
options are available or how likely these are to succeed. The public, they 
suggest, generally assumes that military operations are pursued when non-
violent methods of conflict resolution have failed. As Hoffman and his col-
leagues put it, this type of experiment prompts participants to believe that 
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“force is a last resort— to be used only after other feasible alternatives are 
exhausted.” Omitting diplomatic alternatives signals that they are unavail-
able and that some kind of military response is required.
They conduct a series of studies demonstrating that when respondents 
are informed about the existence of viable alternatives to the use of force, 
support for military action declines.46 Conversely, when the information 
about alternatives is not mentioned or when the prospects of diplomatic 
success are low, the support for war is similar to that found in experi-
mental designs that only include military options. This is evidence that 
“[o]mitting information about the feasibility of diplomatic strategies can 
induce people to conclude that non- war courses of action are unattractive, 
strengthening their willingness to back military action.” The potential hu-
man costs play a central role in the causal process the authors outline. They 
find that raising the expected casualties dampens enthusiasm for attacking, 
such that the alternatives to war look more attractive as the projected casu-
alties increase. Lowering the number of expected casualties makes military 
options more appealing even if peaceful alternatives are mentioned. By 
this account, casualty sensitivity is best evaluated in terms of how much 
loss the public will tolerate when the available options, their likelihood of 
success, and the policy objective are also factored in.
Military action is viewed as a last resort because it is costly and risky. 
The preference for nonmilitary strategies when these are available, or when 
high casualties are anticipated, is a natural consequence of risk aversion 
and the associated moral abhorrence for causing needless harm. As we saw 
in chapter 3, a key cost for many individuals is the possibility of military 
casualties. Drones, of course, permit the United States to use force without 
risk to soldiers. If the logic of moral hazard outlined above reflects how 
people think about the risks and costs of conflict, the findings reported in 
the Hoffman experiment should disappear when drone strikes are avail-
able. Since drones reduce the expected military losses to zero, the logic of 
moral hazard indicates that the public should be willing to support their 
use even when the chance of success is low and if there are viable alterna-
tives to military force. The public should feel the lure of the easy “wars of 
choice.” On the other hand, the moral hazard reasoning would be con-
tradicted if the public continues to favor nonmilitary options even when 
drones can be used to prevent American losses.
Our experiment in this chapter tests this expectation. Like other exper-
iments reported in this book, it takes the form of a news story describing 
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a planned attack. This time, respondents read about a plan for American 
forces to support Iraqi troops defending a strategically important bridge 
from militants. It had two treatment arms. The first, similar to the experi-
ments reported in chapter 3, varies the attack type, which was described 
as being carried out by a drone, aircraft with onboard crews, or ground 
troops. The second arm, building on the work of Hoffman, adds informa-
tion about alternatives to military action. Half of the respondents read 
that the secretary of defense, responsible for authorizing the strike, “was 
overheard saying that this decision was an easy one because the alternatives 
to American intervention . . . such as dropping weapons to the Iraqi troops 
or airlifting more Iraqi troops to defend the bridge, were unlikely to work.” 
The other half of the respondents read a nearly identical text, except they 
were informed that the secretary said the decision was a “difficult” one 
because the alternatives were “likely” to work. This replicates the way Hoff-
man and his colleagues presented their experiments, making our results 
comparable to theirs. Framing the experiment in this way produces six 
conditions: a drone strike with good or with bad alternatives to the use of 
force, an airstrike with good or bad alternatives, and an attack by ground 
troops with good or bad alternatives.
As in our previously reported experiments, the dependent variable 
is support for the attack described in the news article; respondents can 
strongly oppose, somewhat oppose, somewhat support, or strongly sup-
port this use of force. Our key comparison is across respondents that are 
assigned to treatments with the same attack type but different information 
about the alternatives to military force. The moral hazard theory would 
predict that among respondents who read about attacks by ground troops, 
support would be higher among those who were told there were only bad 
alternatives to the attack than among those who were told that good alter-
natives existed. Respondents in the later condition, wishing to avoid the 
risk of military casualties and knowing that there are other ways of achiev-
ing the same objective, should be less enthusiastic about using force. The 
moral hazard theory would expect a quite different pattern across respon-
dents who read about a drone strike but differed in what they were told 
about the alternatives. These respondents should, according to the logic of 
moral hazard, be indifferent to the availability of alternatives, since drones 
are a low- cost means of achieving the objective. This expectation generates 
weaker predictions about respondents assigned to the air strike treatments. 
Since the pilots of strike aircraft are presumably at less risk of harm than 
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ground troops, a plausible extension of the logic of moral hazard might 
hold that the effect of good alternatives would be weaker than in the case 
of ground troops but stronger than for drone strikes.
To assess these predictions, we first divided the sample of respondents 
into three groups: those who read about drone strikes, air strikes, and the 
use of ground forces. We then created a dichotomous measure of assign-
ment to a condition describing the alternatives to military action as good 
or bad. For each group of respondents, we regressed this dummy variable 
on our dependent variable of support for the use of force using ordered 
logistic regressions and including standard control variables: gender, edu-
cation, party identification, age, and minority status. The results are pre-
sented in table 5.2.
The predictions of the moral hazard argument were not borne out by 
our experiment. For each attack type, the key independent variable— the 
existence of good alternatives to military action— is negative and statis-
tically significant. This means that respondents who were informed that 
there were good alternatives expressed less support for military action, re-
gardless of the type of attack. This is to be expected among the group of 
respondents who read about an attack by ground forces. But the fact that 
the same relationship holds among those who read about a drone strike is 
TABLE 5.2. Regression Results for Attacks with Good and Bad Alternatives
 Drone Strike Air Strike Ground Troops
Good alternatives −.666* −.462* −.791*
(.200) (.193) (.199)
Gender −.526* −.845* −.133
(.210) (.201) (.201)
Education 1.101* .0418* −1.405*
(.564) (.193) (.562)
Party identification 2.106* 1.390* 1.292*
(.382) (.374) (.396)
Age 1.212* .749 −.434
(.680) (.703) (.700)
Minority .201 .032 .137
(.239) (.214) (.227)
Likelihood ratio 842 915 872
AIC 860 933 889
Observations 381 387 379
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05.
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inconsistent with the prediction that the availability of drones will increase 
the public’s willingness to initiate “riskless wars.”
The results in table 5.2 only tell us if the effect of the existence of 
good alternatives is statistically significant or not. It is possible that the 
size of the effects of this variable are quite different across the three groups. 
For example, it might be that such alternatives reduce support for drone 
strikes, but by a much smaller amount than for ground troops. To investi-
gate this possibility, figure 5.2 plots the changes in the predicted probabili-
ties for each level of the dependent variable across respondents assigned 
to conditions with good and bad alternatives. We see that the substantive 
effect of this variable is similar across the three attack types; respondents 
who read about good alternatives to military force were between 10 and 
20 percent less likely to strongly support or to support the planned attack. 
These differences were largest among respondents who read about the use 
of ground troops, but were still of similar magnitude to those for whom 
the attack was described as a drone strike.
The experiment included one additional question that addresses a po-
tential alternative explanation. As with the representative sample of re-
spondents from the experiment reported in chapter 4 and figure 5.1, in 
this experiment we also asked respondents to report whether they expected 
the attack described in the condition they read to succeed. The percentages 
of respondents reporting each possible answer choice is reported in figure 
5.2.47 Among the respondents in this experiment there was very little dif-
ference in the expectations that the attack would succeed across the three 
attack types. In particular, note that the two conditions involving drone 
strikes do not produce substantially higher expectations of success than do 
air strikes or the use of ground troops. This offers further evidence against 
expectation 5.1 by showing that respondents did not think that drones 
were more or less likely to secure victory than other methods of attack.
Conclusion
Our finding that the public does not see drones as being any more or 
less effective than manned aircraft and ground forces indicates that these 
different forms of military force are viewed as interchangeable when it 
comes to their ability to achieve objectives. If anticipated success is the 
decisive factor in determining support for war, then a war waged with 
drones will not appear significantly more attractive than one conducted by 
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other means. Any difference in enthusiasm for drone attacks compared to 
alternatives would have to come from something other than shifts in the 
chance of victory. In chapter 3, we suggested that the most important rea-
son that drones increase support for the use of force is they render Ameri-
can military personnel invulnerable from attack. The findings in this chap-
ter, that drones are not viewed as more likely to achieve their objectives 
than are other types of attacks, lends further credence to this conclusion. 
This should help to allay some of the concerns that drones may lower the 
threshold for war. It means that drones are not likely to promote greater 
confidence in military force as a way of reaching foreign policy goals. The 
military option remains a singular approach that is apt to be judged by the 
same standards about likelihood of success as in previous conflicts when 
drones were not available.
These conclusions have some implications for the work on elite fram-
Fig. 5.1. Differences in predicted probabilities of supporting attack with good and 
bad options
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ing we have discussed in previous chapters. Elites attempting to mobilize 
support for a drone war may have limited success if they present drones as 
being more effective weapons platforms for achieving military objectives. 
Instead, they are likely to produce greater improvements in public opinion 
when they focus on the protection of American soldiers. Opponents of 
drone strikes may likewise achieve little if they characterize these machines 
as less effective than alternative forms of military force and would be bet-
ter served by emphasizing their impact on civilians, which we discuss in 
the next chapter. The murkiness of concepts like victory and defeat in the 
Fig. 5.2. Expectations of success by mission type and good and bad options
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War on Terror that has come to define drone operations only adds to the 
challenge for elites on either side who attempt to promote drones as more 
or less effective than traditional weapons and tactics.
Anticipations of the likelihood of success get at several important nor-
mative considerations when it comes to determining when wars are justi-
fied and how they should be fought. First, likelihood of success is often 
taken to be one of the core principles of just war theory.48 A futile war, 
the reasoning goes, is immoral because it inflicts suffering without any 
chance of producing redeeming benefits. Predictions of success may there-
fore inform judgments about whether a war is justified. With drones hav-
ing roughly the same degree of perceived efficacy as manned aircraft and 
ground forces, they are unlikely to influence this dimension of the moral 
and legal reasoning that goes into determining when wars are justified. 
Drones may alter the calculations people make about when to fight, but 
this result helps us focus on how they do this by eliminating some of the 
possible explanations. We can see that although the likelihood of victory 
is normatively important, perceptions about the morality of drone warfare 
are more heavily shaped by other influences.
Second, the likelihood of winning may influence how belligerents 
choose to fight. Alexander Downes argues that states are more inclined to 
target civilians when they are desperate to win— a condition that occurs 
when the costs of losing are high and the chances of winning seem to be 
remote. “According to the desperation logic, states that are embroiled in 
costly and prolonged struggles become increasingly desperate to snatch 
victory from the jaws of defeat and reduce their own losses.”49 As this quo-
tation indicates, the anticipated number of casualties interacts with an-
ticipated success just as in public opinion research, making it essential to 
distinguish these factors in experiments. But he adds the additional worry 
that changes in opinion might translate into shifts in the conduct of wars, 
with terrible results for the civilian victims. Drones could be advantageous 
or disadvantageous depending on whether their availability changes the 
conditions under which states experience the desperation that Downes de-
scribes and become willing to deviate from the norms of fighting. Based 
on our results, their impact appears to be neutral and therefore unlikely to 
influence the civilian public’s desperation to win.
The results of our experiment in this chapter show that effects of moral 
hazard or the Petlzman effect do not appear to hold when it comes to 
combat drone technology. The ability to use drones does not increase the 
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American public’s willingness to engage in risky military ventures when 
nonviolent alternatives are available. Rather, good alternatives to war are 
consistently preferred regardless of what weapons are available, and vio-
lence only becomes more attractive as the alternatives disappear or become 
less promising. We should therefore be skeptical about arguments that the 
advent of drones will radically alter the conditions under which the United 
States decides to initiate wars. As we have shown in previous chapters, 
drones help to build support for war, but their effect tends to be mod-
est and short of what the United States would need to initiate wars with 
impunity.
There is an important caveat to this conclusion about moral hazard. We 
have focused on one manifestation of moral hazard linked to drones, the 
one most commonly expressed in the literature and potentially the most 
concerning because it raises the possibility of an increase in the prevalence 
of armed conflicts. Nevertheless, there are other variations of the moral 
hazard argument that cannot be directly tested using public opinion data. 
For example, Chamayou argues that “[i]f the military withdraws from the 
battlefield, enemy violence will turn against targets that are easier to reach. 
Even if the soldiers are beyond reach, civilians are not.”50 Killmister like-
wise contends that relying more heavily on drones is morally questionable 
because this will induce enemies to pursue terrorism. These arguments 
rely on the moral hazard logic insofar as they suggest that the displace-
ment of risk, in this case from soldiers onto civilians, may encourage states 
that use drones to become more risk- acceptant. Future research should ex-
plore these and other ways drones may upset risk calculations during wars. 
However, the analysis will have to focus less on attitudes within the coun-
try using drones and more about how these weapons platforms change 
strategic calculations for those who come under attack.
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Chapter 6
Drones and Sensitivity to Civilian Harm
We saw in chapters 2 and 3 that individuals are, on average, more will-
ing to support the use of force when attacks are carried out by drones 
rather than by ground troops, and that the invulnerability these weapons 
platforms create for American military personnel is an important part of 
this relationship. This creates an ethical dilemma: by lowering one cost of 
war— military casualties— drones may make it politically easier to start or 
intensify wars. These wars could result in civilian deaths. As discussed in 
the introductory chapter, a major concern of critics of the use of armed 
drones is that they may lead to the substitution of military casualties with 
civilian casualties. There is also the related fear that these civilian casualties 
would be ignored if drones promote public disengagement from the over-
all costs of fighting. In this chapter, we suggest that this way of thinking 
about drones and civilian casualties overlooks how this technology changes 
public expectations about the likelihood of civilian casualties.
There is some evidence that the American public is not overly con-
cerned about civilian deaths during war. As we discuss in the next section, 
some systematic studies of the issue find that the deaths of noncombatants 
have little effect on American public opinion. Other studies, though, pres-
ent evidence that Americans are quite concerned about the possibility of 
civilian casualties. Our conjoint survey experiment in chapter 2 found that 
increased expectations of civilian casualties were associated with sizeable 
reductions in support for attacks. This is evidence of such a high con-
cern for civilians that expected civilian casualties can constrain US military 
options. What can account for these contradictory findings? We contend 
that one answer can be found by looking at how the availability of drones 
changes the perceived salience of civilian casualties.
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Drawing on insights from psychology about “counterfactual think-
ing,” we theorize that the selectivity of drones— that is, their ability to 
distinguish legitimate targets of military action from noncombatants— 
raises expectations about the results that will obtain when they are used. 
Drone technology may make it easier to avoid civilian casualties, and when 
prompted with this information, the public adjusts its expectations. Other 
precision weapons may have a similar sensitizing effect, but drones deserve 
special attention because they have been the most heavily publicized tool 
for launching selective attacks throughout the War on Terror. Moreover, 
the US military’s overall preoccupation with achieving greater precision 
across a range of different weapons systems fuels expectations that drones 
will contribute to the overall reduction of civilian losses.
A risk of civilian casualties should reduce support for the use of force 
when drones are available, and attacks with drones that result in civilian 
casualties should heighten concern about the casualties that are inflicted 
compared to similar attacks using less selective weapons or attacks that 
place military personnel at risk. This process of counterfactual reasoning 
drives people to pay more attention to civilian harm because such out-
comes conflict with their expectations. It raises the salience and promi-
nence of civilian casualties in the minds of the public and leads to greater 
dissatisfaction and regret when drone strikes produce civilian deaths.
A first experiment tests the chapter’s first two expectations (summa-
rized in table 6.1) derived from the logic of counterfactual thinking about 
how the selectivity of drones makes individuals more sensitive to civilian 
harm. Respondents primed to expect fewer civilian casualties expressed 
more regret, more sympathy with victims’ families, and less satisfaction 
than did those primed with a higher risk of civilian deaths, even though 
the actual outcomes across treatments were identical. This effect weakens 
when precision strikes are carried out by manned platforms.
TABLE 6.1. Expectations
Expectation 6.1: Compared to otherwise identical attacks with non- precision weapons, 
attacks with drones that result in civilian casualties produce less satisfaction, more 
regret, and more sympathy for the victims.
Expectation 6.2: The effects of civilian casualties caused by attacks with precision weap-
ons on satisfaction, regret, and sympathy will be attenuated when these weapons place 
military personnel at risk of harm.
Expectation 6:3: Support for the use of force declines when the authorities forgo op-
portunities offered by precision weapons to reduce the chance that the use of force will 
result in civilian harm.
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An important counterargument is that many view civilian casualties 
as tragic but unavoidable accidents that result when military force is em-
ployed. We further argue that the development and use of drones should 
alter this perception of the origins of civilian harm. Most people want to 
avoid civilian casualties, and they expect political and military leaders to 
take reasonable steps to achieve this goal. But these steps can conflict with 
the pursuit of other military objectives; for example, deciding not to attack 
a potential target because doing so would result in civilian harm might 
expose American troops to greater danger or leave an insurgent group free 
to engage in more violence in the future. These conflicts recede, though, 
when drones are employed. Their technological characteristics enable force 
to be used in ways that more carefully distinguishes military from civilian 
targets and that has the potential to reduce the risk of civilian harm.
We argue that people expect their leaders to exploit these advantages 
and to plan their attacks in ways that reduce the risk of killing civilians, 
especially when doing so does not reduce their ability to achieve military 
objectives. A second survey experiment assesses this third expectation and 
finds that support for the use of force declines when planned attacks un-
necessarily endanger civilians. This effect strengthens when respondents 
are informed that the attack violates international law, which suggests that 
legal and moral norms exert an independent influence on assessments of 
the use of force. Importantly, the differences remain even when the tar-
geted group targeted is described as directly threatening the United States, 
indicating that individuals are not willing to “trade” risking civilian death 
for greater security.
Counterfactual Thinking about Civilian Casualties
What effect might the deaths of foreign civilians in drone strikes have on 
the American public’s support for the use of force? Existing research does 
not provide the straightforward answers that work on military casualties 
does. Much less attention has been devoted to analyzing if and how civil-
ian deaths influence attitudes toward war. Some systematic studies of the 
issue find that the deaths of noncombatants exercise little effect on Ameri-
can public opinion. John Mueller’s review of aggregate polling data from 
the Second World War through the 1990s leads him to conclude that the 
American public is not much influenced by such casualties. John Tirman’s 
historical analysis reaches a similar conclusion. One remarkable finding 
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is that civilian deaths at the hands of American forces in some conflicts, 
especially the wars in Korea and Vietnam, were far greater than those re-
sulting from drone strikes, but they seemed to exert little influence over 
public attitudes. On its face, this would seem to indicate that even very 
high levels of harm to foreign noncombatants has little effect on support 
for the use of force.1
Nevertheless, there is strong evidence in favor of the opposing perspec-
tive. Some studies show that civilian casualties might influence public at-
titudes under certain conditions. Richard Eichenberg found that survey 
questions mentioning civilian casualties led to a reduction in support for 
the use of force. The size of the effect of civilian casualties was similar to 
that of military casualties and as large as many of the principal policy ob-
jectives, such as foreign policy restraint and humanitarian intervention.2 
Experimental work by Johns and Davies finds that information about civil-
ian casualties reduces support for the use of force.3 Other studies indicate 
that concern about civilian casualties has increased in recent decades.4 This 
helps to reconcile the opposing viewpoints by introducing the possibility 
that opinions may vary over time, yet the causal processes responsible for 
the growing concern remain unclear.
Existing research, then, has reached conflicting conclusions about the 
effects of civilian casualties, with some finding that it has no effect on sup-
port for the use of force and others concluding that support declines when 
civilians are harmed. We suggest that one reason for these different find-
ings is that the public is, often implicitly, balancing the costs of military 
casualties against the costs of civilian harm. In their important work on 
support for the use of force, Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler say that “the Ameri-
can public views civilian casualties much the same way they view military 
casualties— as a necessary evil to be minimized, but tolerable under the 
right conditions.” But any trade- off between minimizing risks to military 
personnel and to noncombatants disappears when drones are employed. 
Drone strikes place no American service members at direct risk of harm. 
How might this influence support for the use of force? One perspective 
might hold that the weakening of the trade- off between civilian and mili-
tary casualties should unambiguously lead to more support for military 
action. When this trade- off is sharp, many individuals will be willing to 
“exchange” a higher risk of civilian harm for a reduction in the risks to 
military personnel. But drones render this mental exchange unnecessary; 
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it is now possible for people who opposed an attack because of the risk of 
military casualties to support the attack.
As we discussed in chapter 3, much of the research on drones takes this 
perspective by speculating that the absence of military casualties will lead 
to a corresponding willingness to wage more wars. The central argument 
in this chapter is that heightened concern about noncombatant casualties 
is a direct consequence of a weapon’s selectivity. Drones, for example, are 
perceived by many as selective in their ability to identify and destroy a tar-
get while minimizing harm to nearby people and structures. We argue that 
this selectivity influences not only support for the use of force, but that it 
also raises expectations about the outcome of military action: as military 
technology becomes more selective, and this selectivity is communicated 
to individuals, they become less tolerant of paying costs that might have 
been avoided. As Sapolsky and Shapiro noted some time ago, there are 
“ratchets in our war experience”; the successful use of precision weaponry 
in a conflict today creates the expectation that the same degree of success 
will be achieved in tomorrow’s wars.5 The US military has shown a strong 
desire to employ precision weapons throughout the post– Cold War era, 
with drones emerging out of this quest for precision and becoming its 
most prominent expression.
Insights from the study of “counterfactual thinking” explain this 
ratchet effect. The key work is by Kahneman and Tversky, who introduced 
the idea that counterfactuals can be integrated with the study of judgment 
and decision making.6 In this tradition, counterfactuals are conditional 
propositions with an antecedent and a consequence, where the antecedent 
is the action or decision of an individual or group and the consequence 
is the outcome that results from this action. Counterfactual thinking in-
volves a mental modification to the antecedent, and then imagining how 
this modification would alter the consequence. Upward counterfactuals, 
which are most relevant here, occur when the outcome is judged to be 
inferior to what would have obtained if the imagined alternative to the 
antecedent had been chosen.7 An example of an upward counterfactual is 
“if the drone strike had not been authorized, the civilians would not have 
been killed.” Upward counterfactuals have been shown to influence emo-
tions and judgments. For example, they drive feelings of regret, defined as 
the recognition that a different antecedent action would have resulted in 
a superior outcome.8 Respondents are willing to provide more compensa-
134  Drones and Support for the Use of Force
tion to victims of crime and negligence when an upward counterfactual 
is mentally available to them.9 These effects are the consequence of two 
mechanisms: contrast effects and causal inference effects.
Contrast effects arise “when a judgment is made more extreme via the 
juxtaposition of some anchor or standard.”10 This is nicely illustrated in a 
study of Olympic athletes, which found that those winning silver medals 
were less satisfied than those awarded bronze metals. Silver medal win-
ners generated upward counterfactuals, comparing their outcome with 
winning a gold medal, while bronze medal winners thought in terms of 
downward counterfactuals, contrasting their medal with the outcome of 
no medal.11 The reference value that an individual uses to evaluate an out-
come, then, has a decisive influence on the effect and judgments produced 
by counterfactual thinking.12
Causal inference effects occur when the imagined counterfactual is 
identical to the facts except for the action in the antecedent. This means 
that in the mind of the individual, the antecedent action is the cause of 
the outcome. The practice of contrasting an otherwise identical counter-
factual with the actual decisions and events and outcome highlights the 
causal link between the action and the outcome. Causal inferences are 
more likely when the antecedent is more “mutable” or subject to change. 
It is more difficult to imagine changing immutable causes, such as gravity. 
Actions and decisions, in contrast, are often perceived as more mutable, 
since in many cases it is possible to imagine that a different action had been 
chosen. Based on this reasoning, our first expectation is that compared to 
otherwise identical attacks with nonprecision weapons, attacks with pre-
cision weapons that result in civilian casualties produce less satisfaction, 
more regret, and more sympathy with the victims.
The contrast effect and causal inference effect contribute to this differ-
ence. Drones’ selectivity and pilot invulnerability allow political leaders to 
argue that the weapons are less likely to produce negative unanticipated 
effects. The political and military leaders that develop and deploy preci-
sion weapons justify them, in part, because they are more likely to produce 
desirable outcomes (such as killing the enemy) and less likely to result in 
undesirable consequences (such as killing civilians). The reference value for 
civilian casualties that individuals adopt for drones, then, should be lower 
than that for other, less selective weapons. If an attack does inflict civilian 
casualties, the contrast between the reference value and the outcome will 
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be greater when drones are employed, leading to stronger affective and 
cognitive responses.
A second relevant feature of drones is their tight integration of intel-
ligence collection with targeting and attack decisions. This integration is 
one of the factors that makes these weapons so precise and contributes to 
the contrast effect. It is also an advantage over some other types of preci-
sion weapons. As we pointed out earlier, the decision to arm drones was 
initially taken to avoid the lag time between identifying a target and the 
impact of missiles. Drones increase selectivity beyond what some other 
precision weapons can achieve by reducing this time from the minutes it 
takes a cruise missile to arrive at its destination— during which a civilian 
may wander into the kill zone— to a few seconds.
Combining reconnaissance and attack roles makes the decision to 
launch an attack more mutable. Decision makers, including military per-
sonnel piloting the weapon or political and military leaders who authorize 
its use, have more, higher quality, and more up- to- date information about 
the target. This is particularly clear from the American military’s drone 
strikes against suspected terrorists, which are often preceded by hours or 
even days of monitoring the target to confirm that the person is a combat-
ant and to select the right moment of attack. This means that it is easier 
to imagine that there might have been intelligence that would have led to 
calling off an attack that results in civilian harm.
Contrasting an old- fashioned “gravity” bomb with a guided missile 
fired from a drone illustrates this effect. It is not difficult to imagine many 
factors, some of which are not particularly mutable, preventing a gravity 
bomb from hitting its target: wind, the inability to view the target due to 
weather, or human errors in making the complex calculations needed to 
accurately drop the bomb. In the case of an attack from a precision weap-
ons platform such as a drone, imagining a different and better outcome is 
considerably easier. The weapon controllers are able to monitor the target 
in real time, can rely on software the guide the missile to a specific point, 
and can call off an attack if a civilian wanders into the target area. All pre-
cision weapons improve on gravity bombs when it comes to reducing the 
risk of civilian casualties, so drones are not unique in this respect. Drones 
should be seen as one part of a broader category of precision weapons 
systems that aim to reduce the risk to civilians. Drones offer some advan-
tages over other technologies in this group by integrating functions and 
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reducing lag time between target identification and a weapon’s impact, 
but all precision weapons systems may have some influence on altering the 
anticipated number of civilian casualties that would result from a strike.
The important work by Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler included a survey 
experiment that compared the effects of military and civilian casualties in 
a hypothetical war with North Korea. Civilian casualties reduced support 
for the war about as much as did US military casualties. Furthermore, a 
majority agreed that military planners should limit harm to foreign ci-
vilians even if this placed American military personnel in greater danger. 
Most importantly for our purposes, their survey experiment directly asked 
respondents to rate the importance of limiting American military casual-
ties compared to civilian casualties. Most respondents stated that the for-
mer goal was more important.13 This suggests a second expectation: the 
effects of civilian casualties caused by drones on satisfaction, regret, and 
sympathy will be attenuated when these weapons place military personnel 
at risk of harm. The logic of this expectation is that respondents would pre-
fer to avoid both civilian and military casualties. When it is impossible to 
guarantee this outcome, the possibility of military casualties makes them 
somewhat more willing to tolerate civilian casualties.
In sum, individuals’ assessments of an attack with drones that may 
cause harm to civilians are shaped by the difference between the refer-
ence point individuals adopt and the outcome. Negative differences lead to 
more negative assessments. This means that assessments of an attack with 
the same outcome can differ across individuals who begin with different 
reference points. These reference points, in turn, are influenced by how 
precise a weapon is depicted by opinion leaders such as the media. Finally, 
this effect is blunted when military personnel are placed at risk.
Counterfactual Thinking and Selectivity: A Survey Experiment
We conducted a survey experiment in the summer of 2013 to better un-
derstand how counterfactual thinking influences attitudes about drone 
strikes and civilian casualties. After collecting information about their 
demographic characteristics, political attitudes, and attention to current 
events, respondents were randomly assigned to read one of four hypo-
thetical news stories (the treatments, survey administration details, demo-
graphic statistics, and regression results can be found in the appendix to 
Drones and Sensitivity to Civilian Harm  137
this chapter). All four treatments described a planned attack by the United 
States military on the hideouts of insurgent groups in Pakistan that had at-
tacked American troops in Afghanistan. These hideouts were described as 
being near civilian residences. The vignettes stated that civilian casualties 
were one possible outcome of the planned attack.
The treatments varied the military technology that would be used in 
the attack and the assessment of military experts regarding the likelihood 
of civilian casualties. In the “high selectivity, unmanned” treatment, the 
attack was described as being carried out by a drone equipped with video 
surveillance that allowed the attacks to be launched when civilians were 
not nearby and using highly accurate missiles that would minimize the risk 
of civilian casualties. The vignette also stated that in 2012, only 3 percent 
of those killed in similar drone strikes were civilians. This number is drawn 
from the estimates of the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, which care-
fully tracks drone strikes and civilian casualties.14 This information was 
intended to provide respondents with a low reference value regarding the 
likelihood of civilian harm.
The “high selectivity, manned” attack was identical to this first treat-
ment but described the attacks as conducted from piloted aircraft. This 
treatment stated explicitly that the insurgents lacked weapons capable of 
firing on the attacking aircraft, meaning that the crews were not at risk of 
harm from the enemy. Differences between these two treatments allow an 
assessment of the expectation that the effects of civilian casualties should 
be attenuated when the attack is conducted with manned rather than un-
manned platforms. This design creates a difficult test for this expectation, 
since respondents are explicitly told that the air crews cannot be attacked. 
Respondents must imagine some way the crews could be harmed, for ex-
ample equipment malfunctions over hostile territory or the possibility that 
the insurgents have acquired weapons unknown to the United States.
The “moderate selectivity” treatment described the attack as bombs 
dropped from aircraft. These aircraft would fly at high altitudes so that 
their crews would not be at risk from insurgent fire and would drop bombs 
on the insurgents’ hideouts. These bomb attacks were described as possibly 
producing civilian casualties because of their larger blast size and the fact 
that the pilots could not easily determine if civilians were near the targets. 
In this treatment, experts stated that civilian casualties were “possible” and 
that 35 percent of those killed in similar attacks in 2012 were classified 
as civilians. Since the goal of this treatment was to prime respondents to 
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imagine a much higher likelihood of civilian harm than those assigned to 
the high- precision treatment, we selected a number here that was an order 
of magnitude larger than in the high- precision treatment. Finally, the “low 
selectivity” treatment was identical to the moderate selectivity treatment 
except it stated that 50 percent of those killed in similar attacks were civil-
ians. The third and fourth treatments assess the expectation that differ-
ences in respondents’ degree of sympathy and regret for civilian casualties 
should be lower than for the unmanned, high- selectivity treatment.
Immediately after reading the vignette, respondents in all four treat-
ment conditions were asked if they supported the plan to attack insurgent 
bases, their assessment of the likelihood of civilian casualties, and their level 
of satisfaction with the attack plan.15 All respondents were then informed 
that the attack had been carried out and had resulted in the death of the 
targeted insurgents as well as civilians. After learning this information, 
they were again asked questions regarding their level of satisfaction with 
the attack plan. Respondents also indicated how surprised they were that 
the attack resulted in civilian casualties and how important they thought it 
was that the United States issue an apology for killing civilians. They were 
also told that in past conflicts, the United States has offered compensation 
to victims’ families, and they were asked how much compensation should 
be offered in this case. Possible responses ranged from no compensation 
to $40,000 or more in increments of $5,000. Respondents were informed 
that the average amount suggested was $20,000.16
The theory of counterfactual thinking creates three expectations about 
how responses should differ across treatments, even though the outcome 
was identical for all respondents. First, those primed by the unmanned, 
high- selectivity treatment to expect fewer civilian casualties should be 
more sympathetic to the victims and favor higher levels of compensa-
tion to victims’ families. This measure draws from an important study 
that assessed how counterfactual thoughts accounted for sympathy with 
victims of violent crime.17 Second, those assigned to the high- selectivity, 
unmanned treatment should be more willing to issue an apology, since 
doing so would indicate more regret for the outcome of the attack. Third, 
the degree to which their satisfaction with the attack plan changes from 
before to after they learn that civilian casualties have been inflicted should 
be larger for those in the unmanned, high- selectivity treatment.
The top panel of table 6.2 describes the measurement scale and mean val-
ues for these variables across the four treatments.18 Asterisks indicate if the 
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mean values for the moderate and low- precision treatments are statistically 
distinguishable from the mean value for the unmanned, high- selectivity 
treatment. Respondents in this treatment group preferred higher levels of 
compensation. These differences in means are not large— the mean value 
for the high- precision treatment is $30,000, while that for the other two 
treatments falls between $25,000 and $30,000— but they are statistically 
significant. Recall as well that respondents were “anchored” at a value of 
$20,000. This anchoring likely pulled many respondents’ choices in the 
direction of this value, as it was the modal choice for respondents in all 
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three treatments. The general support for this level of compensation, and 
the interest in paying more to victims of precise attacks, is itself an impor-
tant finding. The United States has typically paid less to civilian victims 
of negligence— around $2,500— than the $20,000 anchor point that re-
spondents gravitated toward. This suggests a general aversion to attacks on 
civilians and a feeling that they are a serious injustice against the victims.
There were no discernible differences between the treatments in the 
importance attached to issuing an apology. This is surprising; one might 
expect that those more willing to offer compensation would also be more 
willing to offer an apology. One possible explanation is that respondents 
viewed an apology as “cheap talk” and were willing to support an apology 
but not willing to support large payments to victims’ families, which im-
pose a monetary cost on the government and also might suggest a greater 
degree of culpability than verbal apology alone. It is also possible that re-
spondents wanted to show sympathy for the victims of attacks, but with-
out admitting to fault or misconduct by the American military. Payments 
to civilian victims are often given with the caveat that they are meant to 
express sympathy or condolence without being an admission of guilt.19 
The third measure, satisfaction change, is calculated by subtracting each 
respondent’s level of satisfaction after learning the outcome of the attack 
from his or her response to the identical question asked before learning the 
outcome. One would anticipate that respondents primed to expect no ci-
vilian casualties would exhibit a negative value for this variable. This is the 
case, and these changes are significantly different from satisfaction change 
in the other two treatments.
Table 6.2 also reports mean differences for the remaining three vari-
ables, which serve as checks on how effective the information provided to 
respondents was in influencing their attitudes. Respondents assigned to 
the unmanned, high- selectivity treatment should be more willing to sup-
port the attack plan presented to them, since there is no risk to military 
personnel and little risk to civilians. These respondents should also provide 
lower estimates of the likelihood of civilian casualties and exhibit more 
surprise when informed that such casualties resulted from the attack. All 
three of these expectations are borne out in the data. This suggests that the 
treatments were effective in shaping the ways respondents thought about 
the value and consequences of the attacks. As important, it is experimental 
support for the supposition that the drone technology shapes individuals’ 
assessments of its desirability and likely consequences.
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The bottom panel of table 6.2 compares the high- selectivity, manned 
treatment with the moderate- and low-selectivity treatments. The mean 
values for the three manipulation checks are nearly identical to those for 
the unmanned selectivity treatment, suggesting that the experimental con-
ditions produced similar reference points for respondents in both treat-
ment groups. The fact that respondents in the high- selectivity, manned 
treatment experience statistically significant declines in their satisfaction 
with the attack plan after learning that it produced civilian casualties in-
dicates that they also experience regret over civilian casualties. Compared 
to the moderate- and low- selectivity treatments, respondents in the high- 
selectivity, manned treatment were more willing to offer an apology but 
not willing to pay more compensation. This is the opposite of the pattern 
we see in the top panel of table 6.2 and is consistent with the logic of our 
second expectation. Even the remote possibility of military casualties re-
duces respondents’ willingness to make costly payments to compensate for 
civilian casualties. Instead, they are now more willing to offer a less costly 
apology. This suggests that respondents in this condition continue to feel 
some regret for civilian casualties, but less than when the precision weapon 
is an unmanned platform.
Finally, we also compared the mean values of these variables for respon-
dents assigned to the unmanned and manned high- selectivity treatments.20 
This allows us to assess how the presence of an onboard crew influences 
respondents’ attitudes and preferences regarding high- selectivity attacks. 
This comparison is an important one because most of the aerial attacks 
carried out by the United States against militant targets meet our defini-
tion of selectivity, regardless of whether they are launched from drones or 
from strike aircraft. Respondents assigned to these two treatments did not 
differ systematically in their support for the attack plan, estimates of or 
surprise at civilian casualties, willingness to offer an apology, or surprise at 
the outcome. This is consistent with our findings across earlier chapters, 
as well as in other research, that the public perceives few differences be-
tween drone and air strikes.21 However, those assigned to the unmanned, 
high- selectivity treatment were more willing to support compensation 
payments to the families of killed civilians than were those in the manned, 
high- selectivity group. Recall that this comparison holds the likelihood 
of civilian harm constant across the two treatments, suggesting that some 
mechanism other than selectivity is driving this difference. One possibility 
is that respondents were willing to offer more compensation for a drone 
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strike because they believed that this platform was more likely to lead to 
civilian casualties. But the fact that estimates of such casualties across the 
two treatment groups did not differ significantly casts some doubt on this 
proposition. The key difference across these treatments is the presence of 
an onboard crew, which leads participants to support higher compensation 
payments.
Accidental Victims of War
The previous experiment indicates that disappointment regarding civil-
ian harm increases as expectations about its likelihood declines. From one 
perspective, the finding that civilian casualties substantially reduce sup-
port for the use of force is surprising. In their detailed study of the issue, 
Larson and Savych argue that the public attaches a high priority to avoid-
ing civilian harm when military force is employed, but the actual number 
of civilians killed or wounded by American military force seems to exert 
little influence on their attitudes. The reason is that many Americans have 
a high level of trust in the military, and believe that military leaders and 
planners routinely take considerable care to minimize the chance that ci-
vilians will be harmed when force is employed. This leads the public to 
view civilian casualties that result from the use of force as “unavoidable 
accidents of war.”22
The regular use of drones opens up new opportunities to minimize the 
chance of such accidents. Drones’ selectivity should reduce the chance of 
harm to civilians. For example, the Hellfire missiles fired from Predator 
and Reaper drones are laser- guided munitions that are far more accurate 
than “gravity” bombs. As important, drone operators are able to collect 
real- time intelligence on potential targets through video feeds and moni-
toring of cell phone, radio, and other communications, allowing attacks to 
be called off it they place civilians in danger. This sets drones apart from 
the manned aircraft and attack helicopters that can use the same muni-
tions but that cannot carefully screen potential targets prior to launching 
an attack to confirm that they are enemy combatants.
Attempts to avoid causing civilian casualties with more conventional, 
less selective weapons often fail because they cannot be targeted with great 
accuracy or because the intelligence used to select targets is obsolete by the 
time an attack is launched. The argument that the public views civilian ca-
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sualties as “unavoidable accidents” can be extended to cases where drones 
are available. The public should expect the military to take advantage of 
the selectivity of drones to launch attacks only when there is a high prob-
ability that civilian casualties will not occur. Rules and procedures about 
decisions to launch attacks should draw on the weapon’s ability to inte-
grate multiple sources of intelligence and to time attacks to minimize the 
possibility of killing noncombatants. When the abilities of such weapons 
to avoid civilian harm are not fully exploited, we can expect individuals to 
offer less support for the use of force.
Much of the controversy surrounding drone strikes centers on this is-
sue. Until early 2008, the United States only launched drone strikes when 
they thought they had reliable intelligence on the identity and location 
of high- profile terrorists. After this date, procedures were changed so that 
the targets of drone strikes could include rank- and- file insurgents instead 
of leaders and so that strikes could be made against groups of armed men 
whose location and behavior indicated they were likely to be insurgents 
even if their identities were not known. While such “signature strikes” were 
only meant to be authorized if there were no civilians near the target area, 
many critics argued that this stricture would be difficult to implement. 
Many people in the area of Pakistan where most drone strikes occurred, the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), including those unconnected 
to insurgent groups, possess arms and travel in groups for greater security.23 
This meant that members of local militias, criminal organizations, and 
others who did not target the United States and should thus be considered 
noncombatants under international humanitarian law, likely were targeted 
by drones. Finally, defining and identifying “civilians” is often difficult in 
counterinsurgency campaigns. Insurgents deliberately conceal their affilia-
tion with armed groups, by for example refusing to wear uniforms and by 
living and circulating among civilian populations.
According to their critics, signature strikes violate the norm of distinc-
tion.24 Distinction is a key element of just war theory that governs the 
use of force during hostilities.25 International humanitarian law, which is 
based in part on the ethical tradition of just war theory, governs the treat-
ment of combatants and noncombatants during hostilities, and has been 
codified in a series of key treaties including the 1907 Hague Conventions, 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and two Additional Protocols to these 
conventions adopted in 1977.26 The norm of distinction holds that com-
batants must always distinguish between military targets, such as enemy 
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military personnel, equipment, and structures, which may be targeted with 
lethal force, and noncombatants, who cannot be deliberately targeted un-
less they are directly participating in hostilities. Importantly, international 
humanitarian law requires that those who “plan or decide upon an attack 
shall . . . do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked 
are neither civilians nor civilian objects” and, if there is “doubt” about the 
status of a potential target, “that person shall be considered to be a civilian” 
until the attacker can acquire “additional information and if need be give 
orders for further reconnaissance.”
What we know about the practice of signature strikes from drones 
seems to violate these injunctions. Such strikes are carried out when there 
is uncertainty about the combatant status of the targets, while the failure 
to utilize drones’ capacity to loiter for long periods and to collect real- time 
intelligence appears to contradict the need to “do everything feasible” to 
determine the status of the target as well as to seek additional information 
before attacking.27 A reasonable extension of the logic of counterfactual 
thinking, then, is that individuals expect political and military authorities 
to exploit the opportunities that drones create for minimizing the risk to 
civilians when force is employed. Support for the use of force should de-
cline when the opportunities are forgone.
This expectation provides an opportunity to assess two additional con-
cerns about the experiment presented earlier in this chapter. First, while 
many individuals believe it is important to minimize potential harm to civil-
ians when using force, there is considerable evidence that much of the public 
is not well- informed about domestic and international politics.28 Some indi-
viduals may favor a policy of using force if it is implemented in a way consis-
tent with just war theory and international humanitarian law, but are unfa-
miliar with the standards and principles to apply, such as that of distinction. 
In such cases, telling people that a policy is consistent with international 
legal principles may influence their preferences in particular situations.
Individuals who lack specific knowledge about a particular policy often 
adopt the positions of elites who share their underlying political prefer-
ences or independent third parties who are seen as providing unbiased 
information.29 One study, for example, finds that members of the public 
are more likely to oppose policies when informed they violate interna-
tional law.30 Subsequent research has found that it is the precision with 
which international law defines an act as legal or illegal that matters, with 
the public more likely to oppose actions that international law clearly and 
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precisely identifies as illegal.31 If this is the case, providing individuals with 
credible information that an attack with drones violates international law 
should reduce support for the use of force compared to cases where such 
information is not provided.
Civilian protection is not the only concern of individuals, however. We 
might expect that some would be willing to accept a higher risk of civil-
ian casualties in cases where the group targeted with attack poses a greater 
threat to the United States. This differs from civilian victimization, which 
is the deliberate and intentional infliction of harm on civilians as a strategy 
of conflict. Instead, as discussed earlier, individuals balance the benefits 
from the use of force against the costs. The key benefit, of course, is weak-
ening the enemy; one of the costs is harm to civilians. It seems reasonable 
to expect, then, that attacks placing civilians at risk should receive more 
support if the target directly threatens the United States than if it does not.
Responses to Accidental Attacks: A Survey Experiment
We conducted a second survey experiment to assess this third expectation. 
As with the first experiment reported earlier in this chapter, respondents 
were over the age of eighteen, located in the United States, and recruited 
online. They answered questions about themselves and were then randomly 
assigned to read a hypothetical news story describing plans by the United 
States to launch drone strikes on suspected insurgent bases in Yemen. After 
reading the news stories, respondents were asked if they strongly approve, 
somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, or strongly disapprove of the 
planned drone strikes. (The appendix to this chapter includes the texts of 
the treatments, the survey instrument, information about assignment and 
demographic characteristics of the sample, and robustness checks using 
ordered logistic regression models.)
The news stories were the treatments in this experiment, and they sys-
tematically varied three elements. In half of the treatments, labeled “high 
distinction,” the attacks are described in terms consistent with the norm of 
distinction, stating that American authorities have the capacity to closely 
monitor the insurgent bases and are “confident” they can time their attacks 
to avoid civilian casualties. In the other half of the treatments, labeled “low 
distinction,” the vignettes state that despite attempts to monitor the insur-
gent bases, the attackers cannot be sure that all victims will be combatants. 
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The second factor is threat, operationalized as the degree to which the in-
surgents directly threaten the United States. Half of the treatments (“high 
threat”) describe the insurgents as having targeted the United States, while 
the other half (“low threat”) state that the insurgents plan to attack only 
targets in Yemen, an ally of the United States. The third factor concerns in-
ternational law. One- third of the treatments make no mention of the legal-
ity of the planned attacks. One- third state that the attacks “would violate 
international law.” The remaining vignettes state that the attacks “might” 
violate international law and that independent experts are divided on this 
question. This captures the precision dimension of international law, with 
the last group of treatments offering less precise information regarding the 
legality of the planned targeted killings.
After reading the news stories, respondents in the experiment were 
asked if they strongly opposed, somewhat opposed, somewhat supported, 
or strongly supported the attack plan. The least supportive response was 
assigned a score of 1 and the most supportive a score of 4. Figure 6.1 
summarizes responses in each of the twelve treatments. The bottom panel 
treatments vary the degree to which the attacks are consistent with the 
norm of distinction and the threat the target poses but make no mention 
of their legality. Comparing responses across these four treatments allows 
an assessment of the specific expectations that support will decline when 
the attack is less consistent with the norm of distinction and the threat to 
the United States is greater.
The data is consistent with these expectations. The values of this vari-
able are lower for the low- distinction treatment than the high- distinction 
treatment, and these differences are statistically significant. The same is the 
case for threat; support for the use of force is lower when the insurgent 
group targeted with drone strikes has not itself launched attacks against 
the United States. Interestingly, the effect of distinction is considerably 
larger than that of threat, and the difference between the low- threat, high- 
distinction and the high- threat, low- distinction treatments is statistically 
significant. Furthermore, these factors have an additive relationship to the 
dependent variable. Combining a low threat with low distinction leads to 
a larger decline in support than do either of these factors alone. The dif-
ferences between the low- threat, low- distinction and both the low- threat, 
high- distinction and the high- threat, low- distinction treatments are statis-
tically significant.
The remaining treatments in figure 6.1 assess the effect of international 
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legal commitments on support for drones. The treatments in the top panel 
of figure 6.1 are identical to those in the bottom panel discussed above, 
and also state that the drone strikes violate international law. Mean values 
for these treatments are all lower than for the corresponding treatments 
that make no mention of international law, and these differences are statis-
tically significant. This indicates that respondents are less likely to support 
attacks that clearly violate international law. Note that the effect of violat-
ing the norm of distinction is independent of the contribution of interna-
tional law. In other words, violating the norm of distinction alone reduces 
support for the use of force. Informing respondents that the attack violates 
international law also reduces support, but these effects are not contingent 
on each other. The final four treatments state that the attack may violate 
international law. There is a much less consistent pattern here. The pos-
sibility of violating the law leads to reductions in support in only two of 
the four comparisons. This suggests that the precision of international law 
is particularly important; respondents are more strongly persuaded when 
the legal violation is more precise.
Fig. 6.1. Distinction, threat, and law
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Looking across all of these differences, three patterns emerge. First, re-
spondents’ willingness to support an attack declines when it is less consis-
tent with the principle of distinction. Second, support also declines when 
the target poses a less direct threat to the United States. Importantly, the 
effect of distinction is larger than that of threat, indicating that respon-
dents are, on average, unwilling to abandon their concern with civilian 
protection when doing so might increase the security of the United States. 
Third, legal precision matters; treatments that clearly specify that an attack 
violates international law have lower levels of support than those that make 
no mention of international law, while less precision regarding the legality 
of the planned drone strikes do not produce consistent differences from 
similar treatments that do not mention international law.
Some might be encouraged by the finding that attacks described as 
clearly violating international law consistently have less support. It is im-
portant to note, however, that there is considerable controversy among 
real- world experts over the legality of targeted killings outside of war zones. 
Actual news stories that address this issue are more likely to describe at-
tacks as potentially inconsistent with international law and will thus more 
closely resemble the vignettes used here. This suggests that the practical 
effect of international law on attitudes may be small. Instead, attitudes are 
more predictably influenced by consistency with the underlying norm of 
distinction.
Conclusion
Drones are better- equipped to precisely hit their targets than other air-
craft, and they reduce the risk of harm to military personnel. These char-
acteristics lead some to worry that the development of these weapons will 
decrease the costs and risks involved in using force. If this is the case, it 
should operate with particular effect in democracies such as the United 
States. Elected leaders must worry that their decisions to use force can 
backfire against them, as unsuccessful missions or high levels of military 
casualties reduce their domestic political support. The fact that President 
Carter was not re- elected in 1980, for example, has been blamed in part on 
the failure of the mission he authorized to rescue American hostages being 
held in Iran.32 Presidents Johnson and George W. Bush saw their popular-
ity decline as military casualties mounted in the Vietnam and second Iraq 
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wars, respectively. The introduction of drones on a large scale, then, might 
make it politically easier for presidents to authorize the use of force, safe 
in the knowledge that drones are more likely to achieve their goals and less 
likely to lead to the death or capture of service members. If drones make 
war politically cheaper and easier, we might expect leaders to resort to force 
more often and more recklessly.
At the same time, though, drones also increase the capacity to avoid 
harming civilians. The ability to collect real- time intelligence and integrate 
it with other sources of information allows drones to accurately guide mu-
nitions to a well- defined target. This allows these platforms to be armed 
with smaller weapons that are less likely to create collateral damage. We 
have suggested that this development creates novel political constraints 
on the use of force. Individuals’ expectations adjust with technology; as 
weapons become more capable of avoiding harm to civilians, people expect 
their political and military leaders to utilize this capability and adjust their 
expectations regarding civilian casualties.
The first experiment in this chapter demonstrated that respondents 
primed to believe that weapons used in an attack are accurate express more 
disappointment and regret over civilian casualties than do those primed 
with information about less accurate weapons. This difference exists even 
though the outcome of the attacks is described in identical terms in both 
treatments; in other words, respondents in the experiment with high ex-
pectations for avoiding civilian harm are considerably more disappointed 
when this outcome fails to materialize. While drones increase support for 
the use of force by increasing the chance of a successful mission and re-
ducing the likelihood of military casualties, they also generate heightened 
concern about and sensitivity to civilian casualties. The development of 
drones, then, does not have a straightforward or linear effect on support 
for the use of force.
The second experiment extends this insight. It compares attack plans 
that do and do not fully exploit drones’ capacity for minimizing civilian 
casualties. The former treatment receives more support from respondents 
in the experiment, indicating that they expect planners to take available 
steps to avoid civilian harm. This difference increases when respondents 
are told that the attack would violate international law. This suggests that 
human rights campaigners and others who view drone strikes as violating 
international norms for the protection of civilians would be well- served to 
emphasize this point, as doing so may shift the terms of the debate about 
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development and use of such weapons. Furthermore, the difference in lev-
els of support between attacks that do and do not fully distinguish civil-
ians from combatants remain even when the threat to the United States 
is described as more direct. This suggests that the concern for civilians is 
not superficial, as respondents in the experiment remained opposed to less 
discriminate attacks in such treatments.
Finally, the first experiment found important differences between at-
tacks from manned aircraft and from unmanned aircraft. Concern about 
harm to civilians declined when the attack involved an aircraft with a pi-
lot, even though the insurgents were described as unable to attack this 
aircraft and the outcome in terms of civilian harm was identical to the un-
manned treatment. This indicates an important limitation on the findings 
of this chapter: worry about killing civilians appears to decline as the risk 
to American military personnel increases even modestly. One implication 
of this is that greater use of unmanned precision weapons in the future 
may heighten the political sensitivity of collateral damage. However, it also 
suggests that this effect could weaken if opponents of the United States 
themselves develop more selective weapons. If this provided them with the 
ability to more effectively target American military forces with harm, or 
to launch attacks on the territory of the United States, concern about the 




Democratic leaders are not free to make war whenever and however they 
choose. They respond in part to citizens’ wishes, or they risk the conse-
quences of a public backlash when enacting new policies or running for 
election. American citizens have played an important role in constraining 
executive power by protesting wars, refusing to fight them, and attempting 
to remove leaders from office.1 Citizens are equally important when giving 
a mandate for their leaders to wage wars without fear of electoral punish-
ment, or even rewarding violence with higher approval ratings. Existing 
research on public opinion during war helps to identify the causes for 
antiwar and prowar sentiments, but advancements in military technology 
and possible shifts in citizens’ values over time make it vital to continually 
reassess the influences on support for war. The twenty- first century has 
thus far been marked by a seemingly unending string of American con-
flicts, from major operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to smaller interven-
tions in Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, and Pakistan. These raise legitimate 
concerns that changes in the conduct of war or in civic engagement with 
military affairs could fundamentally alter the conditions under which poli-
ticians may initiate wars.
Drones stand at the forefront of the debate over whether wars are be-
coming dangerously risk- free for the United States. They are the latest 
phase of a revolution in military affairs that put greater emphasis on air 
power, increased selectivity, and on preventing harm to American soldiers.2 
Drones take the United States’ search for “useable weapons”3 that allow 
it to project power at relatively low cost to its most extreme conclusion 
by making it possible to launch strikes while keeping pilots so far away 
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from the battlefield that they are invulnerable from enemy fire. For the 
first time in history, a machine can act as a reliable proxy for a human sol-
dier or manned vehicle, rather than as a single- use weapon that detonates 
on impact. This raises legitimate fears of wars becoming so easy that the 
public— and maybe even soldiers themselves— will lose any sense of the 
costs of violence and become less restrained.
Drones’ selectivity is equally revolutionary. Although the United States 
has pursued precision warfare for decades and uses other weapons, such 
as laser- and GPS- guided munitions, to achieve accurate strikes,4 drones 
mark another step forward by making it possible to launch much quicker 
attacks using real- time surveillance. Greater selectivity provides the techni-
cal capacity for waging wars more effectively, but it also risks incentivizing 
war by making drone strikes seem like the ideal tool for killing opponents 
even when this is not essential to national security.
Thus far, the debate over whether drones create unique dangers that 
would make them morally questionable, or whether they are just another 
type of military hardware that will fit into established patterns of fight-
ing, has been primarily conducted in moral and legal terms. There is little 
empirical research to substantiate the claims offered by either side, espe-
cially when it comes to their predictions about how public opinion will 
change.5 To some extent, this framing is appropriate. It is impossible to test 
claims about issues like whether the extreme asymmetry of drone warfare 
is inherently immoral or whether drone strikes contravene martial virtues 
that militaries depend on for normative orientation. These types of issues 
are best approached with moral and legal analysis. However, many of the 
claims being made by those on both sides of the debate rely on empirical 
assumptions, and throughout the book we have sought to advance this 
debate by describing the most compelling versions of these arguments and 
testing them with survey experiments.
Perhaps the most common worry coming from critics is that drones will 
lower inhibitions against fighting and lead to a proliferation of violence. 
Those who support the use of drones contend that this fear is overstated 
and that drones are employed in much the same way as manned aircraft or 
cruise missiles. Our results show that both sides are partially right and par-
tially wrong: the availability of drones does sway public opinion, but not 
as much as many critics have said and with significant influence from other 
variables. Everything else being equal, the American public is more willing 
to fight a war with drones than with soldiers who are physically present on 
Conclusion  153
the battlefield. Attacks involving manned aircraft were also more popular 
than ground forces but less popular than drones.
This pattern of ranking the three options holds several important in-
sights. First, it shows that the American public is sensitive to military casu-
alties and that this influences attitudes toward military action. Politicians 
hoping to mobilize support for fighting could therefore benefit from not 
committing ground forces and employing drones instead. Second, because 
the pattern is consistent across missions designed to achieve different prin-
cipal policy objectives, our results suggest that the preference for drones 
will persist even as the strategic context and reasons for fighting change.
Determining whether the increased support for war substantiates 
claims that drones make it easier to fight raises the issue of their substan-
tive effects size that we have addressed throughout the book. Drones can 
be said to have a large or small substantive influence on support for war 
depending on one’s prior beliefs and what background literature is used to 
contextualize the findings. The effect of using drones is about as large as 
other factors that are known to influence attitudes toward war, such as the 
prospect of success or the likelihood of civilian casualties. These compa-
rable substantive effects demonstrate the importance of including drones 
in public opinion research that gauges attitudes toward war.
The substantive consequences of drone technology look much smaller 
when interpreted in light of fears that drones will dramatically lower the 
threshold for fighting, cause a rapid increase in American militancy, or un-
dermine democratic accountability. No single variable that we tested could 
be said to have such a strong effect on support for war— even drones. It 
is more accurate to say that drones can play a part in building the overall 
case for war, but that they lack the power to independently cause major 
shifts in American foreign policy or in the public’s ability to hold leaders 
responsible for how military force is used. For certain individuals, drones 
clearly lower inhibitions against using force, and it is possible to imagine a 
situation in which choosing drones over competing methods could tip the 
balance of public opinion when the electorate is sharply divided, or a situ-
ation in which drones could form part of a broader effort to build public 
support for fighting that includes manipulating other variables (such as 
framing a conflict in terms of counterterrorism or showing that there is a 
high likelihood of success). Those who defend drones would be wrong to 
argue that having these weapons platforms available makes no difference 
to the United States’ propensity to fight, yet they are correct in saying that 
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the degree of increased support is probably too low for drones to cause a 
major shift in the incidence of wars.
Public opinion does not directly influence policy, and leaders may to 
some extent ignore public opinion when declaring wars if they think they 
will be vindicated in the long run.6 The primary threat from low approval 
ratings is losing the next election,7 and this is generally a more distant 
concern that can in principle be countered by quickly achieving a good 
outcome, shifting the electorate’s attention onto other issues, or evading 
blame for the decision.8 Even at the lowest moments during the occupa-
tion of Iraq, President Bush was steadfast in asserting that his decision to 
invade the country would be vindicated in the long term by a successful 
outcome.9 It is easy to imagine other leaders embracing short- term risks 
in the same hope of being ultimately proven right. When applying our 
findings in practice, it is essential to be aware of the relative autonomy 
politicians have to make unpopular decisions and the electorate’s inability 
to directly control use of force decisions. This explains why states that have 
drones continue to rely on other means of attack in some instances, even 
when these are apt to be less popular. Politicians may simply decide that it 
is strategically and politically preferable to risk some small losses of support 
when prioritizing other goals.
It is also important to look at partisan identities when interpreting our 
results. We found in chapter 2 that while Republicans were more willing 
to endorse the use of force in general, members of both parties preferred 
attacks by drones to the use of ground troops. This contrasts with other 
findings about the polarization of support for American military interven-
tions over the past two decades.10 Support for drone strikes over ground 
troops exhibits fewer partisan differences. As we suggested in chapter 2, 
this may explain why President Obama, elected in 2008 on a platform 
that emphasized winding down the large- scale American troop presence in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, continued and even expanded his predecessor’s use 
of drone strikes against militants in Pakistan and elsewhere.
Our experiment involving principal policy objectives (PPOs) showed 
that members of the American public make prudential calculations when 
it comes to judging when and how to launch military interventions. Varia-
tions in the PPO led to significant divergences in enthusiasm for fighting 
regardless of the type of attack that was chosen. Counterterrorism was seen 
as being far more important than the other three PPOs that we tested, and 
it received more support than alternative PPOs regardless of the attack 
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method. Foreign policy restraint came next, followed by internal political 
change— a sign that respondents were less concerned about threats from 
conventional militaries and more inclined to stay out of conflicts that do 
not seem to pose an immediate threat to US national security. Humanitar-
ian interventions received the least support. When this is compared against 
previous research on PPOs,11 it seems that the preferences for certain PPOs 
over others changes over time based on the perceived salience of the PPO 
for the current national security context. Terrorism was clearly seen as the 
biggest threat, as it was easier to build a case for fighting terrorists than 
other enemies. As security priorities change, the relative attractiveness of 
the PPOs may do the same.
For some PPOs, drones were consistently more popular than attacks 
involving ground forces and air strikes, while air strikes were more popu-
lar than ground attacks. This produced a step pattern for each means of 
attack across the PPOs that suggests a consistent ranking of preferences, 
which further reinforces the sense of a public making reasoned calculations 
based on the costs and benefits of military action in each scenario. Thus, 
our findings not only support the “prudential public” thesis by replicating 
some previous findings of work on PPOs but also identify another dimen-
sion of the public’ strategic calculus. This demonstrates the importance of 
recognizing the public’s competence and ability to make decisions when 
it comes to foreign policy issues, and it indicates that any theory of public 
opinion will need to start by recognizing that the public is not always easily 
swayed by elites or who have no sense of what is at stake in America’s wars.
It is difficult to predict how successful drones are in actually achieving 
the objectives set out in the PPOs. Proponents of drone use contend that 
their ability to kill senior figures in terrorist organizations and militant 
groups with selective attacks will make them more effective than alterna-
tives, while their critics argue that drones create resentment that will inten-
sify hostilities and encourage enemies to deviate from the norms of war— 
especially by terrorizing civilians with constant surveillance. At present, we 
lack clear evidence to show which side is right, especially when drones have 
only been employed in the kinds of counterterrorism operations that are 
notoriously difficult to win regardless of how they are conducted. How-
ever, it is possible to test whether the public thinks that the chances of 
winning depend on how an attack is carried out.
Looking at the anticipated success of drone strikes compared to other 
attack types is vital for situating these weapons platforms in the context 
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of existing public opinion literature. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler have done 
some of the most influential and rigorous research on public support for 
war and find that anticipated success plays the decisive role in determining 
the overall level of support.12 If drones caused a major change in the pre-
dicted outcome of a conflict, then they could likewise cause a major shift in 
levels of support for fighting. We found that drones were not seen as being 
any more effective than air strikes or ground forces. The attack types were 
almost interchangeable when it came to predicted success, which means 
that drones will not have a strong influence on this variable that was so 
important in previous efforts to account for Americans’ evaluations of wars.
The concern over drones making war easier and thereby tempting the 
public into supporting more wars or treating war as a quick fix is un-
derstandable. After all, moral hazard is a well- documented phenomenon, 
and the underlying reasoning fits with the finding that choosing drones 
over other means of attack leads to an increased willingness to fight. This 
concept is also important for evaluating drones through the lens of just 
war theory. The principle of last resort requires that belligerents pursue all 
available means of peaceful conflict resolution before they fight. One rea-
son why moral hazard is threatening is that it would be immoral based on 
just war theory for a belligerent to rush into a war when promising alter-
natives exist. Our experiment testing the effects of moral hazard looked at 
whether drones would be more popular than other means of attack when 
military ventures were risky and nonviolent options were available. We 
found that in this context the effects of moral hazard did not appear and 
that respondents consistently wanted to take a nonviolent approach before 
resorting to drones or other weapons. This further indicates that support 
for drones, or for any types of military force for that matter, coheres with 
the principle of last resort and that public opinion will urge politicians to 
explore nonviolent means of conflict resolution when these are available.
Our experiments involving expectations of military casualties showed 
the extent to which pilot invulnerability alters attitudes toward prospective 
attacks, but these do not directly address the effects of increased precision. 
To evaluate this other defining characteristic of drones we looked more 
closely at how respondents felt about the civilian casualties that are sup-
posed to be reduced as weapons become more precise. The experiment 
involving counterfactual thinking showed that predictions about weapons 
being precise or imprecise prime responses to the attack outcomes. Those 
who read stories promising low numbers of civilian casualties reacted more 
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negatively to the results than those who were primed to expect high casual-
ties, even though both groups read the same story about the results of the 
attack. Here we see that the American public is sensitive to foreign civilian 
losses and that overall judgments about the permissibility of attacks will be 
framed with these in mind.
The experiment comparing high- and low- distinction attacks provided 
additional support for this finding. In that case we found that respondents 
were less supportive of drone strikes when there was a higher likelihood 
of harming innocent people and that this had a greater influence on their 
judgments than the level of threat posed by the target. Even more im-
portantly, that experiment showed that concern over civilian welfare was 
higher when there was no risk to American soldiers. One upside of using 
drones and eliminating the risk to soldiers is therefore that the public will 
give more attention to civilian suffering and formulate judgments about 
attacks with that in mind.
Policy Implications
Even though the increased support for military operations involving drones 
compared to those involving ground forces likely has a modest influence 
on building enthusiasm for fighting, the prospect of drones increasing ag-
gression is a potential danger that should be taken seriously. One response 
to this would be to impose stricter regulations that can restrain aggression. 
Buchanan and Keohane propose an international drone regulatory regime 
to “enhance accountability through transparency and publicity and, in 
countries where this is feasible, to mobilize domestic constituencies to sup-
port compliance with the regime.”13 According to this proposal, states that 
use drones would create their own supervisory agencies. Each state would 
likewise monitor the others to ensure that drones were used in accordance 
with the established provisions, and in particular that prospective strikes 
were discussed and agreed on before being launched. In the event that at-
tacks have to be carried out quickly, Buchanan and Keohane say that states 
would need to follow procedures for gaining post facto authorization. This 
concession to practical necessities would allow states to protect vital na-
tional security interests while still promoting transparency by forcing states 
to explain the rationale for attacks and publicize the outcomes.
Other commentators likewise advocate more regulation and oversight 
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of drone strikes, though usually without going into as much detail about 
how these would work. For example, Boyle argues that the United Nations 
should form an investigatory body to monitor drone use and sales.14 This 
would lack the power of the regulatory regime Buchanan and Keohane 
advance, but might be a more realistic proposal and would certainly help 
to generate greater attention to drones from the international community. 
At the very least, such a body could call attention to when drones are being 
misused and attempt to mobilize international public opinion against the 
offending belligerent.
One point of agreement between the various regulatory proposals is 
that the United States needs to take a leading role in implementation. 
They contend that it must act quickly while it is in a position of strength— 
because it will soon lose its monopoly over drones and the leverage that 
goes along with that special status. In other words, they argue that it is in 
the United States’ long- term interest to introduce some regulatory frame-
work for drones and that failure to do this in the near future could reduce 
the chances of ever developing effective regulations. The question now is 
whether the United States would actually support regulating drone strikes 
at this time. Our experiments did not inquire into respondents’ feelings 
about regulation, yet our results do shed some light on Americans’ atti-
tudes toward drones. The greater popularity of drones compared to ground 
forces and aircraft indicates that Americans see these weapons platforms 
as being attractive, which casts doubt on whether they would want to re-
linquish the ability to employ drones unilaterally and without seeking ap-
proval. Respondents’ low confidence in international organizations, aside 
from NATO, is further reason to doubt that the American public would 
support a regulatory regime grounded in some international body.
Whether an increase in the public’s willingness to assent to wars is a 
good or a bad outcome is a matter of debate. For pacifists, anything that 
facilitates war, even slightly, is dangerous and objectionable. Many com-
mentators who criticize drones likewise imply that any increased freedom 
to initiate wars is a bad outcome. As we pointed out in chapter 3, Beau-
champ and Savulescu raise the possibility that drones could make it easier 
to initiate benevolent humanitarian interventions in which the intervener 
may be unwilling to provide assistance unless it can be done cheaply.15 
From this perspective, drones could make atrocity prevention more politi-
cally palatable to the American public. Along the same lines, many com-
mentators who decry the public’s casualty aversion or America’s ability to 
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credibly deter rivals when so many citizens oppose fighting may welcome 
drones. From their perspective, drones may have strategic benefits, such as 
their ability to maintain a balance of power or to punish rogue states, that 
might help to maintain security by preventing the outbreak of large wars.
New regulations may also be adopted unilaterally by the United States 
with the goal of promoting accountability to the American public. One 
of the most urgent concerns is that drones have been used to kill Ameri-
can citizens without trial. The killing of Anwar al Awlaki marked a criti-
cal turning point in the history of drone warfare. He was not the first 
American killed by a drone— that distinction belongs to Kemal Darwish, 
a suspected al Qaeda recruiter who was inadvertently killed in Yemen in 
2002— but he was the first American citizen to be targeted. The attack 
against al Awlaki, which came on September 30, 2011, while he was living 
in Yemen, marked an important shift in the War on Terror.16 Selecting him 
for attack set a precedent of treating American citizens involved in terror-
ism as legitimate targets for extrajudicial killings.
Samir Khan, the editor of al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine and an Ameri-
can citizen, was killed alongside al Awlaki, though he was reportedly not 
the target. Al Awlaki’s son Abdulrahman was killed two weeks later dur-
ing a strike that Obama administration officials said was directed against 
Ibrahim ad- Banna, a senior al Qaeda commander from Egypt. Four more 
Americans were killed over the following years: Jude Kenan Mohammad, 
Ahmed Farouq, and Adam Gadahn each had links to al Qaeda. Warren 
Weinstein, a 73- year- old US Agency for International Development con-
tractor, was killed inadvertently when he was being held hostage.
The Justice Department ruled that targeting American citizens like al 
Awlaki without a trial is legitimate because their involvement in terrorist 
plots constitutes a threat to national security. However, critics have argued 
that extrajudicial attacks violate Americans’ right to due process, especially 
when they take place in areas where the United States was not actively 
waging wars, as was the case in Yemen.17 An urgent concern for bringing 
greater normative clarity to the strikes against Americans is establishing 
clearer guidelines about when the norms relating to war pertain and when 
the much different norms relating to law enforcement pertain. Through-
out the War on Terror the US government has shifted opportunistically 
between employing war and law enforcement paradigms, causing confu-
sion about how to evaluate drone strikes.18
Another important issue when it comes to promoting the responsible 
160  Drones and Support for the Use of Force
use of drones is ensuring that citizens and legislators have the information 
they need to make prudential calculations. Unfortunately, this information 
is often unavailable, especially with covert strikes carried out by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). 
Reports on the drone program suggest that these organizations are much 
less open about when and how their drones are employed than is the US 
Air Force.19 The Obama administration took some steps toward increasing 
transparency by transferring control of drone operations away from the 
Central Intelligence Agency to the military, yet this has led to more opera-
tions being carried out by JSOC without any discernible improvements in 
terms of public oversight.20 For citizens to make the kinds of use of force 
decisions we have discussed throughout the book, it is vital for the govern-
ment to provide citizens with more information about prospective attack 
plans as well as to give more accurate reports about the consequences of 
attacks so these can be weighed in future decisions. Increasing the informa-
tion available about drone strikes may be the easiest route to restricting the 
use of drones, as this would make it possible to activate public opinion as 
a more effective constraint.
Our experiments not only hold lessons for policymakers who are at-
tempting to manage public opinion as they employ military force but 
also for those opponents of drone warfare that hope to build a consensus 
against them. Arguments against drones that are rooted in the logic of 
moral hazard would be difficult to substantiate empirically. Arguing that 
drones might increase support for fighting might also not be an effec-
tive argument because of the public’s preference for not placing American 
military personnel at risk. Anti- drone activists’ efforts would be best served 
by emphasizing the extent to which promises of low civilian casualties are 
not borne out in practice and by challenging the lack of transparency sur-
rounding these casualties. These approaches provide a better opportunity 
for provoking outrage.
One of the core lessons for proponents and opponents of drones alike 
is the importance of transparency about drones and how they are used. In 
each experiment we imagine the choice to use drones as a fairly straightfor-
ward selection between several competing options in which respondents 
had a clear sense of what the objectives were and even some clues about 
the possible outcome of attacking. Citizens are never given such a clear 
choice about how and when to fight, but the experiments do mirror the 
way politicians and journalists discuss various attack options when debat-
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ing whether to launch an attack. The ongoing discussion about how to 
respond to the war in Syria provides ample evidence of this. Proponents of 
intervention have unveiled dozens of different plans for resolving the con-
flict with a minimal loss of American lives, and these options have gravi-
tated toward deploying a small contingent of American forces, attacking 
with manned aircraft, attacking with drones, or relying on a combination 
of these attack types.
Our experiments show that the public is prudent in its judgment about 
when wars are justified and what means of attack to employ when they 
have a fairly clear menu of options, yet our experiments assume that the 
public has all the relevant information to make informed decisions about 
initiating violence. Unfortunately, we cannot assume that this level of 
openness will exist in practice. The United States government has been 
reticent about revealing the number of drone strikes it launches or giving 
casualty estimates.21 The lack of transparency interferes with the public’s 
ability to monitor the effects of drone warfare and to make informed deci-
sions between the policy choices available.
Clearer civilian casualty estimates would impose constraints on how 
politicians actually use drones by offering evidence that can inform judg-
ments of whether promises of low civilian casualty rates are being met. 
Most independent estimates of the civilian casualties resulting from Amer-
ican drone strikes put these figures at less than a thousand throughout 
the Obama and Bush administrations. Any amount of civilian suffering is 
tragic and regrettable, but these numbers are much lower than those asso-
ciated with major ground combat operations, as evidenced by the casualty 
figures from Afghanistan and Iraq. Drones may even inflict fewer civilian 
casualties per attack than special operations forces and cruise missiles.22 
But senior figures in the Obama administration, including the president 
himself, as well as other high- ranking figures in Congress, the military, and 
intelligence services, made lofty promises about drones only killing a few 
civilians.23 Our results suggest that most Americans would be inclined to 
support drone strikes against terrorists, but that hiding the civilian costs 
of attacks is setting them up for much greater disappointment than if 
these costs had been acknowledged at the outset. That is to say, misleading 
promises of perfect precision could be counterproductive simply because 
these are misleading. Our counterfactual experiment demonstrates that 
more honest and realistic predictions about attack outcomes will be a more 
enduring strategy for maintaining public support.
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Another implication when it comes to changing how the United 
States conducts wars is that respondents supported giving relatively large 
amounts of financial compensation to civilian victims. This is evidence 
that there is not only concern for civilian welfare but also a fairly wide-
spread desire to repair harms inflicted on the innocent. These amounts 
were influenced by anchoring the value at $20,000, rather than at the 
$2,500 limit on payment amounts that was imposed throughout the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet respondents were willing to go even higher 
than this and therefore showed that they genuinely wanted to help victims 
of misdirected violence. This suggests that the American public would be 
receptive to the higher levels of compensation that some critics of the exist-
ing compensatory payments have called for.24
Looking beyond payment specifically, the conjoint experiment in chap-
ter 2 and the experiments we discussed in chapter 6 show that the Ameri-
can public has a complicated relationship with international organizations 
and the norms that are supposed to inform the conduct of wars. The con-
joint experiment in chapter 2 found that Americans were less likely to 
support attacks when they were opposed by NATO and that they were 
also less likely to support attacks when the United Nations Security Coun-
cil or human rights nongovernmental organizations expressed an opinion 
toward them, regardless of whether the opinion was positive or negative. 
This level of mistrust for international organizations, except for NATO, 
seems to indicates that Americans wish to act unilaterally. However, the 
experiments in chapter 6 showed that Americans respect the principle of 
distinction and that they were concerned about whether the attacks they 
authorized were in accordance with international law. From this we can 
surmise that Americans respect international norms even though they are 
suspicious of the organizations that are charged with upholding them.
The Future of Drone Innovation
Throughout the book we followed the common practice of using the term 
“drone” to refer to unmanned aerial vehicles like the Predator and Reaper, 
but really our experiments have focused on one of the many different types 
of weapons platforms that may be described as drones. UAVs are currently 
at the forefront of military innovation, but as we pointed out in the first 
chapter, armed forces around the world are creating dozens of drone vari-
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ants, including machines that can operate on land and at sea. Future re-
search will need to take up the challenge of gauging public opinion related 
to other types of drones, especially machines that operate in different ter-
rains or with less human control. It is impossible to reach definitive con-
clusions about these until the machines are capable of being deployed in 
combat, at which point they will enter into the calculations relating to the 
use of force. However, it is possible to extrapolate some predictions based 
on our study of public support for current- generation UAVs.
We expect future UAVs to fit into roughly the same patterns we have 
described throughout the book. The close parallels between support for 
piloted aircraft and UAVs across most experiments indicates that public 
support for their use only varies slightly, despite major technical differ-
ences. Future UAVs are likely to be faster and better protected from enemy 
fire and perhaps more capable of operating in conventional combat roles. 
But if such a radical step as removing pilots from the aircraft only produces 
a slight effect on public opinion, it seems unlikely that improvements to 
drone design will have much impact. Our results indicate that any pub-
lic opinion advantage drones may secure comes from pilot invulnerability 
and greater precision— characteristics that help to define drones as a class 
of weapons platforms and that will therefore persist across the many dif-
ferent models that may be introduced. So long as pilot invulnerability and 
selectivity remain the guiding themes of drone innovation, public opinion 
should continue along the patterns we have identified.
Most of the naval drones in development are designed for fleet security 
and other roles that would have them more removed from daily life for 
most civilians. Except for people employed in maritime industries, naval 
drones would be just as distant from public view as are UAVs. Those ma-
chines could also maintain a high degree of selectivity, or at least perceived 
selectivity, by operating away from populated areas where civilian casual-
ties are likely. For these reasons, we would expect limited public opposition 
to naval drones and also little risk they will alter the public’s calculations 
when it comes to initiating conflict.
We expect more variation in support when drones that would operate 
on land are introduced. These machines could appear to be more intimi-
dating than UAVs because of their proximity to civilians. Daily contact 
with ground- based drones would certainly have a profound effect on peo-
ple in contested areas where the machines would be used. However, their 
influence on public opinion within the United States will depend on how 
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the machines look from a distance. Those with animal and humanoid ap-
pearances may be anthropomorphized, which could produce a sense of loss 
when they are damaged or destroyed, but this is unlikely to match sensitiv-
ity to human losses. For this reason, ground- based drones will maintain 
the theme of pilot invulnerability and offer the same benefits as UAVs 
when it comes to protecting American soldiers. The larger question will 
be whether these machines will be perceived as instruments of precision 
warfare. This will depend on how the machines are armed, how they are 
framed by the media and government officials, when they are deployed, 
and, most importantly of all, the track record they establish in combat.
The pattern of increasing support for drones over ground forces shows 
the extent to which reducing the risks to military personnel can elevate 
approval for wars. Other means of attack that we have not tested prob-
ably fall along this same continuum, depending on the extent to which 
they put Americans at risk. Deploying regular infantry units is probably 
less popular than the elite ground forces we discussed in our experiments, 
while cruise missiles are apt to have approval ratings that are much closer 
to those of drones. Although each attack type may have a slightly different 
position along the continuum, we expect that drones show the furthest 
extent to which approval for war can be increased by removing military 
personnel from danger. Because drones guarantee complete pilot invulner-
ability, it is impossible for any weapons platform to make American sol-
diers safer and thus reap additional public opinion benefits of preventing 
harm to military personnel.
Each of our experiments tests the use of drones in military contexts. 
Even the counterterrorism and humanitarian PPOs we discussed in chap-
ter 4, which sit at the border between warfare and policing, were described 
in terms of an armed military intervention in a foreign country. One im-
portant question for future research will be determining what influences 
support for drones in domestic contexts. Since 2004 the United States 
Customs and Border Patrol has employed unarmed Predator B drones. 
These aircraft have been lent to law enforcement agencies within the 
United States, and many are attempting to acquire their own drones.25 
There has even been some speculation about arming drones with nonlethal 
weapons, though it seems unlikely that this possibility will be realized for 
some time.26
Drones in domestic law enforcement raise many unique concerns, such 
as whether these are consistent with privacy rights and whether they should 
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be armed. It is vital to gauge public opinion regarding these drones as they 
are introduced, especially when so many are dual- use machines that can be 
employed in international and domestic conflicts. Such drones highlight a 
contrast between war and law enforcement and a confusion of the respec-
tive normative and legal paradigms that has also been characteristic of the 
covert targeted killing missions drones have been involved in throughout 
the War on Terror.27 It will be important to see whether the public uses 
different criteria to evaluate drones in domestic settings, how comfortable 
they are with dual- use technologies, and whether drones could lead to 
more aggressive law enforcement tactics that mirror how drones have been 
used internationally.
Autonomous drones that are capable of selecting and engaging tar-
gets without direct human involvement present an especially important 
research challenge and are apt to generate a stronger reaction from the 
public than remotely piloted machines operating in new terrains or in 
different security contexts. Autonomous drones provide the same pilot in-
vulnerability and selectivity that is characteristic of UAVs, but they also 
allow artificial intelligence systems to make, or at least contribute to, the 
decision of whether to kill. Much of the debate over the implications of 
drone warfare is directed at autonomous drones specifically,28 and here 
there is a concerted effort to shape public opinion before these machines 
can be developed. Prominent scientists and inventors including Stephen 
Hawking, Steve Wozniak, and Elon Musk have spoken out against au-
tonomous drones, while organizations like the Future of Life Institute, the 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, and the International Committee for 
Robot Arms Control campaign raise public awareness about autonomous 
drones and urge politicians to ban them. Popular culture also supplies an 
endless stream of movies, videogames, and television shows about autono-
mous robots threatening their creators and even precipitating the collapse 
of human civilization.
Removing or weakening human control over the use of lethal force 
would mark a radical change in how drones operate and would require 
careful analysis of resulting shifts in public opinion. We avoided taking on 
autonomous drones in this book because these are largely speculative at the 
moment, and the general public lacks any experience with what effects they 
would have in practice. Some work has been done to see whether members 
of the public are able to determine which human actors are responsible 
for the use of autonomous drones,29 but more will have to be done to see 
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whether these machines disrupt the influences on public opinion we have 
described. Given the substantial opposition to autonomous drones already 
evident and countless popular narratives involving killer machines, we pre-
dict that decisions to create or deploy autonomous drones would generate 
considerable public outcry. Such machines would almost certainly be less 
popular than remotely operated drones and would therefore undercut any 
public opinion benefits that UAVs might yield. This would make reliance 
on these machines a risky venture for democratic leaders.
Drone Proliferation
Drones are spreading far beyond the United States. It is difficult to say 
precisely how many countries are developing UAVs, as such information 
is often carefully guarded. However, estimates suggest that as of 2012 at 
least 11 countries had developed UAVs that were capable of lethal at-
tacks.30 Aside from the United States, Israel and the United Kingdom are 
the only countries that have made extensive use of UAVs in combat. Israel 
used aerial drones at least as early as 1982, when they were sent over the 
Bekaa Valley as decoys during the Lebanese Civil War.31 Operations in the 
urban environments of Gaza and the West Bank prompted Israel to use 
drone surveillance as a means of acquiring targets that could be attacked by 
manned aircraft or ground forces. As in the United States, reconnaissance 
gave way to offensive missions, and drones were soon being used to locate 
and attack suspected terrorists. Between 2000 and 2014 Israel conducted 
around 270 targeted killings in the Palestinian territories, killing around 
455 people.32 Its IAI Heron and IAI Eitan UAVs are similar to the Ameri-
can Predators and Reapers and are used for the same kinds of missions to 
monitor and kill suspected terrorists, as well as for reconnaissance flights 
over neighboring states.33
British involvement with drones developed through joint operations 
with the United States. These began in Iraq, with the first reported attack 
by an RAF pilot taking place in 2004. In some instances American and 
British pilots have collaborated to attack specific targets. For example, two 
British citizens working with Islamic State in Syria were killed by a com-
bined team of American- and British- controlled Reaper drones in 2015.34 
The United States is reluctant to give armed drones to its other allies, but it 
has provided unarmed Predator drones and helped to train pilots for other 
Conclusion  167
NATO member states, thereby giving them some capacity for operating 
these machines independently. And soon foreign support may be unneces-
sary, as members of the European Union have begun collaborative work 
to produce their own UAVs that would not be dependent on American 
patronage.35
Our focus is on how the American public responds to drone warfare, yet 
our study can inform research on other states. First, it provides a method-
ological model for studying attitudes toward drones. Future cross- national 
research may be able to ascertain the extent to which our findings reflect 
uniquely American concerns or whether citizens in democracies evaluate 
drones according to similar criteria. Second, our results suggest some of 
the general mechanisms that may affect attitudes toward drones in other 
democratic states that employ these weapons platforms. This permits some 
tentative generalizations in the absence of in- depth studies of other coun-
tries that use drones. To draw these generalizations we must consider how 
attractive pilot invulnerability and precision will be in other countries, dif-
fering levels of support for military intervention in general, and whether 
there are prominent strategic challenges that can serve as credible principal 
policy objectives.
Many of the arguments raised against drones are described as general 
flaws that hold true when these weapons platforms are used by any democ-
racy. For example, Sauer and Schörnig contend that drones are attractive 
to democratic leaders because they make it possible to fight while minimiz-
ing financial, material, and human costs. They describe casualty aversion as 
“democracy- specific casualty- sensitivity” to indicate that this is a universal 
concern that holds true across states with this regime type and is not a 
unique feature of American politics.36 The appeal of increasing selectivity 
with the aim of reducing civilian casualties is likewise explained as follow-
ing from a general democratic appreciation of the value of life.
Horowitz and Fuhrmann offer a similar explanation of how regime 
type influences the decision to develop and use drones, though they show 
that the benefits are not unique to democracies.37 They find a U- curve with 
democracies and autocracies that are on opposing ends of the spectrum of 
public accountability both wanting to build their drone capacities. Mixed 
regimes, by contrast, see little benefit in unmanned systems. Although de-
mocracies and autocracies may share an interest in drones, their incentives 
differ. For autocracies, drones are a means of covertly repressing domestic 
populations and minimizing the regime’s dependence on military forces 
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that could potentially launch a coup. Drones facilitate secrecy and the cen-
tralization of power, which are key objectives of many autocratic leaders. 
It is important to note that these regimes may have more accountability 
constraints coming from foreign countries than they do from the domestic 
population because of their capacity to control the flow of information in-
ternally. For democracies, the benefit of drone warfare comes chiefly from 
the prospect of waging foreign wars with a lower risk of upsetting public 
opinion and suffering electoral reversals.
We expect that democracies armed with drones will find it easier to 
mobilize the public in favor of military interventions, but that the overall 
effect of drones will have to be situated alongside other explanatory vari-
ables and that drones will probably not have a decisive influence. There are 
variations in countries’ propensities for war. Some, like the United States, 
United Kingdom, Israel, and France, routinely fight small wars, while 
countries like Germany, Spain, and Japan tend to avoid international con-
flicts, despite having the ability to fight them. It is no accident that coun-
tries that fight more often and that have clearer threats have made larger 
investments in drone technology. The divergent attitudes seem to be rela-
tively stable over time, reflecting the same kinds of deeper attitudes toward 
war that we attempted to operationalize with our military assertiveness 
and party affiliation variables. These variables had a consistent influence 
on attitudes toward war among respondents in the United States and will 
probably have a similar effect on citizens of other countries.
We can reach a rough estimate of how citizens in other democracies 
would feel about drone use by looking at a country’s existing levels of sup-
port for conflicts. Opposition to war is apt to remain consistent regardless 
of whether drones are available. Those who offer conditional support for 
fighting may be swayed when drones lower the costs and raise expectations 
of precision. The presence of perceived threats comparable to the coun-
terterrorism PPOs in our experiments will also be a vital consideration, 
with countries lacking a clear threat being less likely to pursue drones and 
other attack types. With this in mind, we expect that the appeal of drones 
will not be consistent across democracies, as other authors have predicted. 
Rather, the public opinion benefits should be restricted to countries with 
more militant publics and more plausible threats.
Nondemocracies may also find drones attractive, but they do not have 
the same incentives for using them as a way of escaping the constraining 
effects of public opinion. Sauer and Schörnig predict that nondemocracies 
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are not as strongly affected by these considerations not only because their 
governments are not accountable to public opinion but also because they 
think that nondemocracies will generally show lower respect for human 
life. This seems implausible when Russia, China, and Iran are among the 
countries that seem to be most enthusiastic about developing their own 
drone forces. Sauer and Schörnig are correct in arguing that dictators may 
not have to worry as much about public opinion as elected officials do, but 
we agree with Horowitz and Fuhrmann’s contention that autocracies have 
other incentives for developing and using drones. In particular, they need 
military force that can be centralized under their control and used with 
limited international oversight. The different incentive structure means 
that predicting drone use by autocracies will require a different research 
approach that does not rely on gauging domestic opinion. It would be 
more instructive to consider how much these countries depend on main-
taining a good image internationally and the extent to which these leaders 
can entrust drone operations to reliable commanders.
Whatever their regime type, most countries will have more constraints 
on their use of drones than the United States will. Despite their long flight 
times, drones cannot operate at long ranges. They must be launched from 
bases that are relatively close to the target, especially if the attacker hopes 
to take advantage of their long loiter time. The United States has a substan-
tial advantage over other countries with its network of military outposts 
around the world. Existing drones are also poorly suited to combat against 
other conventional militaries because they are slow and do not have good 
defensive systems. Finally, drone technology is imperfect.38 The United 
States has lost control of aircraft and had dozens crash because of mechani-
cal faults. Other countries may lack the resources to use such unreliable 
aircraft. These kinds of structural constraints are apt to limit the extent to 
which countries can employ drones and act as an additional constraint to 
prevent them from causing an increase in the incidence of wars.
Of course, there is also the question of how people view drone opera-
tions that are carried out by allied and opposing regimes. Here the goal 
would not be to anticipate the influence of domestic opinion on policy 
choices but rather to see the interaction between drone warfare and for-
eign perceptions. Drones could potentially strengthen or weaken relations 
with allied and neutral states depending on whether foreign publics see 
drones as being legitimate. Drones could also be used to deflect some of 
the costs of military intervention in terms of international public opinion. 
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One plausible reason why nondemocracies are interested in drones is that 
they will help them more effectively manage international opinion. Again, 
more research is needed but will only become possible over time as we 
gain a stronger sense of how drones are proliferating and as civilian publics 
learn more about how these weapons platforms are being used.
When they are positioned in the broader literature on public opinion 
and war, our findings show the extent to which the concerns that were 
previously identified as shaping attitudes toward the use of force remain 
salient now that drones are disrupting many of the costs and benefits iden-
tified in existing studies. Much of this work predicts that some of the most 
important explanations for opinions about wars— such as casualty aver-
sion, mission objectives, and the number of civilian casualties— will be 
rendered largely irrelevant by these revolutionary weapons platforms. Our 
results reveal that many previous findings are still relevant and that drones 
have not influenced perceptions of conflicts enough to fundamentally alter 
public opinion. Instead, they show that drones (and potentially other new 
technologies that alter the costs of war) change the overall configuration of 
the factors shaping public opinion and that they are an important influ-
ence in their own right, but that the overall explanation cannot be reduced 
to a particular weapons system.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
TABLE A2.1. Conjoint Regression Results
Model 1 2 3 4
Sample All All Republicans Democrats
Dependent Variable: Choice Rating Choice Choice
Attack Type
(Baseline: drone strike)
Air strike −.014 −.012 −.052 .016
(.016) (.018) (.027) (.025)
Ground troops −.073*** −.043* −.101*** −.091**
(.017) (.018) (.028) (.028)
Civilian Casualties
(Baseline: low)
Moderate −.040* −.048 −.027 −.052
(.018) (.018)** (.033) (.027)
High −.159*** −.097*** −.089** −.201***
(.019) (.017) (.028) (.026)
Mission Success
(Baseline: low)
Moderate .122*** .075*** .156*** .103***
(.018) (.017) (.029) (.028)
High .183*** .117*** .254*** .158***
(.017) (.019) (.029) (.024)
International Opinion
(Baseline: NATO support)
NATO opposition −.082*** −.057* .091* −.098*
(.025) (.024) (.039) (.040)












Model 1 2 3 4
Sample All All Republicans Democrats
Dependent Variable: Choice Rating Choice Choice






















Stopping genocide .032 .005 .032 .001
(.018) (.017) (.025) (.030)
Foreign policy restraint −.109*** −.079*** −.136*** −.120***
(.019) (.017) (.028) (.032)
Target
(Baseline: low- level enemy forces)










Respondents 1,000 1,000 357 425
Observations 10,000 10,000 3,570 4,250
Note: * p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01. Robust standard errors clustered on respondent in parentheses 
below coefficients. Choice is variable indicating whether attack plan is preferred over alternative; rating 
is rating of attack plan on 7- point scale.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Treatments
Each respondent was asked to read the following mock news story, which 
includes three treatments about the type of attack (drone, air strike, ground 
troops) that are randomly assigned to respondents. The text of the mock 
news story is below, with the text of each condition in italics:
Terrorist Camps Identified in Yemen
United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington— Terrorists connected to al Qaeda have established 
bases and training camps in the country of Yemen in the Middle 
East. Political turmoil has prevented the government of Yemen from 
acting against the terrorists. Recently the Yemen branch of al Qaeda 
attempted to bomb an American airliner and to mail bombs to the 
United States.
American intelligence agencies have identified the location of the 
al Qaeda bases in Yemen.
[Treatment 1: The United States plans to launch attacks on these 
bases with missiles fired from unmanned drone aircraft to kill 
al Qaeda leaders and militants. The use of unmanned drones 
means that no American military personnel would be placed at 
risk.]
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[Treatment 2: The United States plans to launch attacks on these 
bases with bombs dropped from airplanes to kill al Qaeda lead-
ers and militants. The militants are believed to lack weapons 
capable of attacking these airplanes.]
[Treatment 3: The United States plans to strike the bases with 
American paratroopers. These American troops would attack 
the militants and their leaders located in the bases.]
Survey Instruments
After reading the condition described above, each respondent in both 
experiments answered the following questions:
On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that the United States should 
definitely not carry out the attack and 7 indicates that the United States 
definitely should carry out the attack, how would you rate this attack 
plan?






 □ 7: Definitely carry out attack
How likely do you think it is that this attack would be to result in the 
death of American military personnel?
 □ Extremely unlikely
 □ Very unlikely
 □ Somewhat unlikely
 □ Neither likely nor unlikely
 □ Somewhat likely
 □ Very likely
 □ Extremely likely
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How likely do you think it is that this attack would be to result in the 
death of civilians?
 □ Extremely unlikely
 □ Very unlikely
 □ Somewhat unlikely
 □ Neither likely nor unlikely
 □ Somewhat likely
 □ Very likely
 □ Extremely likely
How likely do you think it is that this attack would be to achieve its 
military objectives?
 □ Extremely unlikely
 □ Very unlikely
 □ Somewhat unlikely
 □ Neither likely nor unlikely
 □ Somewhat likely
 □ Very likely
 □ Extremely likely
Respondents recruited from Mturk then answered the following ques-
tions. Respondents from the YouGov panel had answered these questions 
earlier; their responses were provided by YouGov.
What year were you born?
What is your sex?
 □ Male
 □ Female
What racial or ethnic category best describes you?
 □ White/Caucasian




 □ Native American
 □ Middle Eastern
 □ Mixed
 □ Other
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
 □ No high school diploma
 □ High school graduate
 □ Some college
 □ 2- year college degree
 □ 4- year college degree
 □ Graduate school






 □ Domestic partnership
How would you describe your family’s total income for last year?
 □ Less than $10,000
 □ $10,000– $19,999
 □ $20,000– $29,999
 □ $30,000– $39,999
 □ $40,000– $49,999
 □ $50,000– $59,999
 □ $60,000– $69,999
 □ $70,000– $79,999
 □ $80,000– $89,999
 □ $90,000– $99,999
 □ $100,000– $119,999
 □ $120,000– $149,999
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 □ $150,000– $199,999
 □ $200,000– $249,999
 □ $250,000– $349,000
 □ $350,000 or more
How would you describe your political views?




 □ Very conservative
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a 
Democrat, an Independent, or something else?
 □ Strong Democrat
 □ Not very strong Democrat
 □ Lean Democrat
 □ Independent
 □ Lean Republican
 □ Not very strong Republican
 □ Strong Republican
How would you describe your religious beliefs?
 □ Protestant
 □ Roman Catholic
 □ Mormon







 □ Nothing in particular
 □ Something else
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Demographics
TABLE A3.1. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
 YouGov Mechanical Turk ANES
Age 48 33 38– 53
Income $50,000– $59,000 $50,000– $59,000 $60,000– $74,999
Ideology Moderate Liberal Moderate
Gender
Male 46 52 48
Female 54 48 52
Education
Less than a high school 
degree
6 1 2
High school degree 35 11 38
Some college/2 year degree 33 36 30
College degree/post- grad 26 52 29
Race and ethnicity
White or Caucasian 72 82 71
Black non- Hispanic 10 6 12
Latino or Hispanic 10 4 11
Other 16 8 6
Party identification
Democrat 35 52 46
Independent 29 26 14
Republican 25 21 39
Religion
Atheist or agnostic 12 38 13
Marital status
Married 51 43 48
Observations 1,000 1,205  
Note: Age, income, and ideology are median values; remaining variables are percentages. ANES is 
the American National Election Studies; data is from the 2012 survey reported in American National 
Election Studies, User’s Guide and Codebook for the ANES 2012 Time Series Study, the University of 
Michigan and Stanford University, May 28, 2015, available at http://electionstudies.org/studypages/
anes_timeseries_2012/anes_timeseries_2012_userguidecodebook.pdf
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Appendix to Chapter 4
Experimental Treatments
Treatment: Counterterrorism and Drone Strikes
Terrorist Camps Identified in Yemen
United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)— Terrorists connected to al Qaeda have established 
bases and training camps in the country of Yemen in the Middle 
East. Political turmoil has prevented the government of Yemen from 
acting against the terrorists. Recently the Yemen branch of al Qaeda 
attempted to bomb an American airliner and to mail bombs to the 
United States. American intelligence agencies have identified the 
location of the al Qaeda bases in Yemen. The United States plans 
to launch attacks on these bases with missiles fired from unmanned 
drone aircraft to kill al Qaeda leaders and militants. The use of un-
manned drones means that no American military personnel would be 
placed at risk.
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Treatment: Counterterrorism and Air Strikes
Terrorist Camps Identified in Yemen
United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)— Terrorists connected to al Qaeda have established 
bases and training camps in the country of Yemen in the Middle 
East. Political turmoil has prevented the government of Yemen from 
acting against the terrorists. Recently the Yemen branch of al Qaeda 
attempted to bomb an American airliner and to mail bombs to the 
United States. American intelligence agencies have identified the 
location of the al Qaeda bases in Yemen. The United States plans to 
launch attacks on these bases with bombs dropped from airplanes to 
kill al Qaeda leaders and militants. The militants are believed to lack 
weapons capable of attacking these airplanes.
Treatment: Counterterrorism and Ground Troops
Terrorist Camps Identified in Yemen
United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)— Terrorists connected to al Qaeda have established 
bases and training camps in the country of Yemen in the Middle 
East. Political turmoil has prevented the government of Yemen from 
acting against the terrorists. Recently the Yemen branch of al Qaeda 
attempted to bomb an American airliner and to mail bombs to the 
United States. American intelligence agencies have identified the loca-
tion of the al Qaeda bases in Yemen. The United States plans to strike 
the bases with American paratroopers. These American troops would 
attack the militants and their leaders located in the bases.
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Treatment: Foreign Policy Restraint and Drone Strikes
Yemen Threatens International Oil Supply
United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)— The country of Yemen has threatened to attack 
ships carrying oil from the Persian Gulf. Yemen’s location in the 
Middle East places its military’s missiles in range of oil tankers that 
transport petroleum to international markets. The threat has led to 
sharp increases in oil prices and uncertainty in world markets about 
the future supply of petroleum. American intelligence agencies have 
identified the location of the Yemen military bases that can attack 
the oil shipments. The United States plans to launch attacks on these 
bases with missiles fired from unmanned drone aircraft. The use of 
unmanned drones means that no American military personnel would 
be placed at risk.
Treatment: Foreign Policy Restraint and Air Strikes
Yemen Threatens International Oil Supply
United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)— The country of Yemen has threatened to attack 
ships carrying oil from the Persian Gulf. Yemen’s location in the 
Middle East places its military’s missiles in range of oil tankers that 
transport petroleum to international markets. The threat has led to 
sharp increases in oil prices and uncertainty in world markets about 
the future supply of petroleum. American intelligence agencies have 
identified the location of the Yemen military bases that can attack 
the oil shipments. The United States plans to launch attacks on these 
bases with bombs dropped from airplanes. The Yemen military forces 
at these bases are believed to lack weapons capable of attacking these 
airplanes.
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Treatment: Foreign Policy Restraint and Ground Troops
Yemen Threatens International Oil Supply
United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)— The country of Yemen has threatened to attack 
ships carrying oil from the Persian Gulf. Yemen’s location in the 
Middle East places its military’s missiles in range of oil tankers that 
transport petroleum to international markets. The threat has led to 
sharp increases in oil prices and uncertainty in world markets about 
the future supply of petroleum. American intelligence agencies have 
identified the location of the Yemen military bases that can attack 
the oil shipments. The United States plans to strike the bases with 
American paratroopers. These American troops would attack Yemeni 
military forces at the bases.
Treatment: Humanitarian Intervention and Drone Strikes
Government of Yemen Accused of Genocide
United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)— Military forces in the country of Yemen are 
committing atrocities. Members of minority ethnic groups as well as 
opponents of the country’s government are subject to mass killings, 
arrest, and torture. International human rights groups are calling 
these actions genocide and demand that the international community 
intervene. American intelligence agencies have identified the location 
of the Yemen military bases involved in the genocide. The United 
States plans to launch attacks on these bases with missiles fired from 
unmanned drone aircraft. The use of unmanned drones means that no 
American military personnel would be placed at risk.
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Treatment: Humanitarian Intervention and Air Strikes
Government of Yemen Accused of Genocide
United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)— Military forces in the country of Yemen are 
committing atrocities. Members of minority ethnic groups as well as 
opponents of the country’s government are subject to mass killings, 
arrest, and torture. International human rights groups are calling these 
actions genocide and demand that the international community in-
tervene. American intelligence agencies have identified the location of 
the Yemen military bases involved in the genocide. The United States 
plans to launch attacks on these bases with bombs dropped from 
airplanes. The Yemen military forces at these bases are believed to lack 
weapons capable of attacking these airplanes.
Treatment: Humanitarian Intervention and Ground Troops
Government of Yemen Accused of Genocide
United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)— Military forces in the country of Yemen are 
committing atrocities. Members of minority ethnic groups as well as 
opponents of the country’s government are subject to mass killings, 
arrest, and torture. International human rights groups are calling these 
actions genocide and demand that the international community in-
tervene. American intelligence agencies have identified the location of 
the Yemen military bases involved in the genocide. The United States 
plans to strike the bases with American paratroopers. These American 
troops would attack Yemeni military forces at the bases.
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Treatment: Internal Political Change and Drone Strikes
Government of Yemen May Collapse
United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)— The government of Yemen, an ally of the United 
States, is on the verge being overthrown. Rebel groups in the north 
of the country have defeated government forces in a series of battles 
and are approaching the capital. The government has appealed to 
the United States to provide military support. American intelligence 
agencies have identified the location of the rebel bases in Yemen. The 
United States plans to launch attacks on these bases with missiles fired 
from unmanned drone aircraft to kill rebel leaders and militants. The 
use of unmanned drones means that no American military personnel 
would be placed at risk.
Treatment: Internal Political Change and Air Strikes
Government of Yemen May Collapse
United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)— The government of Yemen, an ally of the United 
States, is on the verge being overthrown. Rebel groups in the north 
of the country have defeated government forces in a series of battles 
and are approaching the capital. The government has appealed to 
the United States to provide military support. American intelligence 
agencies have identified the location of the rebel bases in Yemen. 
The United States plans to launch attacks on these bases with bombs 
dropped from airplanes to kill rebel leaders and militants. The mili-
tants are believed to lack weapons capable of attacking these airplanes.
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Treatment: Internal Political Change and Ground Troops
Government of Yemen May Collapse
United States Considering Use of Military Force
Washington (AP)— The government of Yemen, an ally of the United 
States, is on the verge being overthrown. Rebel groups in the north 
of the country have defeated government forces in a series of battles 
and are approaching the capital. The government has appealed to 
the United States to provide military support. American intelligence 
agencies have identified the location of the rebel bases in Yemen. 
The United States plans to strike the bases with American paratroop-
ers. These American troops would attack the rebels and their leaders 
located in the bases.
Survey Instrument
How do you feel about this attack plan?
 □ I strongly approve of this attack plan. (1)
 □ I somewhat approve of this attack plan. (2)
 □ I somewhat disapprove of this attack plan. (3)
 □ I strongly disapprove of this attack plan. (4)
How likely is it that the attack plan will succeed?
 □ Very likely (1)
 □ Somewhat likely (2)
 □ Somewhat unlikely (3)
 □ Very unlikely (4)
What is your best guess of the number of American soldiers that would 
be killed or injured if the attack were carried out?
 □ None (1)
 □ Between 1 and 10 soldiers (2)
 □ Between 11 and 100 soldiers (3)
 □ More than 100 soldiers (4)
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The United States faces many challenges today, at home as well as 
overseas. Among these challenges, how important do you think it is to 
address the problems discussed in the news story you read earlier?
 □ Very important (1)
 □ Somewhat important (2)
 □ Neither important nor unimportant (3)
 □ Somewhat unimportant (4)
 □ Not very important (5)
Respondents then answered questions about their education level, age, 
income, ethnicity, gender, political ideology, and party identification; the 
survey items for these questions are identical to those used in the conve-
nience sample reported in chapter 3.
Demographics
TABLE A4.1. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
 PPO Experiment ANES






Less than a high school degree 0 2
High school degree 10 38
Some college/2 year degree 37 30
College degree/post- grad 52 29
Race and ethnicity
White or Caucasian 76 71
Black non- Hispanic 6 12






Observations 3,700  
Note: Age, income, and ideology are median values; remaining variables are percentages. ANES is 
the American National Election Studies; data is from the 2012 survey reported in American National 
Election Studies, User’s Guide and Codebook for the ANES 2012 Time Series Study, the University of 
Michigan and Stanford University, May 28, 2015, available at http://electionstudies.org/studypages/
anes_timeseries_2012/anes_timeseries_2012_userguidecodebook.pdf
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Treatments
Respondents first read the text below, which randomly varies the attack 
type and alternatives to military action:
U.S. Plans Attack on Insurgents in Iraq
Washington (AP)— U.S. intelligence agencies have identified the loca-
tion of an insurgent compound in Iraq. The insurgents are planning 
to attack Iraqi soldiers guarding a bridge over a wide river. If the in-
surgents capture the bridge, they could move their forces into position 
to threaten a major Iraqi city.
The U.S. is planning to attack the insurgents [drone strike treat-
ment: with guided missiles launched from drones— remotely piloted 
aircraft without an on- board crew / air strike treatment: with guided 
missiles launched from strike aircraft, each of which has an on- board 
crew of two officers / ground troops treatment: with a unit of American 
ground troops, who would approach the compound and fire guided 
missiles from about 25 yards away].
The Secretary of Defense has authorized the attack. He was 
overheard saying that this decision was an easy one because the 
alternatives to American intervention with [drone strike treatment: 
drone strikes / air strike treatment: air strikes / ground troops treat-
ment: ground troops], such as dropping weapons to the Iraqi troops 
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or airlifting more Iraqi troops to defend the bridge, were [bad options: 
unlikely / good options: likely] to work.
Survey Instrument
How do you feel about this attack plan by the United States?
 □ I strongly approve of this attack plan.
 □ I somewhat approve of this attack plan.
 □ I somewhat disapprove of this attack plan.
 □ I strongly disapprove of this attack plan.
Do you think it is a good idea or bad idea for the United States to carry 
out this attack plan?
 □ A very good idea
 □ A somewhat good idea
 □ A somewhat bad idea
 □ A very bad idea
Would you say that you favor or oppose the United States’ plan to launch 
this attack?
 □ I strongly favor this attack plan
 □ I somewhat favor this attack plan
 □ I somewhat oppose this attack plan
 □ I strongly oppose this attack plan
Based on the information in this news story, the Secretary of Defense 
thought his decision was a difficult one.
 □ True
 □ False
Based on the information in this news story, the alternatives to an Ameri-
can attack, such as dropping weapons to the Iraqi troops or airlifting 




Based on the information in this news story, how confident are you that 
the plan to attack the insurgent compound will be successful?
 □ Extremely confident
 □ Somewhat confident
 □ Not very confident
 □ I am confident it will NOT succeed
Regardless of whether you support the American attack, how many 
deaths would you expect the U.S. military to suffer in this operation?
 □ Zero deaths
 □ Between 1 and 10 deaths
 □ Between 11 and 50 deaths
 □ More than 50 deaths
Next we have some questions about your background.
What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have com-
pleted?
 □ No high school diploma
 □ High school diploma
 □ Some college, no bachelor’s degree
 □ Bachelor’s degree
 □ Graduate degree
What year were you born?
What racial or ethnic category best describes you?
 □ White/Caucasian




 □ Native American
 □ Pacific Islander
 □ Other or multiple categories
What is your sex?
 □ Male
 □ Female
How would you describe your political views?




 □ Very liberal
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a 




 □ Something else
(Asked if respondent identifies as Democrat) Would you call yourself a 
strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
 □ Strong Democrat
 □ Not very strong Democrat
(Asked if respondent identifies as Republican) Would you call yourself a 
strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?
 □ Strong Republican
 □ Not very strong Republican
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(Asked if respondent identifies as Independent) Do you think of yourself 
as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?
 □ Republican Party
 □ Democratic Party
 □ Just independent
Demographics
TABLE A5.1. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
 Moral Hazard Experiment ANES






Less than a high school degree 1 2
High school degree 10 38
Some college/2 year degree 34 30
College degree/post- grad 52 29
Race and ethnicity
White or Caucasian 71 71
Black non- Hispanic 11 12






Observations 1,241  
Note: Age, income, and ideology are median values; remaining variables are percentages. ANES is 
the American National Election Studies; data is from the 2012 survey reported in American National 
Election Studies, User’s Guide and Codebook for the ANES 2012 Time Series Study, the University of 
Michigan and Stanford University, May 28, 2015, available at http://electionstudies.org/studypages/
anes_timeseries_2012/anes_timeseries_2012_userguidecodebook.pdf
192
Appendix to Chapter 6
This appendix provides additional details about the two experiments dis-
cussed in chapter 6. These include the texts of the treatments for the ex-
periments, details regarding administration of the survey experiments and 
demographic information about the respondents, additional information 
regarding difference of means tests, and regression results.
Treatments for First Experiment
All Treatments: U.S. Military Plans Strike Against Insurgent 
Hideouts
Insurgents have established hideouts in the country of Pakistan. These 
insurgents have attacked American military forces based in neighboring 
Afghanistan.
American intelligence agencies have identified the location of the in-
surgents’ hideouts.
High selectivity/unmanned: The United States plans to launch 
attacks on these hideouts with missiles fired from unmanned 
“drone” aircraft. The use of unmanned drones means that no 
American military personnel would be placed at risk.
All other treatments: The United States plans to launch attacks on 
these hideouts with (high selectivity, manned: missiles fired/
moderate and low selectivity: bombs dropped) from airplanes. 
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The insurgents do not have weapons capable of attacking these 
airplanes. This means that no Americans would be placed at 
risk.
The insurgents’ hideouts are in farming villages near the houses of civil-
ians. These civilians have no connection to the insurgent group. It is pos-
sible that the drone strikes would accidentally kill civilians.
High selectivity, unmanned: But experts conclude the chance of 
killing civilians is very low. The drones are equipped with high- 
definition video cameras, so strikes can be launched when no 
civilians are nearby. The missiles fired by drones are small and ac-
curate enough to be aimed at specific room in the hideouts. This 
makes it less likely that civilians would be harmed. Recent drone 
strikes have resulted in very few civilian casualties. In 2012, for 
example, only 3 percent of those killed in drone strikes were 
civilians.
High selectivity, manned: But experts conclude the chance of 
killing civilians is very low. The airplanes are equipped with 
high- definition video cameras, so strikes can be launched when 
no civilians are nearby. The missiles are small and accurate 
enough to be aimed at specific rooms in the hideouts. This 
makes it less likely that civilians would be harmed. Recent mis-
sile strikes have resulted in very few civilian casualties. In 2012, 
for example, only 3 percent of those killed in drone strikes were 
civilians.
Moderate selectivity: Experts conclude the attacks could kill civil-
ians. The bombs might drift off course and miss their target. 
The pilots will not be able to see if civilians are near the target 
when they drop the bombs. Even if the bombs hit the hide-
outs, the explosions they create might injure nearby civilians. 
Past bomb attacks have killed civilians by accident. In 2012, 
for example, 35 percent of those killed in bomb attacks were 
civilians.
Low selectivity: Experts conclude the attacks could kill civilians. 
The bombs might drift off course and miss their target. The 
pilots will not be able to see if civilians are located near the target 
when they drop the bombs. Even if the bombs hit the hideouts, 
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the explosions they create might injure nearby civilians. Past 
bomb attacks have killed civilians by accident. In 2012, for 
example, fully 50 percent of those killed in bomb attacks were 
civilians.
Treatment for Second Experiment
High- Threat Treatments: U.S. Military Plans Strike Against Ter-
rorist Bases in Yemen
Washington— Insurgents have established bases in the coun-
try of Yemen. Political turmoil has prevented the government 
of Yemen from acting against this insurgent group. Recently 
the group has attempted to bomb an American airliner and to 
mail bombs to the United States.
Low- Threat Treatments: U.S. Military Plans Strike Against Ter-
rorist Bases in Yemen
Washington— Insurgents have established bases in the coun-
try of Yemen. Political turmoil has prevented the government 
of Yemen from acting against this insurgent group. Recently 
the group has attacked military and civilian targets in Yemen. 
Yemen is an important ally of United States, but the insurgents 
have not threatened or attacked the United States.
All Treatments: The United States plans to try to kill insurgents 
by launching attacks on the bases with missiles fired from 
unmanned drone aircraft. The use of unmanned drones means 
that no American military personnel would be placed at risk.
High- Distinction Treatments: American intelligence agencies 
have identified members of the insurgent group and the loca-
tion of their bases. Drones equipped with video cameras allow 
them to monitor the bases closely. They are confident they can 
launch missile strikes when the insurgents are at the bases and 
no civilians are nearby.
Low- Distinction Treatments: American intelligence agencies have 
located the insurgents’ bases, but have had difficulty identifying 
members of the insurgent group. Drones equipped with video 
cameras allow them to monitor the bases closely. They plan 
to launch drone strikes when people arrive at the bases who 
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appear to be insurgents, such as men of military age. American 
officials acknowledge that some of those killed might not be 
active members of the insurgent group.
Violates International Law Treatments: The drone strikes would 
violate international law. The United States has signed treaties 
that allow the use of deadly force only under certain circum-
stances. Most experts in international law conclude that the 
drone strikes would violate these treaties.
May Violate International Law Treatments: The drone strikes 
might violate international law. The United States has signed 
treaties that allow the use of deadly force only under certain cir-
cumstances. But experts do not agree if the drone strikes would 
violate these treaties, as there is much debate about what they 
really mean.
Survey Instrument for First Experiment
What is your gender?
 □ Female
 □ Male
What racial or ethnic group best describes you?
 □ White or Caucasian
 □ Black or African American
 □ Latino or Hispanic
 □ Asian
 □ Native American
 □ Other
What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have com-
pleted?
 □ No high school diploma
 □ High school diploma
 □ Some college, no bachelor’s degree
 □ Bachelor’s degree
 □ Graduate degree
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What year were you born?
Please pick the category of the income group that includes the income 
of all members of your family living with you in 2011 before taxes. This 
figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all 
other income.
 □ Less than $25,000
 □ $25,000 to $49,999
 □ $50,000 to $79,999
 □ $80,000 to $119,999
 □ $120,000 and above
Next are some questions to help us see how much information about 
politics gets out to the public. Please answer these questions on your 
own, without asking anyone or looking up the answers. Many people 
don’t know the answers to these questions, but we would be grateful if 
you would please answer every question, even if you are not sure what 
the right answer is.
Do you happen to know how many times an individual can be elected 
President of the United States under current laws?
 □ 1 time
 □ 2 times
 □ 3 times
 □ No limit





For how many years is a member of the United States House of Repre-
sentatives elected? That is, how many years are there in one full term of 
office for a U.S. House member?
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 □ 2 years
 □ 4 years
 □ 6 years
 □ 8 years
What percentage vote of the House and the Senate is needed to override 
a Presidential veto?
 □ A bare majority
 □ Two- thirds
 □ Three- fourths
 □ Ninety percent
According to federal law, if the president of the United States dies, is no 
longer willing or able to serve, or is removed from office by Congress, 
the vice president would become the president. If the vice president were 
unable or unwilling to serve, who would be eligible to become president 
next?
 □ The chief justice of the supreme court
 □ The secretary of state
 □ The speaker of the House of Representatives
Please indicate how confident you are in the US military:
 □ Very confident
 □ Somewhat confident
 □ Not very confident
 □ Not at all confident
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a 
Republican, an independent, or what?




 □ Strong Republican
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How would you describe your political views?




 □ Very liberal
Have you or has anyone in your household ever served in the US military 
or the military reserves?
 □ Yes
 □ No
All respondents answered the following questions after reading the treat-
ment:
How do you feel about this plan to attack insurgent bases?
 □ I strongly approve of this attack plan.
 □ I somewhat approve of this attack plan.
 □ I somewhat disapprove of this attack plan.
 □ I strongly disapprove of this attack plan.
If you had to choose, would you support this plan to attack insurgent 
bases?
 □ Yes, I would support this attack plan.
 □ No, I would not support this attack plan.
If this attack is carried out, do you think it will cause civilian casualties?
 □ Definitely
 □ Very Probably
 □ Probably
 □ Possibly
 □ Probably Not
 □ Very Probably Not
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Overall, taking into account the risks and benefits, how satisfied are you 
with this attack?
 □ Very satisfied
 □ Somewhat satisfied
 □ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
 □ Somewhat dissatisfied
 □ Very dissatisfied
According to the news story you read earlier, what percentage of those 
killed in similar attacks in 2012 were civilians?
 □ None
 □ 3 percent
 □ 35 percent
 □ 50 percent
 □ 85 percent
Respondents in all treatments then read the following statement:
The military carried out the attack described on the previous page. The 
attack did kill the leaders of the insurgent group. However, the strike also 
killed nearby civilians unconnected to the insurgent group.
Now that you know the results of the attack, please answer the final set of 
questions on the following page.
Overall, taking into account the risks and benefits, how satisfied are you 
with this attack?
 □ Very satisfied
 □ Somewhat satisfied
 □ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
 □ Somewhat dissatisfied
 □ Very dissatisfied
In past conflicts that have accidentally killed civilians, the United States 
has offered compensation to the victims’ families. How much compen-
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sation should it offer in this case to each civilian victim’s family? The 
average amount suggested by people like you is $20,000. Please select the 
amount you think should be offered from the drop- down menu.








 □ $40,000 or more
How surprised were you to learn that civilians were accidentally killed in 
this attack?
 □ Very surprised
 □ Somewhat surprised
 □ A little surprised
 □ Not very surprised
 □ Not at all surprised
How important do you think it is that the United States issue a public 
apology for accidentally killing civilians in this attack?
 □ Very important
 □ Important
 □ Moderately important
 □ Of little importance
 □ Not at all important





Survey Instrument for Second Experiment
Respondents answered the same questions used in the first experiment in 
this chapter measuring gender, ethnicity, education, income, age, military 
service, and attention to politics, confidence in the military, party identi-
fication, and political ideology.
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of twelve treatment groups 
and presented with the appropriate vignette. They then answered the fol-
lowing two questions:
How do you feel about this plan to attack insurgent bases?
 □ I strongly approve of this attack plan.
 □ I somewhat approve of this attack plan.
 □ I somewhat disapprove of this attack plan.
 □ I strongly disapprove of this attack plan.
If you had to choose, would you support this plan to attack insurgent 
bases?
 □ Yes, I would support this attack plan.
 □ No, I would not support this attack plan.
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Demographics
TABLE A6.1. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
 First Experiment Second Experiment Population
Gender
Male 62 69 49
Female 38 31 51
Education
Less than a high school 
degree
1 1 13
High school degree 13 9 30
Some college 41 46 29
4- year college degree 34 35 18
Graduate degree 11 9 10
Race and ethnicity
White or Caucasian 79 77 74
Black or African American 5 5 13
Latino or Hispanic 4 5
Asian 10 11 5
Native American 0 1 1
Other 2 2 16
Party identification
Strong Democrat 11 12 19
Democrat 35 35 32
Independent 39 39 11
Republican 11 11 25
Strong Republican 3 2 13
Observations 731 1,713  
Note: Data are percentages. Population is the United States; data from U.S. Census Bureau and 
American National Election Survey. Note that race and ethnicity sums to greater than 100 percent in 
the population column because respondents could choose more than one race.
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Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis for First Experiment
The use of difference of means tests to this point in the analysis may be 
problematic for two reasons. First, it assumes that the difference between 
the possible answer choices on ordinal scales reflect identical differences 
in the range of the respondent’s preferences. This might not be the case. 
Second, although the treatments are balanced in terms of the demographic 
characteristics of the respondents, it is possible that other individual- level 
characteristics are driving the results. To address these concerns, table 
A6.2 below reports the results of ordered logistic regression models for 
the dependent variables in the first experiment. The excluded category is 
the unmanned high- precision treatment, and the model includes dummy 
variables measuring assignment to the moderate- or low- precision treat-
ments. Respondents assigned to the manned, high- precision treatment are 
not included in the model. The dependent variable in the first model is 
the amount of compensation the respondent would be willing to have the 
United States government offer to the family of each civilian victim. This 
is a 9- point ordinal measure ranging in $5,000 increments from no com-
pensation to $40,000 or more in compensation. The dependent variable 
in the second model is the 5- point scale measuring the degree to which 
the respondent thinks it is important to offer an apology for the attack. 
In the third model, the dependent variable is the degree of satisfaction 
with the attack before the respondent learns that it resulted in civilian 
casualties minus the response to the same question after learning about 
civilian casualties. The results of all three models are similar to those from 
the difference of means analysis reported in the chapter. Assignment to 
the moderate- or low- precision treatment reduces compensation, com-
pared to the excluded treatment. Neither of these treatments influence 
the degree to which the respondent thinks it is important to issue an apol-
ogy. Assignment to the moderate- or low- precision treatment leads to a 
smaller amount of satisfaction change compared to those in the excluded 
treatment. Here few of the control variables are statistically significant, 
although confidence in the military reduces the amount of compensation 
the respondent supports and the importance attached to an apology. Table 
A6.3 reports results of the same models, but using the manned, precision 
treatment as the excluded category and not including respondents assigned 
to the unmanned, precision treatments. This means that the coefficients 
on the moderate- precision and low- precision variables estimate the differ-
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ence in the dependent variable between respondents assigned to either of 
these treatments and the excluded category. Consistent with the difference 
of means discussion in the chapter, we see that these differences are not 
significantly significant for compensation but that respondents assigned 
to the low- precision or moderate- precision treatments were more likely to 
approve of offering an apology for civilian casualties.
TABLE A6.2. Ordered Logistic Regression Results for First Experiment
Dependent Variable Compensation Apology Satisfaction Change
Moderate precision −.38* .20 1.66*
(.19) (.20) (.22)
Low precision −.39* .17 1.67*
(.20) (.20) (.22)
Confidence in military .30* −.43* −.03
(.11) (.11) (.11)
Partisanship .18* .16* .04
(.09) (.09) (.10)
Gender .32 .16 −.02
(.17) (.18) (.18)
Age .00 .01 .01
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Education −.09 .19* −.12
(.09) (.10) (.10)
Caucasian −.22 .07 .16
(.19) (.20) (.21)
Income −.20 −.01 −.06
(.07) (.07) (.07)
AIC 1,912 1,411 1,296
Note: Unmanned, high- precision is the excluded category. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05.
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Ordered Logistic Regression Analysis for Second Experiment
We also carried out regression analysis for the second experiment. Table 
A6.4 reports the results of two ordered logistic regression models that cor-
respond to the difference of means analysis summarized in the chapter. 
These models include only respondents in the four treatment groups that 
make no mention of international law. The dependent variable in both is 
the respondent’s answer to the four- point question about support for the 
use of force. Dummy variables were used to capture assignment to each 
condition, and the high- proportionality, high- distinction treatment is the 
excluded category. Control variables include confidence in the military, 
military experience, party identification, gender, age, education, race, and 
income.1
Regression analysis is particularly useful here because of the potentially 
confounding effect of confidence in the military. Larson and Savych hold 
that civilian casualties do not systematically influence attitudes toward the 
TABLE A6.3. Ordered Logistic Regression Results for First Experiment
Dependent Variable Compensation Apology Satisfaction Change
Moderate precision −.03 .41* 1.64*
(.19) (.20) (.22)
Low precision .03 .36 1.64*
(.19) (.21) (.23)
Confidence in military .25* −.11 .17
(.11) (.11) (.11)
Partisanship −.20* .19* .06
(.08) (.08) (.09)
Gender .32* .59* −.05
(.16) (.17) (.18)
Age −.00 −.00 .00
(.00) (.00) (.00)
Education −.13 .18 −.11
(.09) (.09) (.10)
Caucasian −.23 .16 .07
(.20) (.20) (.22)
Income −.03 .11 .01
(.07) (.07) (.07)
AIC 2,015 1,410 1,298
Observations 553 553 553
Note: Manned, high- precision is the excluded category. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05.
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use of force because most Americans believe that the military will take 
reasonable steps to avoid killing civilians.2 The treatment conditions used 
here directly measure some decisions that could be made to avoid civilian 
deaths. Proportionality measures the extent to which the degree of threat 
influences decisions to use force that might risk civilian casualties, while 
distinction captures how willing the respondent is to risk killing civilians 
in order to achieve a military objective.
Consistent with the findings reported in the chapter, assignment to a 
condition other than the baseline of high proportionality, high distinction 
results in statistically significant decreases in support for the use of force. 
Confidence in the military has a negative and significant influence on sup-
port, indicating that those with less confidence in the military are less 
likely to agree to the decision to launch attacks. Military experience, iden-
tification as a Republican, and income are associated with greater support 
for the use of force, and a more liberal political ideology reduces support 
for the use of force. Note as well that the inclusion of control variables does 
not result in substantial changes in the coefficients for the experimental 
treatments.
We used a similar approach to test the robustness of the difference of 
means reported in figure 6.1; these models are presented below in tables 
A6.5, A6.6, and A6.7. Table A6.5 uses respondents assigned to the same 
treatments summarized in the first panel of figure 6.1. The models dif-
fer in terms of the treatment groups that they include. Respondents in 
the first model include those assigned to the high- proportionality, high- 
distinction treatment that makes no mention of international law and the 
high- proportionality, high- distinction treatment which states that the at-
tacks violate international law. Respondents in subsequent models include 
those whose vignettes did and did not mention international law and the 
treatments described in the first row.
We created a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent 
read that the attack violates international law, and a value of zero other-
wise. This is the first independent variable listed in the table, and it tests 
if exposure to this information influences support for the attack. All the 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant, which is consistent 
with the difference of means reported in the chapter.
Tables A6.6 and A6.7 perform the same exercise for the center and 
lower panels of figure 6.1. In table A6.6, respondents read vignettes that 
made no mention of international law, or stated that the attacks might 
violate the law. In table A6.7, respondents read vignettes that stated that 
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the attack might violate international law, or that it would violate interna-
tional law. The dummy variable measuring assignment to these treatments 
is significant and negative for the same comparisons in which this was the 
case for the difference of means tests. In addition, the first model in table 
A6.7 suggests that definitively violating international law reduces support 
compared to treatments in which the attack is described as possibly violat-
ing the law when the degree of proportionality and distinction are both 
high.
Turning to the control variables, few of these have a consistent sta-
tistically significant relationship with the dependent variable across the 
models. The exception to this is again confidence in the military; in all the 
models, respondents with less confidence in the military were less likely to 
approve of the attack plan described in their assigned treatment.
TABLE A6.4. Ordered Logistic Regression Results for Distinction and Threat 
Treatments in Second Experiment
 Model 1 Model 2
Low threat, high distinction −.56* −.77*
(.22) (.23)
High threat, low distinction −1.26 −1.32*
(.23)* (.24)
Low threat, low distinction −1.59* −1.76*
(.23) (.24)


















Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p <. 05.
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TABLE A6.5. Effect of Violating International Law Compared to No Mention of International 






































Military experience .70* .07 .32 .56
(.31) (.30) (.48) (.30)
Partisanship .22 .35* .28* .16
(.12) (.11) (.13) (.12)
Gender .71* .51* .06 .15
(.25) (.24) (.26) (.25)
Age .02 −.01 .01 .01
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Education −.04 .15 .11 −.15
(.15) (.14) (.15) (.14)
Caucasian −.22 −.04 −.04 .04
(.25) (.27) (.26) (.26)
Income .01 .04 .30 .18
(.10) (.09) (.09) (.09)
AIC 671 676 607 669
Observations 282 290 276 290
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05.
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TABLE A6.6. Effect of May Violate International Law Compared to No Mention of 






































Military experience .66* .44* .21 .32
(.31) (.29) (.28) (.28)
Partisanship .20 .23* −.04 .15
(.12) (.11) (.13) (.13)
Gender .73* .25* .30 .07
(.25) (.25) (.25) (.25)
Age .02 .01 .02 .00
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Education −.06 .30* −.01 −.17
(.14) (.15) (.14) (.14)
Caucasian .08 −.16 .05 .53
(.27) (.29) (.27) (.27)
Income −.16 −.07 .09 .13
(.10) (.10) (.09) (.10)
AIC 631 660 630 645
Observations 275 286 287 295
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p <. 05.
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Military experience .35 .05 .27 −.44
(.29) (.30) (.30) (.30)
Partisanship .31* .21* .24 .12
(.13) (.12) (.13) (.13)
Gender .94* .07 .24 .40
(.26) (.25) (.26) (.25)
Age .02 −.01 .00 .00
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Education .00 .33 −.01 −.12
(.14) (.14) (.14) (.13)
Caucasian .05 −.21 −.05 .22
(.25) (.28) (.27) (.27)
Income .01 .01 −.01 .13
(.10) (.09) (.09) (.09)
AIC 639 640 616 685
Observations 275 276 289 299
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